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The purpose of this dissertation is to discover the relative place
and significance of empirical and rational factors in Hegel's philosophy
of religion. By the empirical is meant that element in a philosophical
view which is drawn from and based on the facts of human experience, past
or present; by the rational, that element which is derived from and found-
ed on reason. Experience is here defined as the manifold data of con-
sciousness viewed in their raw immediacy and unorganized particularity;
reason, as the thinking activity which seeks to establish universal and
necessary truth, either by criticizing, relating, systematizing, and in-
terpreting the data of consciousness, or by deduction independent of ex-
perience.^ The problem is then to determine to what extent Hegel's view
of religion is derived from and grounded in (1) a survey of the data of
the religious consciousness, present and past, or (2) the reflective ac-
tivity of thought; and to evaluate the significance of both factors in
relation to each other.
II. Other Investigations of the Problem
To the best of the writer's knowledge, no detailed research in this
specific problem has so far been attempted. Yet the problem is by no
means totally new, for various aspects of it have received wide and care-
1 It may be fairly questioned whether reason in the latter sense
is ever a reality. However, since it is thought by some critics to be
typical of Hegel, itt> possibility must be allowed pending investigation.
The study of the rational element in Hegel's philosophy of religion will
seek throughout to determine which use of reason is involved.

ful attention. Some of the resulting treatments are of marked importance,
and form a valuable, indeed an indispensable, "background for the present
inquiry,
A full century of research in Hegel's philosophy of religion has pro-
duced a "body of criticism and interpretation so extensive as to render in-
advisable any attempt in this dissertation to survey separately the work of
individual investigators, especially in view of the frequent recurrence of
some criticisms. Hegel's critics will therefore be grouped according to
the ideas which they represent. In order, however, that the survey may pre-
serve on the whole the chronological sequence of the investigations, it will
consider three main periods of research: (1) the period of early criticism
carried on by the first generation of Hegelians and their contemporaries,
dating roughly from the death of Hegel (1831) to the publication of Rosen-
krans's last relevant book (1870); (2) the dark decades of Hegelianism, dur-
ing which the philosophy was almost dead in Germany, though predominant in
Great Britain and active in Italy ( 18711-1904) ; and (3) the period of re-
birth, dating from the appearance of Dilthey's Die Jugendfteschichte Hegels
(1905) to the present time.
A. The Period of Early Criticism ( 1831-1870
)
2
1. Hegel's interpretation of religion was early characterized as one-
sidedly int ell ectualistic. Hegel, writes Noack, confuses the actual spir-
itual life with the notion or knowledge of this life; underestimating the
* It should be noted, however, that this division does not correspond
completely with the eclipse of Hegelianism. After enjoying almost complete
supremacy in Germany from 1820 to 1850, the Hegelian philosophy began to
lose its fascination about the middle of the century.
^ For the sake of smoothness and brevity in the text, the pertinent
works of the investigators are mentioned only in footnotes. All citations
of booka found in the bibliography use the abbreviations there listed.
When cited for the first time, the name and date of each book is given in
parentheses. For writings infrequently cited and therefore not in the bib-
liography, full data are given in footnotes.
3 Ludwig Noack, RBH ( Per Religionsbegriff Hegels . 1845), pp. 68-69.

importance of feeling, intuition, and will, he makes thought the genuine
ground of religion, thus identifying heing with thought.
1 Haym also holds
that Hegel depreciates the heart-content of religion by conceptualizing
it. At Hegel's hands the divine dissolves itself in reason and piety in
knowing. 2 Trendelenburg and Ullmann protest likewise against Hegel* s in-
tellectual ism.
3 Ulrici maintains that Hegel makes religion simply a tran-
sitional stage leading to philosophy, to which it is subordinate and in
4
which it must be transcended.
At this point Hegel has two defenders. Strauss, representing the
Hegelian left wing, contends that Hegel rightly elevates knowledge at the
expense of faith, thus showing the unstable mythical foundation of the
5
latter. Rosenkrans, representing the right, holds that Hegel by no means
eliminates feeling from religion, but simply protests against deriving re-
gligion in general from the feeling of dependence.
2. A second criticism advanced during this early period was that
Hegel forces the historical facts of religion to fit the scheme of his
notion. He distorts the historical, says Noack, by construing it in terms
of his logical dialectic. Hegel is right, says Weisse, in holding that
history, though it forms the necessary background of thought, lacks an
1 Noack, HBH, pp. 16-17, 32, 34,
2 Budolf Haym, HSZ ( Hegel und seine Zeit , 1857), pp. 414, 401.
' Adolf Trendelenburg, essay in the Neue Jenaische allgemeine
Literaturzeitung
.
Hos. 92-99; quoted in G. A. Gabler, Die Hegelsche
Philosophie (Berlin: A. Duncker, 1843), Bk. 1, p. 109. C. Ullmann, "Zur
Charakteristik der hollflndischen Theologie gegenuber der deutschen."
Theol . Stud , u. Krit . . 17 (1844), pp. 808-810.
4 Hermann Ulrici, HZur Beligionsphilosophie" (1853), pp. 240-243.
Cf. Haym, HSZ, p. 404, and later criticism, below, pp. 5-6, 10-11.
5 David Friedrich Strauss, Streitschriften (Tubingen, 1837), Heft 3;
cited by Pfleiderer, PBBH, II, p. 130.
6 Karl Bosenkranz, TTFHS (Krltische Erlftuterungen des Hegel schen
Systems
. 1840), p. 335; cf. also HDN (Hegel als deutscher National-
philosoph . 1870), p. 211.
7 Noack, BBH, pp. 40-48, 70-74.

immanent criterion of truth; Imt he erre in seeking truth only in pure
thought. 1 Haym approves Hegel*s procedure in passing from the notion of
religion to the specific religions, since this shows that the notion in
general must gain actuality in concrete historical development. Like-
wise, thinks Haym, Hegel maintained until the Jena period a dominant in-
terest in the historical pragmatism of Christianity. In his mature phi-
losophy, however, his metaphysical interest triumphs; in his philosophy
2
of religion only fragments of historical comprehension remain.
Bosenkrans and Stirling maintain that Hegel does not proceed in a
priori fashion, "but simply recognises the inahility of the merely hiator-
ical to give us truth and connection in religions. Hegel's primary con-
cern, thinks Stirling, is to give philosophical support to the truths of
religion,4 though Eschenmayer and Saintes find that Hegel *s logical sys-
tem perverts the Christian truths which it seeks to restore. 5 Baur finds
the essential merit of the Hegelian philosophy of religion in its media-
tion "between the subjective and objective aspects. 6 Strauss, concentrat-
ing on Hegel's Christology, holds that Hegel construes not the self-con-
sciousness of a Cod-man, but rather the consciousness of those who be-
1 Christian F. Weisse, "Strauss und Bruno Bauer" (1843), pp. 76-77.
2 Haym, HSZ, pp. 417, 48, 397-398, 420. Haym goes so far as to say
that Hegel* s philosophy of religion contains less of the historical sense
than any other branch of his philosophy.
3 Bosenkrans, HDN, p. 212. James Hutchison Stirling, SOH (The Se-
cret of Hegel . 1865, 1898), pp. 721, 730-732.
Stirling, SOH, p. 750; Stirling's annotated translation of Albert
Schwegler's Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edmonston,
1879), p. 437. Cf. von Hartmann and McTaggart, below, pp. 8-9.
B Eschenmayer, Die Hegel sche Bel igionsphl 1 os ophi e verglichen mlt dem
christlichen Principe (Tubingen, 1834), p. 160; quoted in Strauss . Hegel .
and Their Opinions (anon., no date or place, no pagination), p. 8. Amend
Saintes, Histolre Critique du Rational! sme en Allemagne (Paris: Jules
Benouard, 1841), pp. 325-326.
' Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die chrlstliche Gnosis Oder die christ-
liche Religions-Phil os ophi e in ihrer geschichtl ichen Entwlcklung (Tubing-
en: C. F. Osiander, 1835), pp. 714-715, 717; cf. p. 735.

lieved that a certain individual was the God-man.
3. From Hegel's identification of being with thought, holds Noack,
flows naturally also an underestimate of the significance of individual-
ity, the kernel of which is will. Treating the development of religion
as the development of God, Hegel smothers the individual religious con-
2
sciousness. J. H. Fichte and Weisse also charge that in Hegel the ab-
3
stract necessity of the notion destroys all free individuality. But
Rosenkranz maintains that such writers overlook the Hegelian principle
that only the result yields the full truth. The truth of finite spirits
4
is found only in their relation to the Absolute Spirit.
B. The Period of Obscurity (1871-1904)
Strangely enough, the years in which Hegel's star shone most dimly
witnessed a considerable amount of research in his philosophy of religion.
It is true that most of this occurred about the end of the century. Yet
even earlier there were loyal friends of Hegel who, while by no means ac-
cepting his philosophy in toto
.
recognized in him great insights and show-
ed their interest in sympathetic interpretation and criticism of his views.
Former criticisms were scrutinised and new ones advanced,
1* Hegel* s intellectual ism continued to draw fire.^ Though Hegel is
"im vollen Recht," says von Hartmann, in pointing out the lack in feeling
alone of any claim to truth-content, he is prevented by his one-sided in-
c
tellectualism from doing justice to feeling. Hegel's theory of religion,
* Davis Friedrich Strauss, Die christliche Glaubenslehre (1840f.),
II, pp. 218-219. For later criticisms see below, pp. 6-9, 12-13.
2 Noack, RBH, pp. 34, 43; cf. also pp. 22-23.
3 Cf. Rosenkranz, KEHS, p. 363.
* Rosenkranz, KEHS, pp. 363-364. For later criticisms of Hegel's
treatment of individuality, cf. below, pp. 9, 13.
5 Cf. the earlier criticisms of Noack, Haym, Ullmann, and Ulrici,
above, pp. 2-4; and later criticisms, below, pp. 10-12.
6 Eduard von Hartmann, "Mein Verhttltnis zu Hegel" (1888), p. 336;
EDG ( Die Religion des Gelstes . 1882), pp. 32-33.

holds Pfleiderer, accentuates the religious concept to the exclusion of
the emotional elements. He ignores experience by making the emotional
side of our spiritual nature a subordinate stage of the rational.
1 Bich-
ert and Ott maintain that Hegel also undervalues the moral aspects of re-
2
ligion. Bichert and Ott ascribe this suppression of the will to the ab-
3
sence in Hegel of any deep sense of sin or estrangement from God. Drews,
Lindsay, and Leighton contend that Hegel overlooks the significance of
4
"both feeling and volition.
But Hegel is again not without defenders. Mackenzie points out that
the essence of Hegel's doctrine lies in its insistence on the reality of
the concrete universal, which is found in feeling and action as well as in
5
thinking. Fickler cites passages in Hegel indicating that for him reli-
c
gion is far more than a logical process. Even Ott finds Hegel recognis-




2. As "before, Hegel is charged with treating the facts of history
arbitrarily. His dialectical method, says Ott, forces history out of its
1 Otto Pfleiderer, DT (The Development of Theology . 1887), pp. 73-74,
81; PHBH (The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of Its History . 1893), II,
pp. 91, 96.
2 Hans Richert, HBP ( Hegel s Beliglonsphilosophie . 1900), p. 54. Bnil
Ott, BPH ( Die Bellgionsphilosophie Hegels . 1904), pp. 10, 105-106.
3 Bichert, HBP, p. 50; Ott, BPH, p. 20. Jean Wahl takes precisely
the opposite view, holding that Hegel 1 s whole philosophy grows out of his
wunhappy ,, religious consciousness. Cf. below, p. 10.
* Arthur Drews, HBP ( Hegels Bellgionsphilosophie . 1905), pp. LXXVI,
462. James Lindsay, "Theistic Idealism" (1905), p. 90. J. A. Leighton,
MCG ( Typical Modern Conceptions of God . 1901), pp. 68-72.
5 J. S. Mackenzie, "The Hegelian Point of View" (1902), p. 70.
6 W. Fickler, "TJnter welchen philosophischen Voraussetzungen hat sich
bei Hegel die Wertschfltzung des Staates entwickelt und wie ist diese zu be-
urteilen?" Zeit . f. Phil , u. phil . Krit., 123 (1904), p. 21.
J
Ott, BPH, pp. 105, 99. Cf. above, p. 3, and below, pp. 11-12.




true proportion. Pfleiderer, McTaggart, and L eighton maintain that He-
gel's attempt to explain the historical advance of the religious con-
sciousness in terms of the logical dialectic of the notion must fail he-
cause of the number, variety, and complexity of the empirical factors
concerned. 2 Drews finds in Hegel* s emphasis on the doctrine of the Trin-
ity as central in Christianity, and in his treatment of the life of Jesus,
a vain effort to derive facts from the dialectic of the Idea without suf-
ficient regard for historical experience. 3 According to Seth (Pringle-
Pattison), Hegel makes no adequate provision for the transition from the
Idea per se. to the world of real difference.*
The most distinctive thing about the research of this period, how-
ever, is the emergence of a recognition that Hegel's results are based
5 A 7
on an empirical procedure. Adolf Lasson, von Hartmann, Seth, and
Ritchie8 all conclude that the content of Hegel's exposition has been
gained only through a profound study of the facts of religious history,
and only subsequently arranged deductively in the system of notions.
q
McTaggart and Leighton are in general agreement.
Such writers point out, however, that Hegel adds to his respect for
empirical study of historical religion the profound insight that it alone
is not enough.*^ He insists, says Vera, that such study must be supple-
1 Ott, RPH, p. 117.
2 Pfleiderer, PRBH, pp. 101-102. J. M. B. McTaggart, SHD (Studies
in the Hegelian Dialectic . 1896), pp. 236-258. Leighton, MCG, p. 68.
Drews, HBP, pp. 399-400, 466.
4 Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) , HP ( Hegel ianism and Personality .
1893), pp. 171-179; DKH ( The Development from Kant to Hegel . 1882), pp.
168-169.
5 Adolf Lasson, "fiber Gegenstand und Behandlungsart der Beligions-
philosophie." Phil . Monatsh .. 15 (1879), pp. 168-169.
6 von Hartmann, "Mein Vernaltnis zu Hegel," p. 317.
7 Andrew Seth, SP (Scottish Philosophy, 1885), p. 196.
8 David 0. Bitchie, "Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers,"
p. 12, n. 1; "Hegel's Early Studies a Correction f" p. 568.
9 McTaggart, SHD, p. 237. Leighton, MCG, pp. 43, 46.
10 Cf. Bosenkrans and Stirling, above, p. 4; and below, pp. 12-13.

-3
mented by a truly philosophical investigation which
demonstrates how all
religions proceed from one fundamental principle.
1 Werner, A. Lasson,
and Seth likewise stress Hegel's emphasis on the need of
going behind his-
torical facts to rational content.
2
It is precisely this disclosure that
religion can he both historical and rational, this treatment of the his-
tory of religion as a developing process which reason underlies a priori,
which constitutes in Pfleiderer's opinion "the imperishable achievement
of Hegel.
"
3 Yowinckel,4 Sterrett, 5 and Leighton6 also laud Hegel's recon-
ciliation of reason and history, Eichert, on the contrary, charges that
this reconciliation is not an actual one, since Hegel begins, without ad-
7
mitting it, by presupposing what is to be proved.
Those who find in Hegel an inductive approach do not always conmend
him for it. In Drews 1 opinion, though Hegel claims to proceed according
to the logical necessity of the notion, his construction is throughout de-
termined by his contingent knowledge of the history of religion. 8 Other
critics accuse Hegel of being too empirical. Because of an exaggerated
respect for the existent forms of religion, holds von Hartmann, Hegel makes
the mistake of regarding Christianity as the absolute religion, instead of
9
as merely a stage in the development of the human religious consciousness.
McTaggart, however, opposes the claim that Hegel seeks to provide the dog-
* A. Vera, Introduction to his French translation, Philosophie de
la Religion de Hegel . II, pp. CJJCIV, CXXV.
2 A. Lasson, Heview of Werner, HO (Hegel s Offenbarungsbegriff . 1887).
Phil . Monatsh . . 24 (1888), p. 354. Seth, DKH, pp. 158-164, 227-228.
3 Pfleiderer, PRBH, pp. 80, 82, 114.
* Ernst Vowinckel , EESH ( Religion und Religionen bei Schleiermacher
und Hegel
. 1896), pp. 56-57; cf. also pp. 44, 62.
5 James IffacBride Sterrett, HPR ( Studies in Hegel' s Philosophy of
Religion
. 1890), pp. 233-240.
6 Leighton, MCG, pp. 101-102.
7 Richert, HRP, p. 57.
| Drews, HBP, p. 409.
von Hartmann, "Mein Verhaltnis su Hegel," p. 325. Cf. below, pp.
149-157.

9mas of orthodox Christianity with rational support.
1 Dcussen attacks He-
gel for not treating the world as illusion, as all good religions should.
3. The writers of this period also charge Hegel with disparaging fi-
nite individuality. 3 Because of his abstract monistic epistemology, says
von Hartmann, Hegel cannot do justice to the individual subject in reli-
gion.4 Seth, Leighton, Lindsay, and Ott agree that Hegel makes finite
selves only moments, however essential, in the life of the Absolute, thus
5
destroying their true uniqueness. Ritchie, however, contends that Hegel
does not wipe out finite selves, but simply opposes viewing them in isola-
tion from the Absolute. According to Sterrett also, Hegel maintains the
full content of personality, but protests against the atomic individualism
7
which renders universal truth impossible.
4. According to Seth, Hegel deprives God also of true individuality,
g
making him a mere logical concept. Drews holds that Hegel* s God, as the
eternally self-moving notion, does not satisfy the religious conscious-
ness, which demands in its God a fixed, unchangeable ground of events, a
o
quiet refuge where the soul may rest. Rogers thinks that Hegel carries
his appeal to experience too far in attributing to the Absolute himself




* McTaggart, SHC ( Studies in Hegelian Cosmology . 1901, 1918), pp.
197-251.
2 Paul Deussen, Review of Werner, HO. Arch , f. Gesch. d. Phil .
.
5(1890), p. 155.
' Cf. above, p. 5, and below, p. 13.
* von Hartmann, "Mein VerhSltnis bu Hegel, n p. 336.
Seth, HP, p. 171 j SP, pp. £16-217; Leighton, MCG, pp. 66-68; Lind-
say, "Theistic Idealism, w p. 87; Ott, RPH, p. 103.
^
Ritchie, DH, pp. 74-75. Cf. Roeenkranz, above, p. 5.
Sterrett, HPE, pp. 169-170.
! Seth, HP, pp. 164, 156.
Arthur Drews , DSK (Die deutsche Speculation selt Kant . 2d ed.
,
1895). I, p. 279.
10 Arthur Kenyon Sogers, "The Absolute of Hegelianism" (1900), p.
340. Cf. later criticisms of Hegel* s view of God, below, p. 13.

C. The Period of Rebirth (1905-1933)
1. The appearance in 1905 of Dilthey's Pie Jugendgeschichte Hegels,
based on the hitherto unutilized manuscripts of the University of Berlin,
marked the beginning of a new epoch in the understanding of Hegel. The
light thrown on the development of Hegel's early thought by this work and
the investigations of Nohl, Adams, Wahl, and Haering, all of whom are
partly indebted to Dilthey, has colored a large part of the research of
this latest period, and forms the most distinctive contribution to it.
1
These investigations are significant for our present purposes main-
ly in three respects: (1) they reveal at the heart of Hegel's philosophy
a dominant religious interest; (2) they show Hegel's dialectic to be less
a method than an experience which centers in his struggle with the reli-
gious problem; and (3) they show his mature religious thought to be based
on a close study of historical religions*
The remaining investigations of the period follow in the main the
lines of earlier study, though the influence of the new knowledge of
Hegel's empirical religious interests is of course often apparent.
2. Georg Lasson points out with approval that Hegel makes thought
central in religion; reason must guide if objective truth is to be won.
But with Troeltsch and Griffiths, Lasson holds that Hegel's specifically
logical conception of religion gives insufficient recognition to feeling,
which for Troeltsch is prior. 3 Lasson, though opposing those who charge
Hegel with not taking sin seriously, finds that Hegel does not do full
1 Herman Nohl, ed. , TJS ( Hegel s theologische Jugendschriften . 1907)
George Plimpton Adams, MEH ( The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theolog
ical Writings . 1910 ) ; Jean Wahl , MCPH ( Le malheur de la conscience dans 1
philosophie de Hegel . 1929); Theodor L. Haering, HWW ( Hegel t sein Wollen
und sein Werk. 1929 )
.
2 Georg Lasson, EHR ( Elnftthrung in Hegel s Rellgionsphllosophie .
1930), pp. 5, 14, 18, 20, 33, 35-37, 44, 47-50.
3 Lasson, EHR, p. 147. Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Stellung des Christen
turns unter den Weltreligionen" (1924), p. 71. Rees Griffiths, GIE ( God
in Idea and Experience
. 1932), p. 32.

11
justice to ethical realities,
1
Hessen, impressed by the horrible experi-
ence of the World War, finds next to thought at the heart of reality some-
2
thing irrational and often brutal, which Hegel does not recognize.
But Hegel admits, says Lasson, that the fullness of religious expe-
rience includes not only thought, out faith, meditation, volitional activ-
ity, and obedience as well. The whole, not the parts, is for Hegel the
determining factor.
4
Glockner joins with Lasson in maintaining that Hegel
does not oppose immediate knowledge of God, but only the subjective view
5
that this immediate knowledge is the only kind possible.
A recognition of irrational aspects in Hegel's religious philosophy
c 7
emerges in Glockner and Kroner, who regard Hegel as the great synthesist
of the rational and the irrational, of knowledge and faith. Kroner, for
example, points out that Hegel is distinctly a rationalist, for he seeks
to comprehend experience in thought; but he is also the greatest irration-
alist of history, for he makes the dialectic of contradiction the basic
principle of his thought.** But Hegel* s panlogism, says Glockner, obscures
the irrational element, so that his philosophy inevitably appears as ex-
9
treme rationalism. Glockner is also skeptical as to the success of
* Lasson, EHB, pp. 30, 7-8, 147.
Johannes Hessen, HT ( Hegel s TrinltStslehre . 1922), pp. 39-40, 43.
Lasson, EHB, pp. 10, 25, 37, 47. Cf. Mary Whiton Calkins, Per-
sistent Problems of Philosophy . 3d ed. (N.Y. : Macmillan, 1915), p. 394.
Lasson, EHB, p. 96.
^ Hermann Glockner, "Hegel und Schleiermacher im Kampf van Beligions-
philosophie und Glaubenslehre" (1930), p. 251; G. Lasson, EHB, p. 47.
6 Glockner, op. cit., pp. 242, 246, 256-259. "Bobert Vischer und
die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften im leteten Drittel des neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts," pp. 315, 316. "Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus
P. 169.
7 Bichard Kroner, KBH (Yon Kant bis Hegel . 1921-1924), II, pp. 233,
238, 239, 260-262, 271-272.
| Kroner, KBH, II, pp. 271-272.
Glockner, "Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus," p. 169. Kroner
(KBH, p. 272) rejects the term "panlogism," regarding Feuerbach*s term,
"rationelle Mystik," as the best characterization of Hegel* s system.
t
Hegel's synthesis.
3. Contemporary research also deals with Hegel's relation to reli-
gious history. Hegel's philosophy of rational necessity, holds Troeltsch,
excludes contingency and novelty and damages the original factual ity of
historical religion, 2 Baillie and Georg Lasson also find the latter fault
in Hegel, 3 hut both "believe Hegel's view to be grounded largely in a close
observation of historical fact,4 In fact, Lasson thinks that Hegel relies
too much on his experience in linking Spirit inseparably with a particular
manifestation of it, Christianity. 5 Hammacher regards Hegel as too empir-
ical in finding the ideal already realised, 6
Both Troeltsch and Lasson, however, laud Hegel for combating histor-
ical relativism and transcending it by treating the history of religion as
7
the unfolding of divine reason. Kroner holds that Hegel reconciles his-
tory and reason by viewing the historical aspect of Spirit as itself a
a
thought-aspect. Baillie likewise points out that for Hegel the evolution
of the notion of religion necessarily involves the evolution of a histor-
Q
ical reality, Hammacher, while unwilling to admit reason in everything,
approves Hegel's procedure in trying to work out a reasonable connection
1 Glockner, "Hegel und Schleiermacher," pp, 256-259, On Hegel's
treatment of religious experience, cf, above, pp. 2-4, 5-7,
2 Troeltsch, GS ( Gesaamelte Schriften . 1913), II, pp. 775, 394, 481,
484; III, p. 276. Cf, earlier treatments, above, pp, 315, 6-9.
5 James Black Baillie, "Hegel," ERE (1914), VI, p, 585. Georg
Lasson, EHH, pp. 100-102.
4 Baillie, "Hegel," p. 586. G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 37-38, 93-95. Cf.
S. Alexander, Space . Time and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920), I, p, 204,
5 G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 146-148, Cf, von Hartmann, above, p. 8,
w Emil Hammacher, BPHG ( Die Bedeutung der Philosophic Hegel 3 ftlr
die Gegenwart
. 1911), pp. 56-57.
7 Troeltsch, GS, II, pp. 482, 747-748; III, pp. 267-277. G, Lasson,
EHR, pp. 49, 102, Cf, William Ernest Hocking, MGHE ( The Meaning of God in
Human Experience . 1912, 1928), p, 155.
8 Kroner, KBH, p, 254; "System und Geschichte bei Hegel" (1931),
p. 248,
9 Baillie, "Hegel," pp. 586, 587.

in the fact 8 of history.
4. Troeltsch and Griffiths, like Seth, Leighton, and Lindsay, hold
m
that at times Hegel merges the individual in the Absolute. Hoyce, how-
ever, finds in this aspect of Hegel simply an insistence that individual
selves attain realisation only through their relations with other selves.
3
5. With Seth, Griffiths maintains that Hegel* s Absolute is remote
from the God of religion.4 Brightman, however, finds that the patient, suf-
fering, laboring God of Hegel's Phgnomenologi
e
is profoundly close to the
facts of moral experience, 5 while Hocking believes that the ontological ar-
gument for God so much emphasised by Hegel "is the only one which is wholly




A. The Works of Hegel 7
1. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
The most complete statement of Hegel's philosophy of religion is
found in the lectures on the subject which he delivered at the University
of Berlin during the summer semesters of 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831, and
which were published after his death. Unfortunately, we have from Hegel's
1 Hammacher, BPHG, pp. 43-44.
2 Troeltsch, GS, I, pp. 255, 306; III, pp. 130-133, 135n., 274-276.
Griffiths, GIE, pp. 213-214, 218. On this problem cf. above, pp. 5, 9.
Josiah Boyce, LMI ( Lectures on Modern Idealism . 1919), p. 210; The
Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892, 1928), pp.
215-216.
J
Griffiths, GIB, p. 213; cf. p. 64.
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, The Problem of God (New York: Abingdon,
1930), pp. 94-95; cf. pp. 135-136; below, pp. 181-185.
6 Hocking, MGHE, p. 307. Cf. earlier criticisms of Hegel* s view of
God, above, p. 9.
For the purpose of this dissertation, the new critical edition of
Hegel* s works published by Georg Las son will be regarded as standard. When
not otherwise specified, references to Hegel's Werke are to this edition.
Such references will begin with volume-numbers, the word Werke being implied.
With the exception of Hegel's letters, accessible only in the original edi-
tion of the Werke . the works not available in Lesson's edition will be
cited in the Jub i1 turnsausgab
e




own hand only the lecture notebook. 104 pages in length,
which he wrote
in 1821, and various scattered leaves and fragments. The
manuscript of
1821 covers the entire course, hut varies greatly in completeness and of-
ten only sketches hastily the main outlines which were expanded in the
oral lectures. Therefore our knowledge of many details of the lectures
of 1821 and of almost all of the later lectures is derived entirely from
the notes of Hegel* s students. A second source of difficulty is the fact
that each of Hegel's courses on the philosophy of religion makes fundamen-
tal changes in "both the form and the content of his previous lectures.
This complicates considerably the problem of an editor who would give a
unified presentation of Hegel's religious thought.
Hegel* s Vorlesungen fiber die Philosophic der Religion , including the
supplemental lectures on the proofs of the existence of God, have appeared
in four editions and three distinct forms.
a. The first edition, edited by Fhilipp Marheineke and comprising
volumes XI and XII of the original edition of Hegel's Stoatliche Werke, was
published in 1832. Marheineke left almost completely out of account Hegel's
own manuscript of 1821, confining himself to the later lectures as more au-
thentic sources of Hegel's mature thought. Marheineke' s sources were (1)
several notebooks of hearers of the last three courses of lectures, nota-
bly those of Griesheim (1824), Meyer (1827), and Karl Hegel(1851), which
were criticised and supplemented by Hegel himself; (2) single leaves and
fragments discussing certain aspects in greater detail, found among Hegel's
unpublished papers; and (3) Hegel's own incomplete work on the proofs of
the existence of God. From these materials Marheineke, as he himself con-





b. The haste with which the first edition was prepared
left unused a
considerable amount of material, which was utilised in the
second edition
published in 1840. This edition, like the first, bears the
name of Mar-
heineke as editor, but the essential work was done by Bruno
Bauer. The
main advance made by Bauer lay in his use of Hegel's own notebook
of 1821.
In addition, Bauer had at his command the lecture notes of Leopold
von
Henning (1821), Michelet and FBrster (1824), Droysen (1827), and Geyer,
Beichenow, and Butenberg (1831). Bauer inserted the contents of Hegel's
own manuscript into the lectures at what seemed the appropriate points,
and so built up a more or less unified work.
Because of the new materials used, the second edition is in several
respects different from the first: (1) The second is noticeably larger.
Exclusive of the supplement, the second edition covers 802 pages, the
first only 646. (2) The use of Hegel's manuscript enriches the content
of certain parts of the lectures, especially the introduction and the dis-
cussions of the notion of religion, of the religions of subjectivity, and
above all, of the Christian religion. (3) The second edition, as a result
of the comparison of the formerly used notebooks with the new ones, is free
of many repetitions found in the first.
For several reasons, however, the second edition is by no means an un-
mitigated improvement on the first. (1) On the nature-religions the former
contains scarcely more material than the latter, and is less loyal to He-
gel's own classification. (2) Bauer does not free himself from the arrange-
ment fixed, on the basis of inadequate evidence, by Marheineke. (3) Bauer
Vorwort to second edition, JUB, XV, p. 7. This haste was prima-
rily due to Marheineke' s desire to convince the world as early as possi-
ble of the seriousness of the promise of a society of Hegel's friends to
publish his printed and unprinted works in a complete edition.
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proceeds with insufficient philological acouracy. (4) While eliminating
many repetitions, in adding new material he not only introduces new repe-
titions but obscures the movement of thought, (5) He subjects Hegel's notes
to arbitrary treatment, often paraphrasing rather than quoting Hegel's own
words, at times ignoring the original order, and even making changes in
content. It is generally recognized, therefore, that both of the early
editions present Hegel's lectures in extremely unsatisfactory form.
c. The appearance in 1928 of a facsimile reproduction of the edition
of 1840, comprising volumes XV and XVI of Glookner's new jUbilaumsausgabe
of Hegel's Samtliche Werke, made Hegel's philosophy of religion, long out
of print, once more available, but left the text unchanged,
d. In the publication, from 1925-1930, of Georg Lasson's critical
edition of Hegel's lectures, the long-felt need of a thorough critical
study of the manuscripts has been met. Lasson's sources were (l) Hegel's
own lecture-notebook of 1821; (2) the notebooks of Griesheim, Hotho, von
1 2Kehler, and C. Pastenacci fe on the lectures of 1824 and of Erdmann and an
anonymous student on the course of 1827; and (3) the published editions of
Hegel's lectures. Lasson makes Hegel's notebook the basis of his work.
Since, however, the text is often limited to phrases and key-words, it is
often supplemented by Lasson with words which purport to retain the implied
meaning. The completed text is printed in large type, Lasson's additions
being inclosed within brackets. Much material from other sources has been
woven into Hegel's text but distinguished from it by smaller type.
3
^ von Kehler' s notebook includes only the introduction and the be-
ginning of the first part.
2 Pastenacci's notes were available to Lasson only after the comple-
tion of the first part ( Begriff der Religion ), and break off shortly after
the beginning of Hegel's lectures on the absolute religion.
3 Lasson's edition of Hegel's philosophy of religion forms volumes
XII-XIV of his edition of the Samtliche Werke . Each of the three volumes
contains two half-volumes, each with its own pagination. To avoid ambi-
i
The formal and material changes made by Lasson have produced a work
vastly different from either of the earlier editions. The following com-
parison will seek to point out the main points of similarity and difference
between Lasson* s edition and that of 1840.
1
The primary differences are:
(1) Baxter's edition makes use of three notebooks of 1851 which were
inaccessible to Lasson and are probably no longer extant.
(2) Bauer apparently gives no priority in value to Hegel's own note-
book, rather adapting it to the other manuscripts which are his chief guide.
Lasson, on the other hand, makes Hegel* s text the groundwork of his whole
edition, Judging all else by it.
(3) In his finished edition Bauer distinguishes in no way between
Hegel's own words and those of Hegel's students, and often paraphrases the
former instead of reproducing them exactly. As a result, inaccuracies have
been introduced into Hegel's text which sometimes involve, accidentally or
2
intentionally, actual changes in meaning. Lasson quotes Hegel directly
guity, therefore, every reference to this edition will specify, in addition
to the volume-number, the abbreviation of the half-volume in question. The
arrangement of the volumes, together with the abbreviations to be used, is
as follows:
XII: Lasson, Einftthrung.
Hegel, Vorlesungen tTber die Philosophic der Religion.
1. Teil. Begriff der Religion (BR).
XIII: 2. Teil. Die bestimmte Religion.
1* Kapitel. Die Naturreligion (NR )
.
2. Kapitel. Die Religion der geistigen Individual-
it«t (RGI).
XIV: 5. Teil. Die absolute Religion (AS).
Anhang. Vorlesungen
-fiber die Seweise vom Dasein Gottes (BDG).
1 The 1832 edition, inasmuch as its relation to that of 1640 has al-
ready been discussed, will be mentioned only incidentally.
2 Hegel writes, for example, "Man sagt nun, die Empfindung ist etwas
nur Subjektives, mir eigentttmliches Besonderes." (XII, BR, p. 245.)
Bauer paraphrases, "Man sagt gewBhnlich, das Geffihl sey etwas nur Subjek-
tives. H (JOB, XV, p. 159.) This inadmissible substitution of Geffihl for
Bgpfindung
. several times repeated, is accompanied by transformations in
both the wording and the order of phrases and sentences.
«€
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and carefully distinguishes Hegel's words from those of others.
Those
passages in Bauer's edition which are found in none of the available man-
uscripts Lasson prints as footnotes, making exception only for the long
sections of the introduction and the conclusion of the section on nature-
religion, which are authenticated hy the edition of 1832 and necessary to
the connection. He also prints as footnotes other passages from the 1852
edition.
(4) Bauer often changes the original order of Hegel's own manuscript.




(5) The thought-movement of Bauer's treatment of the absolute reli-
gion is marred hy a certain unclearness, which Lasson' s close reference to
1 The following instances illustrate the changes in arrangement made
hy Bauer. In each case, Lasson follows Hegel's original order.
a. Bauer omits the beginning of Hegel's criticism of contemporary
agnosticism with which Hegel begins his course (XII, BR, pp. 245-245), and
places the body of the passage in an entirely different setting (JUB, XV,
pp. 52-54).
b. Bauer places a discussion of the religious sensibility, considered
by Hegel in connection with cultus (XII, BB, pp. 245-245), in Hegel's polem-
ic against the theology of feeling (JUB, XV, pp. 159-141), and substitutes,
as already noted (cf. above, p. 17, n. 2), Gefflhl for Bnpfindung .
c. Bauer overlooks the fact that Hegel, in his treatment of the three
stages of nature-religion, classifies each stage dichotomously. Apparently
thinking that Hegel, true to his principle of triplicity, must have given
a trichotomous classification, Bauer substitutes such an arrangement for
Hegel's own, as follows:
1) . Bauer removes the Chinese religion from its connection with the
religion of magic, making the latter a stage by itself and treating Chinese
religion as the first aspect of the second main stage, which includes also
Hinduism and Buddhism (XIII, KB, pp. 77-119; JUB, XV, pp. 279-524, 542-554).
2) . Bauer reverses Hegel's order by discussing Hinduism before Bud-
dhism (XIII, NB, pp. 119-185; JUB, XV, pp. 555-416). Though Bauer's ar-
rangement is historically more correct, he is not justified in substituting
it for Hegel's. Since notebooks on the course of 1851 were available not
only to Bauer, but also to Marheineke in the preparation of the first edi-
tion, which follows Hegel's original order, it is not likely that Hegel him-
self made this change.
5). Between Parsiian and Egyptian religion Bauer inserts a chapter on
Syrian religion, "the religion of pain," though nowhere in the extant lec-
ture notes is such a special chapter to be found (JUB, XV, pp. 454-457).
It remains a mystery whence Bauer obtained this material.
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the original manuscripts has largely removed.
(6) The early editions of the supplementary
"Vorlesungen ttber die
Beweise tob Dasein Gottes" retain unchanged the many
imperfections of the
original manuscript and print the lectures as though they
represented a
work fully prepared for the press hy Hegel himself. Lasson has
sought to
correct the defects, and carefully lists all changes made.
The following similarities are worthy of notice:
(1) The discussion of each religion proceeds in hoth editions
hy con-
sideration of, first, the notion of religion, secondly, the historical man-
ifestation of this idea, and finally, the culfrus of the religion. Other
general similarities of form and structure are manifest.
1
(2) Most of the passages on the religions of spiritual individuality
and the ahsolute religion in the 1840 edition which do not appear in the
availahle notebooks are already puhlished in the edition of 1832, and thus
carry the presumption that they appeared somewhere in Hegel , s lectures.
These passages are also well adapted to the tenor of the lectures. For
these reasons Lasson includes them in the text proper, the sources of all
parts of which he indicates in appended tables. Passages which he regards
as doubtful he consigns to the footnotes.
(3) In the essential content of most of the views advanced, Lasson*
s
edition agrees with the earlier versions. His wording also is in many pas-
sages exactly the same as or only slightly different from that of the orig-
* For example, in the discussion of the absolute religion Lasson pre-
serves the classification into the Kingdoms of the Father, the Son, and the
Spirit which is followed in the two early editions but is missing from all
known manuscripts. Though it is not certain that this division is original
with Hegel, and though it has more the advantage of popularity than of
strict accord with the notion, Lasson retains it because its appearance in





(4) With the exception of the differences already
mentioned, the
text of Hegel's lectures on the proofs of the existence of
God is the same
in hoth editions. The alterations made hy Lasson are considerahly
less
sweeping than those in the hody of the Philosophic der Religion.
Because of its superior accuracy and authenticity, the text of
Lasson' s edition will form the oasis of the present investigation.
Hegel's Philosophic der Religion has "been translated into hoth Eng-
lish (by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson) and French ("by A. Vera).
With the exception of the introductions to Vera's translation, however,
these works will not he used in the present inquiry.
2. Other Works of Hegel
Hegel's treatment of the philosophy of religion is by no means lim-
ited to his lectures on the subject. In fact, he was so deeply interested
in religion that he discusses it in almost all of his major works and in
many minor ones. In most cases these discussions add nothing distinctive-
ly new to what is found in the lectures completely devoted to the subject,
hut they do clarify certain phases of his thought and indicate his most
significant emphases. They comprise, therefore, valuable supplementary
material for the purposes of this dissertation.
a. Works Published hy Hegel Himself
Of the writings published hy Hegel, Die Ph&nomenologie des Geistes
(1807) is the earliest major work containing a discussion of religion. It
is significant that Hegel's mature lectures are mainly an expansion and en-
richment of the essential conception of religion already outlined in the
Phgnomenologle
.
Additional light on Hegel's religious philosophy is shed
1 Cf. above, p. 19.

21
by his Encyclop&die der philosophlschen Wissenechaften ( 1817 ).
Beferences
to religion occur throughout the "Logik" and the "Philosophic des Geistes."
The work is of farther and particular significance in that it shows the rel-
ative place occupied hy religion in Hegel's mature system. The Grand! lni en
der Philosophic des Bechts (1821) contains discussions of the relation be-
tween religion and morality, church and state which supplement the "brief
treatments of these problems in the Philosophic der Religion .
In addition to these major publications, several articles and reviews
likewise demand consideration. These include Hegel's "Glauben und Wissen"
(1802), his "Vorrede" to Hinrichs' BeliglonsphilosophieN 1822 ) . his article,
"Wer denkt abstrakt?" (ca. 1828), and his reviews of Both* s edition of
Hamann's Schriften ( 1828 ) , of Kollman' s ftber die Hegel ' sche Lehre oder ;
absolutes ffissen und moderner Pantheismus (1829), and of GBschel's Aphorls-
men tiber Kichtwissen und absolutes Wlssen im Verhftltnisse zur Christ lichen
Glaubens erkenntniss (1829). Of these, the preface to Hinrichs' Religions-
philosophic is extraordinarily significant for the insight it affords into
Hegel's criticism of the theology of feeling.
b. Posthumously Edited Works
One of the most valuable primary sources is Herman Nohl's excellent
historical-critical edition of Hegel s theologlsche Jugendschriften (1907).
These early writings of Hegel are significant because of what they reveal
concerning the young Hegel's view of the importance of religion and his
interest in the historical study of religions.
Of Hegel's posthumously edited lectures other than those on philosophy
of religion itself the most important for this investigation are his Vor-
lesungen fiber die Philosophic der Weltgeschichte . In addition to contain-
ing a discuss ion of the relation between religion and the state and signif-
1 The exact title of Hinrichs' book is Die Beligion im inneren Ver-
hflltniB zur Wissenschaft
. For the sake of convenience, it will be referred
to aa Beliglonsphilosonhle
. the name which appears in Hegel's Werke.
«
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icant treatments of the main historical religions, these lectures throw
important light on Hegel* s view of Christianity and his estimate of human
personality. Hegel 1 s Vorlesungen ftber die Geschichte der Philosophic com-
mand attention for their treatments of Christianity, the Scholastics, the
mystics, and the Reformation, The Vorlesungen fiber die Aesthetik discuss
the relation between art, religion, and philosophy, and the esthetic as-
pects of the various historical religions.
The volume, Philosophische Propgdeutik . Gymnasi al reden und Gutachten
fiber die Philosophie-Unterricht (1808-1815) contains suggestive references
to religion. Hegel's letters, published in Briefe von und an Hegel (1887),
edited by Karl Hegel, and Neue Briefe Hegel s und Verwandtes (1912), edited
by G-. Lasson, contain isolated passages on religion, but are of minor worth
from the standpoint of the present study.
B. Works of Hegel »s Expositors and Critics
The field of investigation includes, in addition to the pertinent
works of Hegel himself, all available expositions and criticisms of Hegel*
s
philosophy in German, English, and French which are relevant to the prob-
lem. A survey of this literature has already been made.*
IV. The Plan of the Inquiry
The method followed throughout is that of personal investigation of
the sources named. Following a brief summary of Hegel's philosophy of reli-
gion (Chapter II), the relative significance of the empirical and the ration-
al in Hegel* s philosophy of religion will be investigated by means of a
critical study of four different, though closely related phases of Hegel's
thought: his view of the nature of religious experience (Chapter III), his
treatment of the historical development of religion (Chapter IV), his con-
ception of the Absolute (Chapter V), and his estimate of human personal-
1 Cf. above, pp. 1-13.

ity (Chapter VI), A ooncise statement of the conclusions reached





A StnOHABY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OP RELIGION
I. The Purpoee of the Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of religion is defined by Hegel as "denkende, pegreifende
1
Erkenntnis der Religion, " "die Erkenntnis Gottes in vernflnftiger Form."
Religion is present in ordinary uncriticised experience as simple faith, as
an inmediate consciousness of the divine. It is the task of philosophy to
penetrate beneath the surface of religious experience as given and discover
its inner meaning for thought. In short, philosophy seeks to understand
religion.
Philosophical thought aims to perform this task "by showing the rela-
tion "between religion and the other aspects of human experience, or, more
particularly, by reconciling religion with scientific knowledge.
Auf was es aber ankommt, ist das Verhftltnis der
Religion im Menschen su seiner ffbrigen Weltanschauung,
Bewusstsein, Erkenntnis, Zwecken, Interessen. Auf dies




Where philosophical insight is lacking, religion is likely to he viewed
in abstraction from the remainder of the mental life.
The conscious life of man is an alternation between two related kinds
of activity. Man has his workdays, during which he busies himself with his
particular interests and finite needs; and also his Sundays, when he lifts
himself above his ordinary life and seeks to view himself in his true light,
as a part of the higher life that is within him. The same is true of man's
specifically scientific activity. Here, too, he has his particular pur-
suits, such as the study of nature and her laws, and the science of govern-
1 XII, BR, pp. 62, 35.
2 XII, BR, pp. 10-11.
4«
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Unfortunately, these two aspects of experience, though
both are legitimate and important, are not always in harmony. Beason and
religion often exist in false separation. On the one hand, thought will
not venture on a serious, thoroughgoing investigation of religion; on the
other, religion lacks confidence in its ahility to know the truth in thought.
It is the purpose of the philosophy of religion to break down this
false partition, to show that religion lies within the scope of rational in-
2
quiry and to give to religion faith in its power to know. Philosophy seeks
to "broaden the limited, finite knowledge of science to include genuine knowl-
edge of the infinite, and to elevate the mystical apprehension of God to
the status of intellectual certainty.
[zwischen diesen heiden Seiten nun ist die} Beligions-
philosophie diese Ausgleichung, (das AufzeigenJ dee Un-
endlichen im Endlichen, des Bidlichen im Unendlichen, Ver-
sOhnung des Gemttts mit der Erkenntnis, des religiOsen, des
absolut gediegenen GefQhls mit der Intelligent. Dies ist
das Bedttrfnis der Beligionsphilosophie, jwie] Notwendig-
keit der Philosophic ttberhaupt.'
For Hegel, therefore, the aim of religious thought is to reconcile
reason and religion by removing the contradiction between them. Philosoph-
ical inquiry attempts to reveal the religion in reason and the reason in
religion.
II. Philosophy of Beligion and the Theology of Hegel's Day
In so conceiving the relation between thought and the religious
life Hegel sets himself deliberately against the doeUnant theology of his
day. The breach which he seeks to remove had been produced by two closely
connected tendencies. On the one side was the deism of the Aufklftrung
.
with its metaphysic of the understanding, which indeed presupposed God as
* XII, BB, pp. 3, 11-12.
| XII, BB, pp. 22, 28, 53.
XII, BB, p. 22; cf. p. 190; cf. XIV, AB, p. 231.
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the highest being, hut maintained the
impossibility of knowing the essence
of this being. Linked with this view in Hegel's
mind was the critical phi-
losophy of Kant, with its denial of demonstrable
knowledge of the divine.
A natural counterpart of this agnosticism of the
understanding wae
the theology of feeling, which affirmed an emotional
premonition of God in
his infinity, but regarded knowledge of Cod as both an
impossibility and a
temptation to atheism. Pious men who found the path of intellectual knowl-
edge of God closed naturally chose the way of intuition and feeling.
1
Both of these tendencies Hegel vigorously opposes. With regard to
2
the "Bildung der Reflexion," he rejects its abstract, atomic, and external
view of the relation between religion and knowledge and maintains the es-
sential unity of the mind.
Wir behaupten eine wesentliche Besiehung der Ver-
nunfterkenntnis und der Religion. Es ist ungegrundet
,
das s der Glaube an dem Inhalt der positiven Religion
bestehen kann, wenn die Vernunft sich vom Gegenteil
uberseugt hat. Die Vernunft ist ebenso gOttliche Offen-
barung wie die Vorstellung in der Religion, und es ist
falsch, dass Glaube und Vernunft, wenn sie entgegenge-
setsten Inhalt haben, gleichgflltig nebeneinander za be-
stehen vermBchten. ... Der menschliche Geist ist im
Innersten nicht ein so Geteiltes, worin zweierlei be-
stehen kBnnte, das sich widerspricht.
Since, therefore, the mind is basically one, it is capable of knowing
in thought the reality which it feels and represents in religious experi-
ence. God not only is, but can be known.
But there is still a further reason for maintaining the knowability
of God. According to Hegel, man can attain ultimate truth because he is
not a foreigner in the universe, but at home in it. Man is a thinking be-
ing, and is therefore essentially one with the innermost nature of reality,
which is Reason. "Ein Geist geht durch die Wirklichkeit und durch das
* XII, BR, pp. 55-56; XIV, BBG, p. 23.
j~ Foreword to Hinrichs* Bel igi onsph i 1 o sophi
e





Man can know God because hoth are Spirit. God is




This immediate manifestation of the divine in human life is
for Hegel
the hasic principle of philosophical knowledge: "dass nimlich
unser Bewusst-
sein unmittelbar von Gott wisse, dass das Wissen vom Sein Gottes dem Mensch-
en schlechthin gewiss sei.
Hegel's criticism of Schleiermacher and the theology of feeling in
general follows a similar course. As against the despair of knowledge which
takes refuge in the "Zufttlligkeit und Willkttr des subjektiven Geffthls und
seines Meinens,"
4
Hegel again maintains the validity of reason. The theol-
ogy of feeling, he holds, leads to atheism, for it makes God only a product
of human weakness, hope, and desire. The world is fundamentally rational,
and must therefore be investigated by reason.
Wie 8oil die Vernunft untersucht werden? Ohne
Zweifel vernflnftig; diese Untersuchung ist also selbst
vernttnftiges Erkennen. Um das Erkennen zu untersuchen,
ist kein anderer Weg mttglich als das Erkennen. 5
If we approach the study of religion from the standpoint of the ana-
lytical understanding, we must either renounce all knowledge of what God is
or take refuge in an intuitive apprehension of God which likewise abandons
all hope of intellectual knowledge of truth. For Hegel, however, we are
not limited to these two possibilities. There is another way, that of syn-
c
optic reason. On this path rational knowledge of God is certain.
1 XII, BR, p. 53.
2 XIV, AH, p. 225; cf. pp. 226, 229; XIV, BDG, p. 47; below, pp.
159-160.
* XII, BB, p. 49.
* Foreword to Hinrichs* Bel igi onsphil os ophi
e
.
JUB, XX, p. 22.
XII, BB, p. 57; cf. pp. 55-56. Hegel's estimate of the place of
feeling in religion is discussed in Chapter Three; cf. below, pp. 51-67.
* Foreword to Hinrichs* Religionephilosophle
. JUB, XX, p. 20.
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III. Beligion in Relation to Art and Philosophy
In Hegel* s view the whole of reality is Spirit. All aspect* of the
universe are manifestations of the living, active totality of one absolute
Mind. The very nature of this Mind is free development according to dia-
lectical principles. By a process of logical and historical evolution, the
Absolute successively negates itself, posits its own other, and therehy ad-
vances to a higher affirmation. Beginning as logical Idea, Spirit exter-
nalises itself to produce the complex world of nature and of man, and re-
turns to itself as all-comprehending Absolute Spirit. All the details of
nature and human history are thus an unfolding of the varied life of the
Absolute, which advances laboriously from stage to stage until it attains
its full truth as Absolute Spirit. This process reaches its culmination
when Spirit rises in human experience to the free realms of art, religion,
and philosophy.
Art, religion, and philosophy have a common content: the object of
each is nothing less than the Absolute. All aim to know absolute truth,
God. In all alike the contradiction between universality and particularity
is broken down. All alike reconcile finite Spirit and Absolute Spirit.
The difference between the three spheres consists only in the form in which
they exhibit truth. Art reveals absolute truth in the form of immediate
perception (unmlttelbare Anschauung ): religion, in the form of representa-
tion or imagination (Vorstellung) : and philosophy, in the form of concep-
tual thought (Denken). 1 In art, the spiritual Idea is presented to con-
sciousness in the external and sensual, and therefore contingent, forms of
time and space. In religion, the absolute truth is elevated above external
perception and in its universality inwardly revealed to consciousness in
1 XII, BB, pp. 279-280; cf. pp. 142, 281-302.
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the form of figurative thought. In philosophy the
truth is fully present
to consciousness in speculative thought. The three
forms are not, however,
exclusive. Rather do they intertwine and imply each other, since
each is
a property of the whole mind.*
Particularly relevant to the present problem is Hegel's distinction
hetween religion and philosophy. While philosophy is for hi« "die Wissen-
schaft der denkenden Vernunft," religious faith is "das Bewusstsein und
ahsolute Purwahrhalten der fur die Vorstellung gegehenen Vernunft."
2
The
primary distinction depends on the difference "between Vorstellung and Denken.
A Vorstellung according to Hegel must he distinguished from a mere
mental picture. A mental picture, for example, of the Brandenhurger Tor in
Berlin, is a purely sensuous image of a particular ohject in space; it is
therefore wholly individual, with no universal element. A representation,
however, is an image elevated to the status of universality or thought, a
3
figurative embodiment of a rational truth. Representations may he either
sensual or spiritual. Examples of the former are "battle," "war;" of the
latter, representations of law, morality, virtue, bravery, the world. Spe-
cifically religious representations include the ordinary ideas of creation,
the fall of man, the Fatherhood of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so
on. The representations of religion, moreover, contain genuine objective
truth.4
But religion falls short of yielding complete truth. It lacks the
element of necessity or true connection which only pure thought can pro-
| Cf. XII, BR, p. 280; PHPR, JUB, III, p. 225.
z Poreword to Hinrichs* Religionsphilosophie . JTJB, XX, p. 12. Cf.
also XII, BR, p. 293.
5
"Bild jlst] sinnlich aus dem Sinnlichen, Mythos; Vorstellung [let]
das Bild in seine Allgemeinheit erhohen; Gedanke, gedankenvoll , Form auch
fflr Gedanken." (XII, BR, p. 284)4 XII, BR, pp. 284-288. The images of art, though ohjective, are
yet sensuous, and therefore unable to grasp the Ahsolute truly.
<
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ride. The connection attained in representation is that of the
abstract
understanding. Separate determinations of a spiritual content, each of
which is for representation an independent whole in itself, are brought
together and externally related by analogy and imagery. True inner con-
nection is therefore impossible, and necessity is out of the question.
Only the concrete notion, with its principle of the identity of opposites,
can establish true connection or show genuine rational necessity. Truth
is not the mere accordance of one's beliefs with principles otherwise re-
garded as true, but rather "die Wahrheit . . « in der Form der Wahrheit,
in der Form des absolut konkreten, schlechthin und rein in sich zusarnmen-
stimmenden."* Speculative philosophy alone yields truth in this form.
This does not mean, however, that philosophy overthrows religion or
renders it unnecessary. Neither does it deny that the content of religion
for itself can be true.
Vielmehr ist die Religion eben der wahrhafte In-
halt , nur in Form der Vorstellung, und die substanti-
elle Wahrheit hat nicht erst die Philosophic su geben
.
Nicht erst auf Philosophic haben die Menschen su warten
gehabt, urn das Bewusstsein, die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit
su empfangen. 2
In fact, unlike philosophy, religion is universal in its appeal.
It is the sphere of conscious life in which the absolute truth is avail-
able and understandable to all. It speaks the truth in a form which the
common people hear gladly. Philosophy, on the other hand, is only for
those who are capable of sustained conceptual thought. But the masses of
men are incapable of thought higher than the figurative type found in re-
ligion. Pure thought, shorn of sensuous imagery, is beyond their grasp.
Thus the truth must reveal itself to the majority of people not in the




pure form of philosophy, but in the more popular form of religion.
1
There can he no doubt, of course, that Hegel regards the conceptual
form of truth as higher than the representative. The very fact that he
places philosophy, not religion, on the highest level of dialectical de-
velopment indicates this. But he is careful to point out that each exists
in its own right, that each is necessary, and that "both reveal ahsolute
truth. Philosophy itself is for Hegel throughout religious; its object is
nothing less than God himself.
Die Philosophic hat den Zweck, die Wahrheit zu
erkennen, Gott su erkennen; denn er ist die ahsolute
Wahrheit. Insofern ist nichts anderes der Mflhe wert
gegen Gott und seine Explication. 2
IV. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion in Outline
Hegel divides his Philosophic der Religion into three parts. He con-
siders, first, the notion of religion; secondly, the definite religions,
the historical manifestations of the notion; and finally, the ahsolute re-
ligion, the unity of the notion and its manifestation.
The principle of dialectical relation adopted by Hegel here, as in
his smaller Logik as a whole and the third book of the Logik in particular,
is that of growth or development. In the Logik
. the Idea advances from be-
ing in its immediacy through essence , the sphere of mediation or universal
relativity, to the notion , the realm of concrete unity. The notion, in
turn, hegins as subjective notion, realises itself in the object, and fi-
nally returns to itself as the Ahsolute Idea. The same principle operates
in the Encyclo-pgdie as a whole, where the Ahsolute, beginning as logical
Idea, externalizes itself in the world of nature, and goes on to complete
self-realization in the realm of Spirit. The process is paralleled in the
Philosophic
,
des Gjsistes, in which Spirit hegins as subjective spirit, moves
* Cf. V, ENC, pp. 14-15, 486; XII, BR, p. 69.
XIV, AH, p. 225; cf. p. 228; XII, BR, p. 30; below p. 158.
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on to become objective, and finally returns to itself as Absolute
Spirit.
In his Philosophic der Religion , therefore, Hegel applies
to religion the
principle which governs, in his view, the entire course of philosophy
and
the concrete development of the whole of reality.
A. The Notion of Religion
1. The Simple Definition of the Notion
-Die Religion in ihrem Begriff," says Hegel, "ist die Beslehung. des
Subjects , des subjektlven Bewusstseins auf Gott, der Geist ist."
1
There
are, therefore, two sides. Religion involves, on the one hand, the human
consciousness which is elevated to God, and on the other, the self-con-
sciousness of the Absolute Spirit himself. Religion is present only when
the subjective or human and the objective or divine factors are present in
relation. "Die swei Momente in ihrem Begriff des Gegensatzes sind: absolute
o
Allgemeinheit, reines Denken, und absolute Einselheit, Empfindung."
The subjective human consciousness is not, however, foreign to God,
but is itself spirit. Religion may also be defined, therefore, as "die Be-
ziehung des Geistes auf den absoluten Geist;" or, speculatively consid-
4 5
ered, it is "der Geist, der seines Wesens, seiner selbst bewusst 1st,"
"die Idee des Geistes, der sich su sich selbst verhftlt, das Selbstbewasst-
sein des absoluten Geistes ."^ Human consciousness is itself a moment or
aspect in the life of the absolute consciousness.
In der hOchsten Idee ist so die Religion nicht die
Angelegenheit eines Menschen, sondern sie ist wesentlich
die hOchste Bestimmung der absoluten Idee selbst. Indem
sich der Geist an sich selbst unterscheidet , tritt die
Endlichkeit des Bewusstseins ein. Aber dies endliche Be-
1 XII, BR, p. 66.
~ XII, BR, p. 154; cf. p. 182.
XII, BR, p. 150.
That is, from the standpoint of the absolute unity which differ-
entiates itself.
5 XII, BR, p. 66.




wusstsein ist Moment dee Geistes selbst; er ist das sich
Unterscheiden, das sich Bestimmen, d. h. sich als end-
lich.es Bewusstsein Setzen, 1
According to its highest notion, therefore, religion is the life of
the Absolute Spirit himself. In this life there are three main phases:
(1) the moment of universality, God as the universal mind; (2) the moment
of particularity, the self-differentiation of God to produce finite minds;
and (5) the moment of individuality, the restoration of the unity of God
2
and man in worship.
Hegel develops the notion of religion from two standpoints, the the-
oretical and the practical, that of intellectual representation and that of
worship. On each level the notion passes through three stages which paral-
lel those found in the simple definition of the notion. Theoretically, me-
diation between God and man is accomplished in the so-called proofs of the
existence of God. Practically, reconciliation between God and man is ef-
fected in worship.'
2. The Theoretical Development of the Notion:
Knowledge of God
a. In the first stage, Spirit exists as pure thought, undifferen-
tiated universality, spirit in general, the consciousness of God in his
absolute unity.4
b. But thought, which is essentially consciousness, cannot remain on
this level. Spirit which reposes in its own barren unity is not spirit.
Its very nature is to be active, to manifest itself. "Der Geist, der sich
nicht manifeetiert, ist ein Totes."5 Manifestation means becoming for an-
\ XII, BE, pp. 150-151.
* XII, BB, p. 149.
* XII, BR, pp. 187-278, especially, p. 225; V, MC, pp. 383-418.
* XII, BB, pp. 65-69, 154, 156.
5 XII, BB, p. 65; cf. p. 200; XIV, AB, p. 35,

34
other, that Is, entry into opposition or difference. Spirit
communicates




As a result of this differentiation, Spirit has over against itself
finite consciousness. There are two sides, the object and the subject for
which the object is, or the Spirit as object of knowledge and the knowing
spirit.
2
This is the point at which religion appears. Only when a differ-
entiation of the original universality has made possible this relation be-
tween subjective consciousness and God can there be any genuine religion.
c. But while this self-objectification of Spirit is essential to re-
ligion, it cannot be final. Religious knowledge is not only a simple rela-
tion of the finite mind to its divine object, but something much more con-
crete.
Dies Wissen von Gott ist eine Sewegung in sich,
nKher eine Brhebung su Gott . Die Beligion sprechen wir
wesentlich aus als eine Erhebung, ein tJbergehen von einem
Inhalte sum andern, vom Endlichen sum absolut Unendlichen.
In appearing to the human knower in religion, God actually appears to him-
self. Likewise, in relating himself to God, the human individual is ele-
vated to his own true nature. The differentiation is therefore transcended
in "absolute Affirmation," in the elevation of the finite mind to God. It
is "ein Erscheinen, das sich swig sur Wahrheit der Erscheinung erhebt."
From the estrangement between finite consciousness and itself, Spirit re-
turns
sum Wissen seiner selbst und zur substantiellen Ein-
heit
. . ., indem das Wissende, ihn erkennend, zu ihm
selber und er dadurch zur Einheit seiner als des Wis-
1 XII, BR, p. 65; XIV, AB, p. 7.
~ XIV, AB, p. 4.
\ XII, BB, pp. 65-69, 199-202; cf. pp. 156-157.




sens und des Gegenstandes wird.
This mediation between Absolute Spirit and finite spirits appears in
the form of the so-called proofs of God's existence. According to Hegel,
the proofs presuppose an immediate consciousness of God. Their great sig-
nificance, therefore, lies not in their proof of God's existence, hut in the
fact that they demonstrate the course followed by reason in its advance from
the finite to the thought of God, "den Gang der Erhehung des Menschen zu
3. The Practical Development of the Notion: Worship
The mediation "between God and man which occurs in the ahstract notion
is not sufficient. The objective and subjective sides of the relation re-
main separate. Between them is only a general reference, an unspiritual
relation. Over against the subject is a foreign power; to knowledge this
object may appear as wholly other, in this world unknown. Furthermore,
since the human individual knows God as absolute subject, it knows itself
only as an accident or predicate of this subject. But the relation is also
positive. The opposition must therefore be reconciled; man must come to
feel and know God in himself.
identisch, jenes ist seine Substanz, sein Subjekt, es ist~
in ihm, sein Wesen, nicht das Wesen eines andern. Diese
Einheit, diese VersOhnung, Wiederherstellung seiner, das
positive Gefflhl des Teilhabens, der Teilnahme an jenem,
Einssein sich zu geben aus jener Entzweiung und seiner Pos-
itivit&t zu geniessen, sich [zu] erfflllen, dies ist mein
Tun, Handeln, zugleich mehr Susserliches Oder inneres, gBtt-
liches Wissen, -ttberhaupt der Kultus
.
XII, BB, p. 202; cf. p. 224.
One of Hegel* s primary philosophical interests was the rehabilita-
tion of these proofs. He not only devotes to them a whole series of public
lectures, but deals with them repeatedly in his Philosophie der Religion
and other works, defending them against the Kantian criticisms which had
placed them in disrepute. Cf. below, pp. 160-174.
J XII, BB, p. 69.




Thus the new relation in which Spirit returns to
itself takes place in
worship. Here man lifts himself to God, wins the certainty
and joy of
having God in his heart and of being united with him.
In the knowledge of God I hare God as my object and hare given my-
self to him. I have God hefore me, am certain of him. I have
planted my-
self on the spiritual ground which is divine. But this relation is merely
theoretical; it lacks the practical element. This practical factor, which
is necessary to complete the notion of religion, is provided in worship.
Worship is "nicht nur Verhlltnis, Wissen, sondern Tun, Handeln, sich diese
Vergewisserung su gehen, daas der Mensch von Gott aufgenommen, su Gnaden
angenommen ist. n^
Only on the volitional plane is a true reconciliation "between my oh-
ject and myself possible. 2 Here I have not only to know of him who is
truth and to be filled by him, hut to know him as in me and myself as in
him, that is, to know myself as in the truth. "Diese Einheit hervorzu-
3
hringen ist das Tun oder die Seite des Kultus."
There are, then, two aspects of the notion of religion. The first
is the theoretical side, that of representation, which refers to the man-
ner in which the divine object appears. It involves an ideal relation "be-
tween God and man, finite consciousness of God. The second is the practi-
cal side, that of worship, which concerns mainly the activity of the human
subject. It involves an active transcendence of the relation of opposi-
4
tion, self-consciousness of man in God and God in man.
* XII, BR, p. 69.
In fact, this practical aspect is essential to the moment of sep-
aration. In pure knowledge I am so absorbed in my object that I know
nothing of myself. The fact that my ohject and I are different is ob-
scured. Only in the practical relation am I for myself, free. Only on the
plane of volitional activity do I stand truly over against my object and at
the same time realize my unity with God. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 226-228.
3 XII, BR, p. 227; cf. pp. 226-228, 237.
4 XII, BR, pp. 202-203, 224-225, 227-228.
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The two aspects of the notion exist in inseparable connection. The
stages of worship, accordingly, correspond throughout to those of the the-
oretical aspect of the notion. In worship are (1) the moment of presup-
posed unity, (2) the sphere of separation, and (3) the moment of restored
unity and reconciliation.
1
Worship involves, therefore: (1) contemplation,
"das ganz allgemeine, unentwickelte subjective Denken und Erhehung in dies
2
ganz allgemeine, abstract e Element; n (2) sentiment or feeling, in which
the subject is "ganz Besonderes, ganz durch und durch in die Bestimmtheit
versenkt und . . . im eigentlichen Sinne subjektiv, nur subjektiv ohne Ob-
3 , ,jektivitftt, ohne Allgemeinheit; H and (3) faith, feeling objectified through
advance to representation and doctrine, nder Begriff des Kultus, die Gewiss-
heit von der Wahrheit des absoluten Geistes in seiner Gemeinde, das Wissen
4der Gemeinde von ihrem Wesen."
Faith marks the culmination of worship and of religion. In it is
realized the complete reconciliation of finite spirit and Absolute Spirit.
This union is the result of a two-sided activity, the grace of God and the
5
sacrifice of man.
4. Synthesis: the Reality of Religion
The attainment of reconciliation between God and man in worship is
the final step in Hegel's detailed development of the notion of religion.
Having treated what are for him the two aspects of the notion, he closes
his discussion. There is thus no synthesis in the usual Hegelian sense.
A synthesis is implied, however, in the entire discussion. The theoreti-
cal relation and the practical reconciliation of God and man constitute
"die Seite der Realitat der Religion," the "Realittt des Begriffs Gottes,"
\ XII, BR, pp. 232-234.
~ XII, BR, p. 239.
f XII, BR, p. 243.
5 XII, BR, pp. 251-252.
XII, BR, p. 258.
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that which, according to the notion, "tlberhaupt zur Realitttt der Idee zu
rechnen ist."
1 Apparently, therefore. Hegel regards the concrete reality
of religion itself as the synthesis. The two aspects, interrelated in liv
ing, organic unity, make up what religion really is. In one place he ex-
presses this specifically:
Das erste VerhSltnis . . . war das des Wissens,
das theoretische Verhffltnis. Das zweite ist das prak-
tische, das Wissen dieser Erhebung, und die Erhebung
ist selbst Wissen. Das dritte Moment ist das Wissen
dieses Wissens. Das ist wirkliche Religion.
Hegel's dialectical development of the notion of religion may be
diagrammatically summarised somewhat as follows:












The concrete reality of religion
B. The Definite Religions
1. General Characteristics
Religion as notion alone is not true religion. It is the very na-
ture of the notion to realise or objectify itself.
Der Geist ... ist nur, insofem er sich setzt,
for sich ist, sich selbst hervorbringt,—er ist nur als
TRtigkeit. Gott, der Begriff, urteilt; erst innerhalb
dieser Kategorie der Sestimmung haben wir exist ierende
Religion.
. . • Der Geist aber ist eben dies, weil er
lebendig flberhaupt ist, fuerst nur an sich oder in sein-
em Begriff su sein, dann in die Existenz zu treten, sich
zu entfalten, sich hervorzubringen, reif su werden, den
Begriff seiner selbst, was er an sich ist, hervorzubring-
en, so dass das, was an sich ist, sein Begriff jetzt fttr
sich sei. 3
1 XII, BR, pp. 278, 202, 224.
I
XII, BR, p. 237.
XII, BR, pp. 70-71; cf. pp. 64-65.
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It is essential to religion, therefore, to exist not only
potential-
ly, as idea, hut actually, in human consciousness. The
notion must deter-
mine itself and become manifest in the definite or ethnical religions.
Consideration of these makes up the second part of Hegel's Philosophic der
Religion . At this stage Spirit has not yet reached its goal; it is, as it
were, under way. Its aim is to "become fttr sich . to attain perfect knowl-
edge of itself. But in the process of doing this, it expresses itself par-
tially and imperfectly in the particular religions. The result is the his-
tory of religion . The historical religions are not accidental growths, hut
rather the necessary objectification of the determinations already con-
tained in the notion of religion.
... Was durch den Begriff bestimmt, im Begriff
e
notwendig ist, hat auch existieren mflssen. ... Die
Beligionen, wie sie aufeinander folgen, sind determiniert
durch den Begriff, nicht Susserlich hestirant; sie sind
"bestinmt durch die Natur des Geistes, der sich gedrttngt
hat in der Welt, urn sich sum Bewusstsein seiner selhst
su bringen.l
The conceptual order of the various religions is governed by the rule
that the idea of God and the self-consciousness of man always correspond to
each other. "Wie sich der Inhalt, Gott, bestimmt, so bestimmt sich auf der
andern Seite der subjektive, der menschliche Geist, der dies Wissen hat."
On the other hand, "Die Vorstellung, welche der Mensch von Gott hat, ent-
2
spricht der, welche er von sich selbst, von seiner Preiheit hat." This
correspondence between the two sides is due to the fact that both are as-
pects of the same notion.
In the definite religions, the notion advances in accordance with the
three major determinations of the logical Idea: Sein, Wesen, and Begriff ,5
The movement begins with the moment of being or immediacy found in nature-
\ XII, BR, pp. 72-73.
I XIII, m, p. 7.
V, BNC, pp. 106-205. Cf. XIII, KB, pp. 19-21.

religion. Here Spirit and nature are still abstractly identical; Spirit
it "noch in der Einheit mit der Natur."
1 Immediacy gives way, however, to
differentiation, and therewith to the religion of essence. Although in es-
sential inner connection. Spirit and nature are here distinguished. This
differentiation appears in the religions of sublimity and beauty. Finally,
religion rises to the plane of the notion, as the religion of utility. But
the notion is still finite and limited and the utility external.
Inasmuch as the definite religions are determinations of Spirit, and
therewith of the notion of religion, they are characterized by the same
three aspects as those found in the notion of religion as such. In dealing
with each religion Hegel considers: (1) its metaphysical notion; (2) its
definite representation, the form in which its notion appears; and (3) its




Though nature-religion is the religion of undifferentiated being, it
already has a certain spiritual character. The being involved is already
conscious being, and the relation to God is a relation of consciousness, 5
But consciousness is not clear about its own spirituality or that of uni-
versal being. Spirit is not yet master of nature. God is all things, Zv
Kolc TToLv, without distinction:
Himmel, Gestirne, Erde, Pflanzen, Tier, Mensch
ist .ein Himmelreich, .ein gOttliches Leben, nicht
[aber] sine Liebe, QLennJ Liebe [istl Unterschiedene
sich vereinend in einem BewusstseinJ^
Historically, nature-religion is manifest mainly in the Oriental religions,
\ XIII, NB, p. 11.
XII, BB, p. 74.
4 XIV, AB, p. 37.
XIII, NB, p. 39.
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and appears in three chief forms.
a. The Religion of Magic
1) . Direct magic t Eskimo and African religion .
1 The chief character-
istic of direct magic is the immediate mastery over nature by the human
will. 2 This rule is not, however, that of Spirit in its universality, but
only that of the particular, contingent human consciousness. The main ob-
ject at this stage is the fulfillment of physical desires.
5
2) . Indirect magic : Chinese state-religion . Here the self-conscious-
ness of man still controls, hut through instruments. It recognises, more-
over, its dependence on the object, and reverences power as free heing.
Bat the will of the subject remains dominant.
h. The Religions of Suhstantiality
1) . The religion of being-in-itself ; Buddhism.
4 On the next higher
level self-consciousness becomes absorbed in itself and conceives heing as
being-in-itself . This is the beginning of objective universality and of &
true definition of God. The highest power, the absolute, is conceived as
substance or being. This being, however, is without qualities, and there-
fore also non-being. Substance, moreover, is still immediate in that it is
sensually present in one or more human individuals. In them it is absolute
5power, the creation and preservation of all things.
2) . The religion of fantasy ; Hinduism .** According to the religion of
1 XIII, NR, pp. 77-86.
2 XIII, NR, p. 78.
3 XIII, NR, pp. 86-119.
* XIII, NR, pp. 119-137.
XIII, NR, p. 122. Western research in Buddhism had only begun in
Hegel's day. Hegel's knowledge of Buddhist religion is therefore very de-
ficient; he apparently knew it only in its Chinese form, as the religion of
Fo. As a result, his treatment of Buddhism is notably unsatisfactory, though
his interpretations of several actually characteristic features are surpris-
ingly accurate.




fantasy, there is one formless, all-inclusive substance, Brahma. All ap-
parently individual entities are hut accidents or predicates of the One,
rising out of it and returning to it. But the One is abstract. Particu-
lar things are therefore external to it and actually independent. They
thus constitute a multiplicity without unity, a fantastic chaos of discon-
nected, uncontrolled beings, lacking order or reason. Everything is aban-
doned to the vagaries of unbridled imagination,*
c. The Religions of Abstract Subjectivity
On the final level of nature-religion appear the first traces of dif-
ferentiation in immediate being. Again there are two forms.
1) . The religion of the good or light-religion : Parsiism . Here God
is conceived as self-determined, as existing independently, in and for him-
self. As such he is the good. But the good itself is still natural and
abstract. Over against it is its opposite, evil. There is thus an ab-
stract dualism of two principles, good and evil, represented by light and
darkness. The good struggles eternally with an external principle.
2) . The religion of riddle : Egyptian religion
. In the next phase a
subjectivity develops which unites in itself the opposing principles. The
negative becomes a determination within the subject. 4 Spirit negates it-
self and then negates the negation; God dies, but returns to life. This
universal subjectivity does not, however, completely transcend its other,
and is therefore full of inconsistency and mystery; it is not yet perfect-
ly free or purely spiritual, but infected with the sensuous. This is seen
in the prevalence of sensuous symbolism among the Egyptians.
3. The Religions of Spiritual Individuality
Already in the nature-religions thought is superior to the merely nat-
\ XIII, NR. p. 147.
t XIII, NR, pp. 186-199.
4 XIII, NR, pp. 200-233.
XIII, NR, p. 203.
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ural powers. But this superiority is developed
inconsistently. As a re-
sult, the content of the nature-religions is a
confused mixture of the
spiritual and the natural. In the second main phase,
however, in the re-
ligions of spiritual individuality, the spiritual is
definitely supreme.
Spirit becomes conscious of itself as free spiritual subject, which re-
places substance and exists for itself. Thought becomes dominant
and de-
1
terminative. The purely material is reduced to mere appearance.
2
a. The Religion of Sublimity: Judaism
At first, Spirit* 8 elevation above nature involves the negation of
the latter. In Judaism there is one God, who is power, wisdom, and right-
eousness. This God is absolutely exclusive, and tolerates no independent
being beside him. The world, including man, is completely dependent on the
free subjectivity of God. All natural or finite beings are only his attri-
butes, servants, or messengers. Hence, though this power is infinite in
itself, in objectifying itself it produces only particularity and limita-
tion. Man* s relation to God is one of external obedience to fixed laws,
4
not one of freedom.
5
b. The Religion of Necessity or Beauty: Greek Religion
In the next form, Spirit is "friendly" to particularity and grants to
nature its own existence. The natural, however, is subordinate, as the or-
t
gan or instrument of the spiritual, the finite form in which Spirit mani-
fests itself. God appears sensuously in beautiful works of art and pene-
trates the daily life of men. Greek religion also avoids the abstraction
of the one; it has many gods. These gods are real persons, spiritual indi-
vidualities. The human subject, moreover, stands in a free, moral relation
1 XIII, NR, pp. 12-13.
? XIII, NR, pp. 13-14; RGI, pp. 51-52, 55-110.
* XIII, RGI, p. 75.
J XIII, RGI, pp. 104-105.& XIII, NR, pp. 13-15; RGI, pp. 52-53, 111-191.
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to them. Greek religion is a human religion.
1
But since Spirit has not
yet transcended the opposition of good and
evil, hoth gods and men are in-
fected with natural heing. Spirit is not yet truly
universal; though par-
ticular, it has not returned to unity.
Moreover, ahove all stands unconscious, selfless, undetermined
uni-
versality: Pate. Ahove the heautiful, above all particulars, above
the
gods themselves hovers a blind, empty, absolute necessity. The freedom of
the Greeks consists ultimately in acquiescence in Fate, and is thus only
an abstract freedom.
2
c. The Religion of Utility: Roman Religion
The Jewish God had one end, himself. The Greek gods, on the other
hand, were finite beings with many finite ends. The Roman religion syn-
thesizes these two extremes. In it, as in Judaism, is one universal end;
but this end, as in the Greek religion, is finite and particular. Roman
religion seeks to maintain the universal dominion of the Roman state. It
is the religion of a practical, selfish people intent on gaining its own
limited end. In keeping with this imperialistic goal, the highest rever-
ence is paid to the Roman emperor. All other persons are subject to him.
The Roman religion is thus a practical, utilitarian religion, its
gods practical gods. The human individual sees in the divine powers means
of satisfying his own subjective interests. Although, therefore, an end
is posited in the objective powers, it is not yet an end which is purely
spiritual or absolute. It is universal, but likewise finite and human.
Universality on this level means simply abstract agreement among the par-
ticular ends of finite individuals,
1 XIII, RGI
, pp. 122-123.
2 XIII, RGI, pp. 192-242; cf. especially pp. 195-197, 207-209, 213,
215, 218, 220, 238, 241.
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C. Tlie Absolute Religion
1
The objectification of the notion in the definite religions
it a
necessary stage, but it is not enough. The complete
realisation of Spirit
requires that the determination be adequate to the notion. In
the definite
religions this demand is not met. The determinateness of the notion
is
limited, abstract, and defective.
2 A third stage is therefore necessary:
the absolute religion, positively represented by Christianity. Only here
does Spirit 1 s appearance correspond to its notion and so fulfill the Idea
of religion. Here Spirit transcends its first manifestation and becomes
its own object. It returns, as it were, to itself, attains complete free-
dom and self-knowledge.4 The absolute religion is ndie Religion, in welch-
er der Begriff der Religion sich selbst objektiv geworden ist," nsu sich
surtlckgekehrt ist, wo die absolute Idee, Gott als Geist nach seiner Wahr-
5
heit und Offenbarkeit fflr das Bewusstsein der Gegenstand ist." Here God
is free and concrete Spirit; having passed from universality to particular-
ity, he now attains true individuality.
The absolute religion, since it corresponds perfectly to the notion
of religion, passes through the same stages as those traversed by the no-
tion itself. Concrete Spirit, the Absolute Idea, is
erstens an und fflr sich: Gott in seiner Bwigkeit vor
Erschaffung der Welt, ausserhalb der Welt; sweitens,
dass Gott die Welt erschafft, dass er die Trennung
set at. Da erschafft er teils die Natur, teils den
endllchen Geist. ... Das Dritte ist, dass durch
diesen Proaess der VersBhnung der Geist das, was er
von sich in seiner Diremtion, in seinem TJrteil unter-
1 It should be noted that Hegel omits consideration of Babylonian
religion, and more seriously, of Islam. His works contain numerous ref-
erences to Mohammedanism (including one in XIII, RGI, p. 100), but he
gives it no place in his classification of religions.
2 XII, BR, pp. 74-75.
T XII, BR, pp. 65, 206.
J XII, BR, pp. 65, 71-72.5 XIV, AR, p. 3; XII, BR, pp. 74-75.
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schieden hat, mit sich versChnt hat und so der heil-
ige Geist, der Geist in seiner Gemeinde ist.
A
These three spheres are designated as the Kingdoms of the Father, the
Son, and the Spirit.
1. The Kingdom of the Father
Here God exists in the form of universality, as eternal being-in-
and-with-itself : in relation to the subjective consciousness, God is pure
thought; with reference to space, he is spaceless, outside the world; with
respect to time, he is timeless, as Eternal Idea. As such, God is the no-
tion, and therefore three-fold, as expressed in the Christian doctrine of
the Trinity. In the absolute religion, the universal which particularises
itself and returns to concrete individuality is God the Father who "begets
3
the Son and in love returns to identity with himself as the Holy Spirit.
But just as each element of the notion is not a mere part tut rather itself
the entire notion, so is each of the persons of the Trinity itself the en-
tire Godhead. Spirit is the concrete unity of its three aspects.
2. The Kingdom of the Son
Here Spirit has the form of appearance, of part icularisat ion, of be-
ing-for other: with regard to the subjective consciousness, God is in the
element of representation; with respect to space, he appears as the world,
the divine history as real, God in perfect determinate being; with reference
to time, he is the divine history as past.4 This appearance of the Idea as
nature is represented in Christianity as the creation of the world. The
thought behind this is that it is God's very nature to create, to particu-
larize himself. This self-externalization gives rise to a separation or
| XIV, AB, p. 30; cf. pp. 28-29.
XIV, AB, pp. 65-66.
* XIV, AB, p. 57.
XIV, AB, pp. 65-66.
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estrangement "between God and the world which, with regard to man as a part
of nature, is represented in the doctrines of the fall and original sin.
Though this estrangement, like the creation, is represented as a definite
event in time, it is eternally true, and involved in the very notion of man.
But separation requires reconciliation, the return of man to God, of
the particular to the universal. Man, even in his separation from God,
is identical with him. This essential unity is represented in religion hy
the doctrines of the incarnation and the death, resurrection, and ascension
of Christ. In these doctrines the popular mind has before it man's kinship
with God as a sensuous, given fact. God enters the world in human form,
suffers, and dies, but rises again to ascend to his glory. That is, the
particularized universal returns to itself. The reconciliation between God
and man becomes a reality,
3. The Kingdom of the Spirit
The third form of the Idea is that of its return out of appearance
into itself, absolute individuality: with reference to subjective conscious-
ness, God is here subjectivity as such; with respect to space, he is the
Spirit in his community, his Church; with regard to time, he is the pres-
ent, the spiritual nowness of immediate subjectivity. 1
The reconciliation of God and man is a reality not only for a partic-
ular man. but for all men. The Spirit of God is therefore represented in
Christianity as dwelling in a community of men. the Church, "Gott in seiner
Gemeinde wohnend."
2
In the Church, as the kingdom of God on earth, is
achieved the complete reconciliation of Spirit and nature, of God and man.
of the universal and the particular. Here Spirit has attained the level of
concrete unity and true individuality.
2 XIV, AR, pp. 65-66.




HEGEL ' S VIEW OF THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
The previous chapter has sought to outline, without attempting to
criticize, the dominant features of Hegel's philosophy of religion. The
present chapter will begin the detailed investigation of the empirical and
the rational factors in Hegel's thought hy considering his view of the na-
ture of religious experience. What, according to Hegel, is the psycholog-
ical locus of man's religious life? What are for him the distinctive
marks of that aspect of man's conscious activity which may he called reli-
gious? To what extent is his account of the essence of religious experi-
ence hased on psychological data, and how far is it governed hy the ac-
tivity of reason? Such are the questions which we have now to consider.
I. The Importance of Personal Experience in Religion
One of the first things to strike the careful reader of the
Philosophic der Religion is Hegel's insistence that the philosophy of re-
ligion deals with what it discovers in experience. Philosophical inquiry
seeks not to awaken or produce religion, but rather to understand the re-
ligion which it finds. Moreover, religion cannot be understood without
being experienced.
Zunftchst muss [nun] dies das bestimmte Bewusst-
sein fiber unsern Zweck [sein] , dass die Religion [ein]
in jedem Vorausgesetztes und Vorhandenes, der St off ist,
den wir nur begreifen wollen. Es ist nicht darum zu
tun, diese Grundlage hervorbringen [zu} wollen, sondern
sie ist die Sache, die in jedem fftr sich vorhanden sein
muss. [Es handelt sich] nicht [darum], ein der Substanz
nach Neues, Fremdes in den Menschen hinein[zu] feringen;
es ware ebenso, als wenn man in einen Hund Geist hinein-
bringen wollte dadurch, dass man ihn geistige Erzeugnis-
se sehen oder Witziges fressen oder gedruckte Schriften
kauen liesse, oder als wenn man einen Blinden damit
sehend machen wollte, dass man ihm von Farben vor-
sprSche. Wer nicht seine Brust auch aus dem Treiben des
i
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Endlichen ausgeweitet und in den reinen Rther der
Seele geschaut, inn genossen, wer nicht das frohe
und ruhige Gefflhl des Ewigen, sei es auch nur ge-
trubt in der Form der Sehnsucht, gehabt hat, der
besftsse den Stoff nicht, von dem hier die Rede ist.
Er kann etwa eine Vorstellnng davon haben, aber der
Inhalt ist nieht seine eigene Sache; es ist ein
Fremdes, tun das er sieh bemuht.*
No merely external historical knowledge of religion suffices. One
may, says Hegel, know which dogmas have heen proclaimed "by the various
church councils and for what reasons, understand the origin of religious
beliefs, and know intimately the other facts of church history, yet have
no genuine knowledge of religion whatever. No amount of familiarity with
the convictions which have been held about Cod can fill the place of per-
sonal experience of God. He who would understand the inner truth of re-
ligion must do more than study the religion of others; he himself must
have religion,.
Ein Blinder kann mit dem Bahmen, der Leinwand, dem
Firnis eines Gem&ldes sich zu tun machen; [er kannJ die
Geschichte des Meiers, das Schicksal des Gem&ldes, [seinenj
Preis, in welche HBnde [es gekommen ist, wissenj usf. -and
nichts vom GemSlde selbst sehen, 2




nichts gewusst wird, was nicht in der Erfahrung ist,
oder wie dasselbe auch ausgedrtlckt wird, was nicht als
geftthlte Wahrheit , als innerlich geoffenbartes Ewiges,
als geglaubtes Heiliges, oder welche Ausdrticke sonst ge-
hraucht werden, vorhanden ist. Derm die Erfahrung ist
ehen dies, dass der Inhalt—und er ist der Geist—an
sich
.
Substans und also Gegenstand des Bewusstseins ist.'
1 XII, BR, pp. 8-9.
| XII, BR, p. 28; cf. pp. 71, 289.
II, FDG (3d ed.), p. 558. (Except where the third edition is
specified, references to PDG are to the second edition. Italics in all
quotations from Hegel, when not otherwise indicated, are Hegel's.) Cf.
also V, ENC, pp. 43-44; XII, BR, p. 20; JUB, III, FHFR, p. 30. "Die
erste Quelle unserer Erkenntnis," writes Hegel in the last-named pas-
sage, "ist die Erfahrung.**
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The philosophical study of religion, therefore, deals
with what is
given in experience. We mast ask what, in Hegel's view, is the nature
of
this experience.
II. The Basis of Beligion: Thought
What, asks Hegel, is the seat of religion in man, the peculiar ac-
tivity of the mind through which God is experienced? His answer is im-
plied in his definition of religion as the relation of the human spirit
to the Ahsolute Spirit,
1
or as "das Bewusstsein ... des an und fdr sich
Seienden, unbeschrftnkt ganz allgemein Wahren," "Bewusstsein von Gott flber-
haupt."2 Prom this conception of religion it follows that its proper
sphere is thought (though in the figurative form of Vorstellung ). Only
for thought can there he that elevation ahove the limited and sensuous to
the truly universal which is religion.
5 This is true whether we view re-
ligion from the standpoint of God or from that of man:
Denken ist allein der Boden dieses Inhalts, die Tfttigkeit
des Allgemeinen, das Allgemeine in seiner Tfttigkeit,
Wirksamkeit . Oder sprechen wir es aus als Auffassen des
Allgemeinen, so ist das, fttr welches das Allgemeine ist,
immer das Denken.
Since the activity involved in the religious consciousness is that of
Spirit, the self-differentiating and self-realizing universal , it must
center in thought. Thinking is
das Element, die ahsolute, ursprttngliche Weise der Tfttig-
keit oder (der) Zustand
. . ., dem das Bewusstsein des
GOttlichen zukommt: nur im und fttr das Denken ist Gott
At first sight, we seem here to have left the warm, familiar atmos-
phere of experience for the cold, bleak air of abstract thought. Hegel be-
gins by demanding that philosophy deal with the living experience of reli-
* Cf. above, pp. 32-33.
2 XII, BB, pp. 187, 156; cf. pp. 7, 50, 110, 142.
XII, BB, pp. 193-194, 201; XIV, BDG, p. 110.
* XII, BB, p. 193; cf. pp. 154, 187; JUB.III, PHPB, p. 225.
XII, BB, p. 239; cf. p. 154.
tt
gion as found, but when he comes to define the experience which he finds,
he seems to have in mind a kind of religion very different from that pres-
ent in ordinary human life. He selects, one might say, one aspect of con-
crete religious experience and makes it the whole of religion. In so do-
ing he overlooks the important part played by feeling and volition. This
precise charge has been made repeatedly against Hegel.*
As will be seen, however, this criticism is unfair. When Hegel says
that God can be known only in thinking, he does not mean that religious ex-
perience is exhausted in thought, but rather that religion is possible only
where thought is active. A being that does not think, whatever else it may
do, cannot be religious. In this sense thought is the condition of reli-
gion. This emphasis comes clearly to light in Hegel*s criticism of the
theology of feeling, and likewise in his discussions of the place of will
in religion. Accurate definition of the full meaning of thought and of re-
ligious experience for Hegel will be possible, therefore, only after a
careful examination of these other aspects of consciousness. We shall con-
sider first his view of the place of feeling in religion.
III. The Place of Feeling in Religion
A. Hegel's Recognition of Feeling
One who, familiar with some of the criticisms advanced against Hegel,
approaches for the first time Hegel's own discussions of religion, is im-
pressed by the difference between what Hegel actually says about feeling
and what many of his opponents have credited him with saying. For, far
from excluding feeling from religion, Hegel repeatedly recognizes its im-
portance and emphasizes its necessity.
J
Cf. above, pp. 2-3, 5-6, 10-11.
2 XII, BR, pp. 103, 155, 238-239.
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1. In Hegel's Early Theological Writings
This regard for the emotional side of religion is
particularly evi-
dent in the theological writings of Hegel's youth.
The earlier of these
writings
1
offer an interpretation of religion primarily in terms of the
Kantian ethics of moral reason. Beginning, however, late in 1795, in the
latter part of his Berne residence, Hegel turns away from Kantian ration-
alism and becomes genuinely mystical in his approach to religion. In "Die
Posit ivitat der christlichen Religion" (1795-1796), he declares that reli-
gion cannot he torn out of the heart and life of the people "durch kalte
Schlttsse, die man sich da in der Studierstube vorrechnet ." In the spread
of Christianity, he maintains, "eher alles andre als Vernunft und Verstand
sind angewendet worden." Here and in the writings immediately following
Hegel regards the Infinite to which man is related in religion as incom-
prehensible to rational thought. Only when reflective conceptions are sup-
plemented by "practical" or "dynamic" ones can man reach God.
Hegel's central conception at this stage is that of Leben . The world
is essentially life, an infinity of living beings which is at once a union
of the finite and the infinite and the separation of itself in this union.
Out of this living whole finite life draws
das Lebendige, frei vom Yergehenden, die Seziehung
ohne das Tote und sich TCtende der Mannigfaltigkeit
,
nicht eine Einheit, eine gedachte Beziehung, sondern
alllebendiges
,
allkrSftiges, unendliches Leben, und
nennt es Gott, ist nimmer denkend, oder betrachtend,
weil sein Objekt nichts Eeflektiertes, Totes in sich
trfigt.
Diese Erhebung des Menschen, nicht vom Endlichen
zum Unendlichen, denn dieses sind nur Produkte der
blossen Reflexion, und als solcher ist ihre Trennung
That is, those dating from the Tttbingen years and the early part
of the Berne period; primarily, the fragments on "Volksreligion und Christ-
entum" (1793-1795), and "Das Leben Jesu" (1795). Cf. "Das Leben Jesu,"
Nohl, TJS, p. 75.
2 Nohl, TJS, p. 221.
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absolut sondern vom endlichen Leben zum unendlichen
Leben ist Religion. 1
E*ery human individual, then, is part of a rich universal life.
This life is characterized hy a dialectical movement in which the individ-
ual is reconciled with the whole in mystical love. Hegel's characteriza-
tion of this love not only shows his high regard for religious feeling at
this point in his development, hut also foreshadows the dialectic which is
to play so large a part in his later philosophy. Love, he writes, is
ein Geftthl des Lehendigen. ... Sie ist nicht Verstand,
dessen Beziehungen das Mannigfaltige immer als Mannig-
faltiges lassen und dessen Einheit selhst Entgegensetzung-
en sind; sie ist nicht Vernunft, die ihr Bestimmen dem Be-
st immten schlechthin entgegensetzt ; sie ist nicht s Begrenz-
endes, nichts Begrenztes, nichts Endliches; sie ist ein Ge-
ftthl, aher nicht ein einzelnes Geftthl; aus dem einzelnen
Geftthl, weil es nur ein Teilleben, nicht das ganze Lehen
ist, drfingt sich das Leben durch AuflOsung zur Zerstreuung
in der Mannigfaltigkeit der Geftthle und urn sich in diesem
Ganzen der Mannigfaltigkeit zu finden; in der Liehe ist dies
Ganze nicht als in der Summe vieler Besonderer, Getrennter
enthalten; in ihr findet sich das Lehen selhst, als eine Ver-
doppelung seiner Selhst, und Einigkeit desselhen; das Lehen
hat von der unentwickelten Einigkeit aus, durch die Bildung
den Kreis zu einer vollendeten Einigkeit durchlaufen.
In addition to the emphasis on feeling contained in this remarkable
passage, it is important to note carefully two related factors. In the
first place, both Verstand and the Vernunft which Hegel here rejects are
the same abstract, analytic understanding which he censures throughout his
entire later work. Secondly, the love which he champions is not at all
the individual emotion which he later condemns, but a living unity which,
though including particularity and variety, transcends them and attains
concrete wholeness of life; in other words, it is something only slightly
different from the concrete reason which forms the key to Hegel's mature
| "Systemfragment von 1800. " Nohl, TJS, p. 347.
3
Fragment on "Die Idebe" (1797). Nohl, TJS, p. 379.




In short, Hegel's early tributes to feeling are neither
a glorifi-
cation of the irrational as such nor an attack on synoptic
reason, but
rather an assertion of the concrete wholeness of life and a rejection of
the ahstract thinking which analyzes reality into discrete parts and de-
stroys the living Spirit-hond which gives these parts significance. He-
gel attacks reason "because reason as he has found it thus far is a cold,
lifeless, analytical process which devitalizes and distorts the rich, uni-
versal life of true reality. He rejects the abstractly rational in the in-
terests of the empirical. This empirical, however, contains within it the
germ of a higher rationality.
This, of course, does not diminish, but rather accentuates, the sig-
nificance of the high regard for religious feeling which the Jugendschrift-
en reveal. At this stage, religion for Hegel is mystical communion of life
with life.
2. In Hegel's Later Religious Thought
But Hegel's recognition of the importance of emotion in religion is
not confined to his early writings. On the contrary, it is evident in all
of his mature discussions of religion. The introduction to his Phllosophie
der Religion , for example, is in beauty and depth of feeling unsurpassed in
the whole literature of the philosophy of religion.
"Wir mflssen und dttrfen,** writes Hegel,
selbst ein Leben mit und in dem Ewigen betrachten, und
insofern wir dies Leben empfinden, ein Geftthl desselben
eugleich haben, so ist die Bnpfindung AuflBsung alles




Wie wir auf der hBchsten Spitze eines Gebirges,
von all em bestimmten Anblick des Irdischen entfernt, in
1 XII, BR, p. 2.
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den blauen Himmel una hineinsehen und mit Ruhe und Ent-
fernung alle Beschrflnkungen der Landschaften und der
Welt ttberblicken, bo ist es, dass der Mensch in der Re-
ligion mit dem geistigen Ange, enthoben der Httrte dieser
Wirklichkeit , sie nur als einen fliessenden Schein be-
trachtet, der in dieser reinen Region nur im Strahle der
Befriedigung und der Liebe seine Schattierungen, Unter-
schiede und Lichter zur ewigen Ruhe gemildert abspiegelt.
Es ist dem Menschen in dies em Anschauen und Gefflhle nicht
urn sich selbst zu tun, nicht urn sein Interesse, (seinej
Eitelkeit, (den] Stole seines Wissens und Ergehens, son-
dern urn diesen seinen Inhalt, urn den absoluten Zweck al-
lein, die Ehre Gottes kundzutun und seine Herrlichkeit
zu offenbaren. 1
No one can read words like these and fail to realize that their au-
thor has in his own life experienced religion in all its many-sided rich-
ness,
Hegel's recognition of feeling in this opening hymn to religion is,
it must be admitted, rather general. But specific statements are abundant.
It is possible, says Hegel, to know God in various ways*
• • • Das Zeugnis des Geistes kann auf mannigfache
verschiedene Weise vorhanden sein; es ist nicht zu fordern,
dass bei alien Menschen die Wahrheit auf philosophischem
Wege hervorgebracht werde.
God may be reached not only through reason, but also through faith,
authority, and revelation; he may be intellectually known, but he may also
be represented, perceived, and felt, as in feelings of reverence, thanks-
giving, and love. 3 Regarding faith in particular Hegel declares, in the
midst of a sweeping criticism of subjectivism, HAber es ist unendlich
wichtig, diese subjektive Grundlage, welche Luther Glauben genannt hat, so
hochgestellt zu haben." The same regard for the affective elements in
consciousness appears in Hegel's frequent treatments of love in connection
\ XII, BR, pp. 3-4.
~ XIV, AR, p. 23; cf# pp. 67-68.
| XII, BR, pp. 157-158; XIV, AR, p. 75.
* XII, BR, p. 161; cf. p. 93.
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with the absolute religion.
Yet Hegel is not satisfied with insisting that religion may he pres-




nur kann aller Inhalt im Gefflhle sein, er soil una muss es audi." . .
Was ich fflr wahr halten, was mir gelt en soli, muss auch in meinem Geftthle
sein, zu meinem Sein, Charakter gehBren." To he a part of me, religion,
like all other conscious content, roust he in my heart.
Die Religion muss geftQilt werden, muss im Geftthle
sein, sonst ist sie nicht Religion. ... Dies muss als
richtig zugegehen werden; denn das Cefflhl ist nicht
s
anderes als meine Subjektivitfit in ihrer Einfachheit und
Unmittelbarkeit , ich selbst als diese seiende PersBn-
lichkeit.4
Everything, to hecome spiritually alive in me, must he felt, and if it is
truly important, it must he felt passionately and deeply. "Es ist nichts
Grosses ohne Leidenschaft vollhracht worden, noch kann es ohne solche voll-
5
hracht werden. " In religion this is expressed hy the representation of
God as love. "Darin ist ehen gesagt, dass Gott pr&sent ist, dass dies als
eignes Gefflhl, als Selbstgeffthl sein muss."^
In fact, it is the very nature of thought itself to manifest itself
as perception, representation, and feeling. This it does in religion.
1 Eternal love is simply Spirit returning to itself, expressed in the
language of feeling. Hegel's mature conception of love is not essentially
different from that of his youth (cf. ahove, p. 53), though the rational as-
pect of the dialectic involved is undeveloped in the latter. Cf. XIV, AR,
pp. 57. 75, 81, 145-146, 158, 170-171.
* XII, BR, pp. 104, 107; cf. pp. 82, 105. Cf. the words of Faust:
Wenn ihr*s nicht fffhlt, ihr werdet*s nicht erjagen,
Wenn es nicht aus der Seele dringt,
Und mit urkrfiftigem Behagen
Die Heraen aller HBrer zwingt. (Faust, I, 1; 11. 534-537)
^ Foreword to Hinrichs* Beligl onsphilosophie . JOB, XX, p. 21.
7 XIV, BDG, p. 32. Cf. VIII, PWG, p. 20.
I V, ENC, p. 413.
XII, BR, pp. 170-171.
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Der Mensch ist nicht nur rein denkend, sondern das
Denken selbst manifestiert sich als Anschauen, als Vor-
stellen; die absolute Wahrheit, die dem Menschen geoffen-
tart ist, muss also auch f«r ihn als Vorstellenden, als
Anschauenden, fttr ihn als fflhlenden, empfindenden Mensch-
en sein.l
Beligion, therefore, if it is to exist at all, roust he a living reality in
the emotional consciousness of man,
B. Hegel's Bnphasis on the Inadequacy of Peeling
But while Hegel maintains that feeling is a necessary element in re-
ligion, he insists even more vigorously that it is insufficient. It is true
that the heart is the source of the content of religion, hut after all, he
points out, this is not saying very much. For just as the seed is not only
the first form of the tree, its origin and potentiality, hat also the result
of the tree's entire developed life, so also is feeling not only the source
and earliest form of appearance of all content, hut likewise itself a prod-
2
uct in that it is dependent on the content for its meaning. Feeling alone,
therefore, is inadequate. It simply holds as enveloped potentiality a con-
tent which must justify itself on other grounds.
It was the accepted presupposition of the theology of Hegel's day
that feeling is the true and only form in which religion maintains its gen-
uineness. Convinced that this subjective view would ultimately mean the
destruction of real religion, Hegel entered the lists as the champion of
reason and objectivity. His criticisms of the theology of feeling are fre-
quent and detailed. They may be summarized under four heads.
1. The Subjectivity of Feeling
A sole reliance on feeling, says Hegel, is purely subjective and
therefore one-sided, making no provision for the objective, universal ele-
* XIV, BDG, p. 177.
2 XII, BE, p. 106.
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ment which is essential to religion.
1 Religion is more than an exalted
feeling of the subject; it involves a real union of the human individual
2
with an objectively real God, But feeling alone can never establish the
reality of God. Subjective certainty, though important, is not enough;
delirious people are certain of the images which they see, hut they do not
have knowledge. Subjective faith by itself is "nichtig und unvollstfindig;
"
it lacks the objective moment.
Die Beligion auf die blosse subjektive Bichtung—
mein Herz all es——zu stellen, hat den Kultus vernichtet
und ebenso wie das Herausgehen aus seinem subjektiven
Herzen zu Handlungen auch das Herausgehen des Bewusst-
seins sum objektiven Wissen; eins ist aufs innigste mit
dem andern verbunden. Das, was der Mensch mit Beziehung
auf Gott zu tun zu haben meint, hfingt von seiner Vorstell-
ung von Gott ab, und er kann umgekehrt nicht irgend etwas
Bestinintes in Sticksicht auf ihn zu tun zu haben meinen,
wenn er keine bestimmte Vorstellung von ihm als Gegen-
stand, der als objektiv an und fflr sich seiend gilt, hat
oder haben zu kOnnen meint.'
To say that I feel religion is simply to say that it is mine, that
it belongs to me as a particular individual, not that it is true.4 "...
5
Darin, dass etwas gewiss ist, ist es noch nicht wahr." If, therefore,
religion is to retain its claim to a content of objective truth, it must
rest on reason.
Furthermore, a religion of feeling without reason not only surrenders
all claim to knowledge of the object of religion, but also removes all ba-
sis of understanding between religious subjects. The individual who shuts
himself in his own particularity "bricht die Gemeinschaftlichkeit mit an-
6
dern ab;—man muss ihn stehen lassen." Common ground can be found only
J
XII, BB, p. 243; XIV, AB, p. 200.
Z XIV, AB, p. 5.
* XII, BB, p. 161.
5 XII, BB, pp. 56, 97.
g
XII, BB, p. 95; cf. p. 85; XIV, BDG, pp. 29-30.
XIV, BDG, p. 36.
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where there is mutual confidence in and use of reason, an appeal to the
universal.
Actually, feeling contains in itself the need of being transcended.
The very fact that it exists in spirit drives it on to representative
thought. It is the nature of man as spirit, consciousness, to have an ob-
ject, an opposite over against himself; therefore his feelings are at the
same time representations. In his feeling, then, he is forced on to con-
sciousness of an object which is the content of his feeling. Religion is
therefore
nicht nur Gewissheit, subjektive Bnpfindung, IdentitSt
meines empirischen Ich, sondern Wahrhelt an und fflr sich,
also religiOse Lehre, [die in} Kunst, Bildung, sonstige
Vorstellungen [sich ausbreitet}
2. The Selfishness and Pride in the Emphasis on Feeling
In consequence of its subjectivity, a religion based on feeling is
in danger of deifying the selfish, particular desires of human beings.
God, far from being objectively real, becomes a mere product of the weak-
2
ness, joy, fear, and hope of man. When feeling is made central, it is
left to the subject to say what feelings he will have. This absolute in-
determination allows the individual to reject the guidance of reason, to
take as his standard and justification his own arbitrary will to be and do
what pleases him, and to make himself the oracle of what kind of religion
is noble and good. This, says Hegel, is religious vanity. The religious
humility which denies the possibility of knowing God is really pride, for
those who have it affirm themselves to be absolute and infinite and make
their own desires the supreme realities. Thus Demut refutes itself and
J III, BB, p. 247; cf. pp. 244-246.
2 III, BR, p. 56.
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becomes Hochmut. True humility, however, "besteht darin, den Geist in
die Wahrheit zu versenken."
2 Genuine religion involves complete self-
renunciation, absolute self-forgetfulness in dedication to God. The re-
ligious man is conscious of his true self only in so far as he gives up
his "beschrflnkte, endliche Interessen, Wunsche, Hoffnungen. . . »" To
4
make contact with the Infinite, I must surrender my particularity.
Der Mensch liebt das Geffthl, weil er darin nur
seine PartikularitSt vor sich hat; es ist die stete
Beminiszenz des Ich, wfihrend, wer in der Sache selbst
lebt, sei sie Wissenschaft , Kunst, Becht, Beligion,
sich selbst vergisst, Deshalb appelliert die Eitel-
keit, die Selbstgeffilligkeit , die stets im Genusse
ihrer selbst sein will, gem an das Geffthl. So aber
kommt sie nur zu sich und nie zur Sache und deshalb
auch nicht zum objektiven Handeln. Ein Mensch, der
noch mit seinem Geffthl zu tun hat, ist noch nicht fer-
tig, ist ein Anffinger im Wissen, Handeln, usf.^
In brief, the person who takes feeling as his guide is still a child;
he is not yet grown up. The mature man subordinates his own particular de-
sires in the interests of objective truth. This is essentially what is
meant by love in religion, nDie Liebe uberhaupt ist das Ablassen von der
Beschrftnkung des Herzens auf seinen besonderen Pankt. n^ Such love is the
essence of religion.
Das Wesen der wahrhaften Beligion ist die Liebe ,
Sie ist wesentlich Gesinnung als Erkenntnis der Wahr-
heit des menschlichen Willens, Die religiOse Liebe
ist nicht nur die natttrliche Anhftngigkeit; oder nur
moralisches Wohlwollen; nicht eine unbestimmt allge-
meine schwachsinnige Empfindung, sondern bewShrt sich
im Einzelnen mit absoluter Aufopferung.
. . , Der
Grund der Liebe ist das Bewusstsein von Gott und seinem
Weaen als der Liebe und sie daher die hOchste Demuth,
Ich soli mir nicht die Ob.jektivita't in der Liebe sein,
XII, BE, pp. 137-158; cf, p. 148.
XIV, BDG, p. 177; cf, XII, BB, p. 138.
XIII, BGI, p, 230.
XII, BB, p. 258,
XII, BB, pp, 109-110; cf, p. 237.
XIV, BDG, p. 38.
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sondern Gott . aber in seinem Erkennen soli ich mich
selbst vergessen.*
At this point Hegel's insight into religion and life is profound.
The very heart of all high religion is precisely this spirit of
self-for-
getfulness and self-devotion which Hegel so eloquently demands. Religion
at its hest has always said, "Not my will, but thine, he done,"
Here it may he fairly asked whether Hegel is altogether just to feel-
ing in linking it so intimately with egotism and vain pride. Is feeling
always selfish? Love is a feeling, yet is not genuine love the most un-
selfish thing we know? In fact, Hegel himself offers love as the supreme
example of self-forgetfulness. In view of the beautiful, unselfish piety
of a Schleiermacher, is it not clear that religious emotion may involve the
very self-forgetfulness which Hegel requires? All of this he would admit.
He means simply that to base religion on feeling unguided by reason places
religion in danger of becoming, like the Bible in the hands of some theolo-
gians, a mere wax nose which each individual may fashion to suit his own
3
convenience. A primarily emotional emphasis which suppresses the ration-
al element opens the way to all sorts of aberrations and fanatical extrav-
agances in religion. This view is abundantly confirmed by experience and
history. It cannot be denied that Hegel, in the heat of conflict, is some-
times more extreme, as when he says that the view which grounds religious
truth in feeling originates in the very feelings of selfishness and pride
which it encourages. But such a statement does not fairly represent his
true emphasis. Peeling, Hegel would say, may be nobly religious, but it may
also be selfish and vain. Therefore it cannot be the fundamental thing in
1 JUB, III, PHPR, p. 225; cf. p. 97; XI?, AR, p. 81; XIV, BDG, pp. 37-
42.
Cf. above, p. 60.
| XII, BR, p. 38.
The lofty religious feeling of Schleiermacher himself, Hegel might
add, is noble not because it is feeling, but because it has a thought con-
tent which is noble.
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religion. This suggests a third objection made "by Hegel to the theology
of feeling.
3. The Dependence of Feeling on Thought-content
Peeling is a mere form into which any content may he poured, the
worst as well as the best. It is therefore ethically and religiously neu-
tral.
Es kann kein Zweifel dagegen Statt finden, dass
das Geftthl ein Boden ist, der fttr sich unbestimrat, zu-
gleich das Mannigfaltigste und Entgegengesetzteste in
sich schliesst. Das Geftthl fttr sich ist die natttrliche
Subjektivitflt , ebenso wohl fShig gut zu seyn, als bBse,
fromm zu seyn, als gottlos.
. . .
Es ist nichts, was
nicht geftthlt werden kann, und geftthlt wird.
All human conditions and circumstances, irrespective of their con-
tent, are felt. "Das Geftthl ist die gemeinschaftliche Form fttr den ver-
2
schiedenartigsten Inhalt." We feel God, truth, beauty, love, and joy, but
also evil, injustice, envy, hate, vanity, pain, enmity, and sorrow.
Gott, insofern er in unserm Geftthl ist, hat in Hin-
sicht der Form vor dem schlechtesten Inhalt e nichts vor-
aus, sondern sprosst, die kOniglichste Slume, auf dem-
selben Boden neben dem wuchserndsten Unkraut auf.^
It is true, Hegel might have added, that the pure in heart shall see
God, but it is also true that the fool hath said in his heart, "There is
no God. H We feel the natural as well as the spiritual, the unreal and im-
agined no less than the real and existing, the lowest and most contradic-
tory as well as the highest and noblest. I can feel in anticipation some-
thing which does not yet and perhaps never will exist, and in imagination
something which never has been. Hegel adds, rather humorously,
Ich kann mir einbilden, ein Irttchtiger, ein grosser Mensch
zu sein, f&liig, alles fttr das Recht, f«r meine Meinung
Foreword to Hinrichs» Religionsphilosophie
. JDB, XX, pp. 18, 20.
XIV, BDG, p. 35; cf. p. 34.
XII, BR, p. 101.
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aufzuopfern, kann mir einbilden, viel gentttzt, viel
geschaffen zu haben; aber es ist die Frage, ob es wahr
ist, ob dem auch so sei, wie wir fflhlen. 1
A thing is not true, therefore, simply because we feel it.
Wenn das, was im Geftthl ist, daruB schon wahr
wBre, so mttsste alles wahr sein, der Apisdienst usf.
Die Yorstellung hingegen enthSlt schon mehr das Ob-
jektive, das, was den Gehalt, die Bestimmtheit des
Gefffhls ausmacht. Und auf diesen Inhalt kommt es an,
er muss sich fflr sich berechtigen.^
The meaning and truth of a feeling depend entirely on its content,
which can be tested only by thought. Feeling as such is contingent; it
lacks the element of universality which thought alone can provide. "Der
wahrhafte Nerv ist der wahrhafte Gedanke; nur wenn er wahrhaft ist, ist
das Gefflhl wahrhafter Art." Feeling is religious, therefore, only when
it involves a certain thinking relation between finite spirit and the ob-
jectively real universal Spirit. As Hegel expresses it,
BeligiOs ist die Bnpfindung, ins ofera sie einen
eigentttmlichen Inhalt, die Bestimmtheit als unmittel-
bares Denken des schlechthin Allgemeinen und al s ganz
empirische Subjektivitflt , und das spekulative Vernalt-
nis derselben.*
Once again it is clear that Hegel's criticism is firmly grounded in
experience. He himself recognises this fact and uses it as an argument for
his view. After pointing out the purely formal character of feeling as
feeling, he adds, "Das wissen wir aus der Erfahrung,"^ On the other hand,
the view that a given content finds its attestation in feeling "widerspricht
unser sonstiges Bewusstsein aufs best immt est e."
1 XII, BE, p. 100; cf. pp. 101, 102.
| XII, BR, p. 107.
' XIII, KB, p. 54. Cf. XII, BB, p. 101; XIV, BDG-, pp. 34-35.
J XII, BE, p. 244.
\ XII, BB, p. 100.6 XII, BB, p. 102.
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4. The Limitation of Religion to Thinking Beings
A fourth Hegelian criticism of feeling is based on a comparison of
man with the animals. Man, observes Hegel, is distinguished from the low-
er animals mainly by his power of thought. Animals do not think, but nei-
ther do they hare religion. From this Hegel concludes that the central,
determining factor in religion is thought. His formulation of the argu-
ment is as follows:
Das Tier hat Gefflhle, aber nur Geftthle; der Mensch
ist denkend, und nur der Mensch hat Religion. Daraus ist
zu schliessen, dass die Religion den innersten Sits im
Denken hat.*
Here Hegel commits the obvious logical fallacy of having more in his
conclusion than his premises allow. The premises that all men think and
that all religious beings are men lead perfectly logically to the conclu-
sion that all religious beings are beings who think, but they do not dem-
onstrate that religious beings are such primarily because they think. In
other words, the argument (if its premises be granted) proves that thought
is indispensable to religion, but not that thought is the innermost seat
2
of religion. There may be other essential elements.
Tet the argument is not without significance. The proof that think-
ing is essential to religion is all that is necessary to overthrow a the-
ology of exclusive reliance on feeling. But while the major premise may
be taken as axiomatic, the minor premise is not self-evident. The assump-
tion that no animals have religion is at least, in the lack of definite
1 XII, BR, p. 195; cf. p. 259; XIV, AR, p, 67; XIV, BBG, p. 54;
V, ENC
, pp. 52, 542, 548; JUB, XX, p. 26.
2 From the inductive standpoint the result is the same. Here Hegel
would have to show that religious beings and non-religious beings have all
other circumstances in common save one, thought, which occurs only in the
former. But even this would do no more than establish a causal relation
between religion and thought, without showing which is the condition of the
other. It may be added that Hegel himself mentions at least one other point
which he thinks distinguishes man from the animals, the fact that man works.
(XIV, AR, pp. 126, 128.)
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evidence, open to question. The argument therefore lacks conclusiveness,
and is certainly the weakest offered "by Hegel in criticism of the theology
of feeling. Since he shows, on other grounds, the great importance of
thought in religion, he does not need this additional argument, and only
weakens his cause "by including it.
Another argument drawn "by Hegel from a comparison of man with the ani-
mals is highly significant, though seriously marred "by extravagance of lan-
guage. He writes,
Grflndet sich die Religion im Menschen nur auf ein
Geftlhl, so hat solches richtig keine weitere Bestimmung,
als das Geftthl seiner Abhftngigkeit zu seyn, und so wttre
der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trttgt dieses am stBrk-
sten in sich, und leht vornehmlich in diesem Gefflhle.
Auch ErlBsungsgeftthle hat der Hund, wenn seinem Hunger
durch einen Znochen Befriedigung wird. Der Geist hat
aher in der Religion vielmehr seine Befreiung und das Ge-
ftlhl seiner gOttlichen Freiheit; nur der freie Geist hat
Religion und kann Religion haben; was gebunden wird in
der Religion, ist das natttrliche Geftlhl des Herzens, die
hesondere Sub jektivitftt ; was in ihr frei wird, und ehen
damit wird, ist der Geist. 2
It is manifest that Hegel is grossly unfair to Schleiermacher when
he places religion according to the latter* a view on a level with the sat-
isfaction of animal hunger. The baldness of expression and the misinter-
pretation are highly regrettahle, for they not only meant the final al-
ienation of Schleiermacher* s friendship, but have also been the cause of
much misunderstanding of Hegel himself. Critics who have accused Hegel of
ruling out feeling have fixed their attention on passages like this, which
aroused their ire, and overlooked the places in which his real arguments
are found*
Cf. E. v. Hartmann*s discussion of this point in Das religiOse
Bewuastsein der Menschheit
. ( Ausgewflhlte Werke . V) pp. 5-11,
2 Foreword to Hinrichs* Religionsphllosophie
. JUB, XX, p. 20. Cf.
XII, BR, p. 119.
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Yet even in this passage Hegel's essential point is altogether sound.
The basing of religion on feeling, he holds, involves a primarily negative
emphasis and overlooks the aspect of freedom in religion.* Religion is
fundamentally not a sense of dependence, but an elevation of man to God,
and thus an affirmative, expanding, freeing, uplifting experience. Even in
religions in which servitude and superstition are most prominent, man is
lifted to the realm in which he feels, perceives, and enjoys his freedom,
infinity, and universality. In stressing this fact Hegel becomes once more
a keen interpreter of what religion actually is in human life. Furthermore
it cannot fairly be charged that he overlooks the undeniable element of de-
pendence in religion. This is shown by the introduction to his lectures on
the philosophy of religion and, more clearly, by his whole emphasis on the
incompleteness of the individual in isolation from God. For Hegel, however
man' s dependence is the charter of his freedom,
C. Summary
Two things are now clear with respect to Hegel's attitude toward feel-
ing in religion. He recognizes, first, that feeling is indispensable; sec-
ondly, he insists that it is not enough. He retains to the end the regard
for the mystical side of religion which is so evident in his early writings,
but he sees clearly that feeling without thought content is meaningless,
that religion to be objectively true must be grounded in reason. The feel-
ing recognized by Hegel is therefore rationally criticized feeling, feeling
inseparably bound up with thought and thereby raised to the status of ob-
jective knowledge.
It is evident that such a view does not destroy feeling, but rather
Where the satisfaction of selfish desire rules, as in Roman re-
ligion, the feeling of dependence is dominant, and religion is unfree,
Cf. XIII, RGI, pp. 209-210, 229.
' it v EH!
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enriches it "by giving it a genuine content of truth.
Das Geftthl als solches ist nicht von der Ikilosophie
ausgestossen. Es ist die Frage nur, oh der Inhalt des Ge-
ffthls die V/ahrheit sei, sich im Denken als der Wahrhafte
erweisen kann. Die Philosophie denkt, was das Sufcjekt als
solches ftthlt, und ftherlftsst es demselhen, sich mit seinem
Geftthl darfther ahzufinden. Das G-efflhl ist so nicht durch
die Philosophie verworfen, sondern es wird ihm durch die-
selhe nur der wahrhafte Inhalt gegeben.
This attitude reveals no trace either of the empiricism which treats
experience as such as the sole source of knowledge or of the rationalism
2
which constructs theories in scornful disregard of the facts. In a broad-
er sense, however, Hegel's view of feeling is both empirical and rational.
Resting solidly on the observable data of religious life, it recognizes the
need of rational interpretation of those data.
For Hegel, then, the important question is not whether feeling shall
be present in religion; this is admittedly necessary. The question is rath-
er whether God, truth, and freedom have their ultimate ground and justifica-
tion in feeling or whether, on the contrary, such objective content, valid
in and for itself, gives to feeling whatever determinateness and justifica-
tion it may have. wAuf diesen Unterschied der Stellung kommt alles an.''5
IV. The Moral, Volitional Element in Religion
Hegel's estimate of the moral and volitional elements in religion is
more difficult to discover than his view of the place of feeling. Criti-
cisms of will comparable in detail to the ever-recurring discussions of
feeling are notably lacking. Nevertheless, passages relating directly or
indirectly to the practical side of religion are frequent and significant;
carefully appraised, they make possible a fairly clear account of Hegel's
attitude toward the volitional factors.
1 XIV, AR, p. 229; JUB, XVI, pp. 353-354. Cf. XII, BR, p. 288.
2 Such rationalism, it may be noted, is largely a myth.





A. The Moral Emphasis in Hegel's Early Writings
1 2
In his earliest writings, as already indicated, Hegel makes moral-
ity absolutely essential in religion. Until 1796 his chief problems lie
exclusively in the practical sphere, and concern such phenomena as religion,
the church, morality, the state, and their relations. From the specifically
religious standpoint, Hegel is seeking to discover the characteristics of a
true, living Volksreligion . that is, a religion which would permeate and en-
rich the total active life of a people. Such a religion, he finds, must
necessarily he moral; otherwise it could have no part in the life of a peo-
ple as a whole. Hegel therefore emphasizes the close relation between reli-
gion and morality, though he does not identify them.
In an early fragment, for example, he defines objective religion as
"dies ganze System von dem Zusammenhange unserer Pflichten und Wftnsche mit
der Idee von Gott und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele." In "Das Leben JesuM
Hegel's stress on the ethical is such that he appears on the surface as a
representative of an outspoken rationalistic moralism in the Kantian sense.
Everything centers in the moral effect of the teaching and the living ex-
4
ample of Jesus. All supernatural elements are eliminated. In a fragment
from this period Hegel describes Christianity as the religion "wo Sittlich-
5keit mit Eeligion zusammenhttngt." In "Die Positivitltt der christlichen
Religion" he contrasts instructively the ethical and religious teaching of
Jesus with the "positive" faith which succeeded it. In Jesus' teaching it
is free, autonomous, unselfish obedience to the will of God and the moral
* Mainly the fragments on Volksreligion und Christentum" (1793-1795),
"Das Leben Jesu" (1795), and "Die Positivitat der christlichen Eeligion"
(1795-1796).
2 Cf. above, p. 10.
* "Volksreligion und Christentum." Nohl, TJS, p. 48.
4 Cf. Nohl, TJS, p. 125.
jj
Nohl, TJS, p. 365.
6 Contrast, for example, Mt 7:22 with Mk 16:15-18.

law which leads to "blessedness; but in the positive religion propagated by
the disciples the obligation to fulfill the will of God is externally
grounded in the authority of Jesus, and belief and baptism become the con-
ditions of blessedness. The latter Hegel strenuously opposes.* An upright
man, he holds, recognizes morality as the highest thing in his faith, and
welcomes as a brother every member of another sect who is a friend of virtue.
Such a Christian says to such a Jew, as Klosterbruder says to Nathan,
Ihr seid ein Christ I-—Bei Gott, Ihr seid ein Christ
I
Ein bessrer Christ war nie.
Such a Jew, moreover, replies to such a Christian,
Wohl unsl Denn was
Mich Each gum Christen macht, das macht Each mir
Zum Judenl
Hegel adds,
Ja* wohl euchl denn Reinheit des Herzens war euch
beiden das Wesentliche eures Glaubens, und darum konnte
jeder den andern als den Genossen des seinigen betrachten.'
The degree of Hegel's moral concern at this stage is well expressed
when he writes,
Ganz allein in Bezug auf die Sache selbst wird hier
bemerkt, dass ttberall der Grundsatz zum Fundament aller
Urteile fiber die verschiedene Gestalt, Modifikationen und
Geist der christlichen Beligion gelegt worden sei,—-dass
der Zweck und das Wesen aller wahren Beligion und auch un-
serer Beligion Moralitttt4 der Menschen sei. 5
J Nohl, TJS, pp. 164-166.
Lessing, Nathan der Weise . IV, 7.
J Nohl, TJS, p. 170.
Moral it ftt for Hegel is by no means the morality of the Aufklgrung
.
but rather a living morality grounded in the whole people.
w
Haering sug-
gests that the phrase Zweck und Wesen aller wahren Beligion must be read
with the emphasis on "aller wahren Beligion," and that Hegel means here
as elsewhere that the criterion of every true religion is the extent to
which it is morally active. (Haering, HWW, pp. 190-191.)
5 Nohl, TJS, p. 153. None of these early utterances, however, is to
be construed as meaning that for Hegel religion is exhausted in morality.
Hegel himself says emphatically that the reduction of religion to moral
conduct alone is not only mistaken, but a direct contradiction, for it robs
religion of its unique character and removes all basis of distinction be-
tween it and morality. (Nohl, TJS, p. 52) The moral ideas of Jesus "las sen
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In the Frankfurt period (1797-1800) Hegel returns to the opposition
"between purely rationalistic religion and rigoristic, atomistic morality,
on the one hand, and inward, practical, living religion and morality on
the other. With regard to religion, he maintains, there is a wide differ-
ence hetween regarding God as isolated, transcendent greatness and living
daily in moral relation to him. During these years Hegel repeatedly de-
scribes the vital union hetween God and man in terms of the love relation-
ship. 1
B. The Practical Aspect in Hegel's Mature Beligious Thought
In the writings of Hegel* s later youth and maturity the speculative
interest comes increasingly to the fore. Thus of necessity he devotes a
smaller proportionate share of attention to the more practical problems of
sich ebensogut aus den Schriften eines Plato, Xenophons, Eousseaus find-
en. . ." (Nohl, TJS, p. 59) If this were not so, if Christianity did
not contain and complete this eternal morality, it would he a_ priori ex-
cluded from being a true, living religion. But this moral quality alone
does not make Christianity a religion. "Die Hauptsache ist, in welchem
Licht, in welcher Verbindung, in welchem Bang sie (the moral principles]
aufgestellt sind. n (Nohl, TJS, p. 59; cf. "Die Positivitttt der christ-
lichen Religion, " Nohl, TJS, p. 158.) In other words, a given moral atti-
tude is determined as religious not by its moral content, but by its dis-
tinctively religious conception of morality.
As Haering suggests, Hegel is not at this stage concerned with the
essence of religion in general. Rather he is seeking to discover what con-
tribution religion, through its sanctification and support of the moral
laws, can make to the complete life of a people. In most of the instances
cited, he is emphasizing, from the standpoint of what a Volksreligi on ought
to be, the superiority of a religion in which morality is basically essen-
tial over one centering in merely external authoritarian belief, "Vor allem
aber, n writes Haering, "ist davon, dass, fttr Hegel selbst, die Bedeutung und
das Wesen der Religion nur in der Moral bestanden hfttte, in keinem Pall die
Rede. Von einem vorttbergehenden Kantianismus braucht also hier so wenig wie
je . . . for Hegel die Rede zu sein." (HWW, p. 187) "Das Leben Jesu? for
example, probably does not aim to be an account of the religious signifi-
cance of Jesus in Christianity, or even an account of the essence of religion
in the Hegelian sense, but rather a defense of the moral emphasis of Jesus
as over against a positive, external, dogmatic, authoritarian faith.
(Haering, KITH, p. 189)
1 Cf. above, p. 53; Nohl, TJS, pp. 266-270, 293-296, 374-385.

his earlier years. This of course may, "but by no means must imply a less-
ened concern for the moral aspect of religion. It is therefore our present
problem to determine just what effect Hegel's heightened speculative inter-
est in religion exerts on his early emphasis on the moral factor. In his
mature philosophy of religion, what is the place of the volitional element?
1. Hegel's Qnphasis on and Interpretation of Worship
The question just asked recalls immediately the fact that the final
stage in Hegel's conception of religion is that of worship, which centers
in volitional activity. Worship is for Hegel, however, a very "broad term,
and it must he carefully investigated if its true meaning, and especially
its implications for the moral, volitional life are to "become clearly evi-
dent.
a. The Volitional Character of Worship
As has been pointed out in Chapter Two,* an intellectual relation to
God is for Hegel not sufficient; it must be supplemented by the practical
relation involved in worship. "Das Verhftltnis des Wissens" finds its com-
2pletion in "das VerhSltnis des Willens." Religion is "nicht nur Verhfilt-
nis, Wissen, sondern Tun, Handeln."'
In the first place, volitional activity is essential to the moment of
differentiation in religion. In pure knowledge man is so ahsorbed in the
religious object that he fails to recognize the difference between himself
and God. Only on the volitional, practical level does he stand truly over
against his object.*
Das Praktische des Geistes flberhaupt 1st das Wollen .
Als wollende ist das Bewusstsein einzeln, Entschluss aus
* Cf. above, pp. 35-37.
I XII, BB, p. 158.
I XII, BR, p. 69.
* XII, BR, pp. 226-228.
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sich selbst, Vollbringen seiner negativen Be*iehung
auf sich; erst der Wille macht den Menschen sum In-
dividuum.
. . » Im Willen ist der Mensch gegen ein
Anderes, verhftlt sich als Getrenntes vom Andem; hier
tritt daher die Endlichkeit ein. 1
Secondly, however, only in the practical sphere is this estrange-
ment of man from Cod transcended and true reconciliation effected.
Der Wille hat einen Zweck -and geht aaf diesen
Zweck; er ist Tfttigkeit, diese Endlichkeit, diesen
Widersprach aufsuheben, dass dieser Gegenstand eine
Schranke fttr mich ist. . • , Im Kultus ... ist
Gott aaf der einen, ich bin aaf der andern Seite, und
die Bestimmong ist diese, mich mit Gott in mir selhst
*usammenzuschl lessen, mich in Gott eu wissen und Gott
in mir——diese konkrete Einheit.
b. The Two Aspects of Worship
1). The inner aspect . Worship comprises the entire range of activ-
ity, inward and outward, whereby this unity of God and man is restored.
From the internal standpoint, it is
wesentlich eine innere Umkehrung des Geistes und Gemflta
.
... So enthftlt der christliche Eultus s.B. nicht nur
die Sakramente, kirchlichen Handlungen und Pflichten,
sondern er enthftlt auch die sogenannte Heilsordnung als
eine schlechthin innere Geschichte und als eine Stufen-
folge von Handlungen des Gemttts, ttberhaupt eine Beweg-
ung, die in der Seele vorgeht und vorgehen soil.'
What, then, is the nature of this inner movement of the soul? It is
a two-sided activity: "Gottes Gnade und des Menschen Opfer," through which
the finite individual is lifted above his isolation and taken into union
4
with the infinite. From the standpoint of man, it involves "die prak-




bu entlassen," the "Aufgeben des natflrlichen Will ens der Partikular-
1 XII, BR, p. 257.
2 XII, BR, pp. 227-228.
J XII, BR, p. 229.4 XII, BR, p. 258.
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itftt." 1 In such inner, spiritual acts as remorse, repentance, and purifi-
cation, man gives his heart to God.
2 Through this conscious, voluntary
surrender of his particularity, the individual "becomes like Cod in char-
acter, "Gott soil ich mich gemftss machen; dies ist meine, die menschliche
Arbeit."5
Tet this activity is likewise God's. God
hewegt sich sum Menschen und ist durch Aufhebung des
Menschen; was als mein Tun erscheint, ist Gottes Tun,
und umgekehrt Gott nur durch meine Tfttigkeit. Beides
in einem ist die absolute VersBhnung.
This participation of God involves, however, no impairment of, hut
is rather the condition of human freedom. It is precisely through the
surrender of his own will to God that man becomes truly free.
... Die Freiheit des Menschen besteht eben im
Wissen und Wollen Gottes durch Aufhehung des menschlich-
en Wissens und Wollens. Der Mensch ist daher bei der
Gnade dieselbe Tfttigkeit und weit davon entfernt, nur
das passive Material, den Stein zu bilden, ohne mit Be-
wusstaein dabei zu sein. Es soil vielmehr das GOttliche
durch mich in mir werden, und das, wogegen die Aktion
geht, die meine Aktion ist, das 1st Aufgeben meiner ttber-
haupt, der sich nicht mehr fflr sich behftlt. Diese ge-
doppelte Tfttigkeit ist der Eultus, und sein Zweck ist
das Dasein Gottes im Menschen. 5
2). The outward aspect . Worship, however, is not confined to the
inward activity whereby the individual consciousness frees itself of its
finitude and becomes united with its true ground, God. It is the very na-
ture of worship to develop itself nach aussen, to find expression in the
moral life of society. "Dies Hinausgehen in die wirkliche Welt ist der
Religion wesentlich."^ If the purification of the heart is carried through
to the end, resulting in an enduring character which corresponds to its
\ XII, BR, p. 259.2 XII, BR, p. 236.
J XII, BR, p. 258.
I XII, BR, p. 258.
| XII, BR, p. 258.
XII, BR, p. 231.
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universal nature, it finds inevitable completion in morality. Moral con-
duct, therefore, in so far as it is related to the consciousness of God,
is the truest kind of worship.
1st Here, Wille ernstlich durch und durch sum All-
gemeinen, Wahren gebildet, so ist das vorhanden, was als
Sittlichkeit erscheint. Insofern ist die Sittlichkeit
der wahrhafteste Kultus. Damit aber muss dann smgleich
das Bewusstsein des Wahren, des GOttlichen, Gottes ver-
9.bunden sein.
In this way religion passes over into the state and is reflected in
the entire political and social life of the people. The highest recon-
ciliation of God and man occurs when the worldly itself is penetrated by
the principle of freedom and, so conformed to the eternal truth of reason,
becomes rational will. "Die Inst itut ion en der Sittlichkeit sind gBttliche
Institutionen;" that is, they are not "holy" in the sense in which volun-
tary chastity and poverty are said to be holy, but divine, in that they in-
volve the free obedience of a rational will to what it recognises as mor-
al. True religion, therefore, realises itself in, not apart from or above
the world. It involves not world-denial, but world-penetration. wSo ist
in dem Sittlichen die VersBhnung der Beligion mit der Weltlichkeit , mit
der Wirklichkeit vollbracht."4 On the one hand, true religion ngeht nur
aus der Sittlichkeit hervor; M on the other, it is the substance and basis
of the morality of the state. 5
Like inward worship, morality involves relating one's own life to
that of the whole, passing from one's isolated particularity to the sphere
of universality. "Sittlichkeit, Liebe ist eben dies, seine [the subject's]
Besonderheit, besondere PersBnlichkeit aufzugeben, sie zur Allgemeinheit
1 XII, BB, p. 302.
\ XII, BB, p. 236.
* XII, BB, pp. 231, 302.
XIV, AB, pp. 218-219. Cf. VI, GPB, pp. 213-214; Kuno Fischer.
HLWL, II, p. 1011.






In any given state, this implies the subordination of
one's own interests to those of the society as a whole.
The extent of Hegel's interest in the moral aspect of religion
should now be clear. Few writers have insisted more emphatically than he
that religion must manifest itself in the active life of the world. Yet
in this very emphasis, or rather in the particular manner of the emphasis,
lies a marked defect in Hegel's view. Paradoxical as it may sound, Hegel
relates religion too closely to the life of the world. The morality to
which religion leads is for him identified with and exhausted in the po-
litical life of the state. It is difficult to avoid the impression that
Hegel's standard of what the moral demands of religion ought to he is de-
termined very largely by his empirical knowledge of what the accepted mor-
ality actually is. This may be illustrated by his discussion of the teach-
ing of Jesus. Jesus' teaching, he holds, inasmuch as it has the form of
Vorstellung . must be at first abstractly universal; lacking the concrete
form of thought, it is unable to recognize the particular in the universal.
For this reason it holds up the kingdom of God, a universal, as the one
thing needful, and sees in it the negation of the particular, the existing
world order. Jesus, for example, demands of his disciples the renuncia-
tion of their ordinary way of life, disparages all worldly things as worth-
less, disregards family ties, counsels against providing for the morrow,
and advises the giving of everything to the poor. The new religion is
thus at first "eine revolution&re Lehre, die alles Bestehende teils auf
der Seite liegen ISsst, teils vernichtet, umstOsst,** because its one all-
consuming interest "noch nicht im Zusammenhange mit dem Weltbewusstsein,
in TJbereinstimmung mit dem Welteustand ist." A mature religion, however,
1 XIV, AB, p. 81; cf. pp. 158, 170, 178, 179; JUB, III, PHPB, p. 98.
2 XIV, AB, p. 150.
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one which has gained concrete form as a Gemelnde or Kirche. is in harmony
with the conditions surrounding it.
Diese Entsagung, dieses Aufgeben, diese Zurflcksetz-
ung alles wesentlichen Interesses und der sittlichen Bande
ist im konzentrierten Erscheinen der Wahrheit eine wesent-
liche Bestimmung, die in der Folge, wenn die Wahrheit ihre
sichere Existenz hat, von ihrer Wichtigkeit verliert. 1
From this it would seem that for Hegel developed religion naturally
expresses itself in the kind of conduct which is officially recognized as
moral in the state concerned* Hegel would, to be sure, trace this harmony
to the fact that the moral and political life of society is founded in and
9
the necessary outgrowth of religion. Yet the actual content of the mor-
ality involved is drawn not from Hegel* s idea of religion, hut from his em-
pirical knowledge of the kind of moral life to he found in various states.
More particularly, the content of Christian morality is drawn very largely
from what he finds in the German state. In other words, Hegel is more em-
pirical than he himself realizes. He is too much overawed by facts. As a
m
result, the penetration of the world "by religion involves in actual effect
little more than conformity of religion to the world. This is not the kind
of moral emphasis which characterizes religion at its best.
In another important respect Hegel's treatment of the ethical aspect
of religion is inadequate. In his Philosophic der Religion , as we have
seen, Hegel lays great emphasis on the moral factor. Religion is for him
throughout ethical. But as Georg Lasson points out, in the construction
of his system as a whole Hegel is prevented by his arrangement from giving
ethics its rightful place. Whereas art, religion, and philosophy belong
in the sphere of Absolute Spirit, morality is a characteristic only of the
\ XIV, AB, pp. 151-152.
2 XII, BB, pp. 231, 236, 302-303; VI, GPR, pp. 208-209; IX, PWG, p. 882.
Cf. above, p. 74.
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objective spirit. It is clear, says Lasson, that it is in the ethical
realm that the Absolute realises the idea of freedom in the self-con-
sciousness of man and thereby manifests itself in its truth. This real-
ization culminates, however, only in the religious devotion of the human
self-consciousness to the Absolute Spirit. But according to Hegel the eth-
ical finds its completion in the morality of the state. The notion of
freedom cannot, therefore, unfold itself into the idea of the freedom of
the self-consciousness in union with God.
The limitation of ethics to the morality of the organised state, the
civil law, is unjustifiable and false. Hegel himself realises that the
Spirit and its freedom attain reality not in any one state as such, but in
the whole course of world history, involving the successive rise and fall
of many states. What Hegel calls morality is therefore continually dis-
solved by the advance of world history, whereas the idea of freedom which
underlies the whole process is really the idea of religion itself. It is
true that Hegel makes religion the foundation of the state* and treats all
historical development as the unfolding of the divine Idea, thereby placing
religion above the state and its morality. Yet in his systematic arrange-
ment he puts religion and morality in two different realms. This sharp
separation makes it impossible for religion to be truly penetrated with a
moral content. For this reason Hegel is always in difficulty when required
to determine the relation between religion and what he terms morality, and
never satisfactorily solves the problem of the relation between church and
state. It must be admitted that, inasmuch as the objective spirit is an
aspect of the Absolute Spirit, morality is a phase of religion, but it
does not permeate the whole of religion. Only a morality integral to the
* Cf. above, p. 76.
•
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life of Absolute Spirit itself could fulfill the latter condition.
A genuine inner relation of church and state, says Lasson,
ergibt sich erst dann, wenn man im Staate und seinem
Recht zwar eine verntlnftige Selbstbestimmung und Aus-
gestaltung der Freiheit sieht, aber nicht die Abschliess-
ende und umfassende, sondern die grundlegende und fttr
hOhere Formen des sittlichen Lehens vorbereitende.
2. The Ought in Hegel's View of Morality
Further light on Hegel's view of the moral life is shed hy his fre-
quent discussions of the ought. Repeatedly he takes issue with the sub-
jective moralism of Kant and Fichte. In the Kantian philosophy, says He-
gel, is an enduring conflict of the evil principle with the good, a funda-
mental dualism between the noumenal and the empirical self, between reason
and sensuality, the formal moral law and human inclination, the ideal and
the actual, Sollen and Sein. In this morality of Zerrissenheit . there is
a wide gap between what ought to be and what is. On this plane one can
never say more than that the good ought to be realized, that the evil,
which stands ceaselessly over against the good, ought to be overthrown.
"Da ist ausser mir eine Welt, die, von Gott verlassen, darauf wartet, dass
ich den Zweck, das Gute erst hineinbringe."4 Here there can be only in-
finite striving toward a goal which is never attained. The good remains a
mere ought.
According to Hegel it is necessary to advance beyond this merely ab-
stract standpoint to the insight that the evil is in and for itself con-
quered, the good already realized. Before the concrete universality of
1 Cf. G. Lasson, EHR, pp. 7-10; Introduction to Hegel's GPE, pp.
XXIV-XXVII. Cf. also Hegel, VI, GPR, pp. 207-219, 355-356; XII, BR, pp.
302-311.
2 G. Lasson, Introduction to Hegel's GPR, p. XXVI.5 Cf. XII, BR, pp. 258-259; XIV, AH, pp. 118-119, 205-206; V, ENC,
pp. 37. 201-202, 408-409, 411; II, PDG, p. 168.4 XII, BR, p. 259. It is possible, as Haering suggests (HWW, p. 193),
that the moral dualism of Kant's philosophy of religion is less prominent
than Hegel and many others have believed.

79
thought the false contradiction is "broken down and the apparent independ-
ence of the evil put to flight From the standpoint of the Absolute, what
ought to "be actually is.
This does not mean, however, that the ought has no significance or
no validity for human "beings. Indeed, Hegel* s whole philosophy involves a
moral demand on the individual to be rational, to adjust himself to a whole
which is the norm of all meaning and value. You ought, says Hegel's sys-
tem, to view your own particular situation in the light of the Absolute.
The natural will ought to be made spiritual. The natural man is
unangemessen . . . dem, was das Wahrhafte ist, und
ebenso ist die Wahrheit des einen Gut en unendlich
fest in mir. Diese Unangemessenheit bestimmt sich
so zu dem, was nicht sein soil. Die Aufgabe, Forder-
ung ist unendlich.
The individual has, therefore, a definite responsibility for making his
own will good through relating it to the Absolute Spirit. But this fact,
though important, is abstract and one-sided. From the point of view of
the Absolute Spirit, the ideal is already realized. It is the very nature
of the Idea to be what it ought to be. Hegel does not oppose value or mor-
al obligation. But he does oppose, from the ultimate point of view, the
attitude for which the realization of value is a mere possibility or po-
tentiality.
"Wer wflre nicht so klug, n asks Hegel,
urn in seiner Umgebung vieles zu sehen, was in der Tat
nicht so ist, wie es sein soil? Aber diese Klugheit
hat unrecht sich einzubilden, mit solchen Gegenstftnden
und der en Soilen sich innerhalb der Interessen der
philosophischen Wissenschaft zu befinden. Diese hat
es nur mit der Idee zu tun, welche nicht so ohnmllchtig
ist, urn nur zu sollen und nicht wirklich zu sein, und
damit mit einer Wirklichkeit , an welcher jene Gegen-
XIV, AE, p. 118; cf. p. 119.
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stftnde, Einrichtungen, Zustflnde u.s.f. nur die ober-
flflchliche Aussenseite sind. 1
In the sphere of religion this relation is expressed hy the fact
2
that the activity involved in worship is two-sided. My activity is at
the same time God's activity. More precisely, Hegel's whole view of the
religious ought is summarized in the following passage:
Der Kreis des moral ischen jin the Kantian sense]
Wirkens ist beschrftnkt; dagegen hat in der Beligion das
Allgemeine den Sinn, zu sein. Das Gute ist in der
Religion an und fflr sich selbst; Gott ist, und es handelt
sich nur urn mich, dass ich meiner Subjektivitftt ahtue und
mir an dies em Werke, dass sich durch sich ewig vollbringt,
meinen Anteil gewinne und meinen Teil daran nehme. Das
Gute ist demnach nicht ein Sollen, sondern ggttliche Macht
und ewige Wahrheit .
'
Behind Hegel 1 s polemic against the ought, therefore, is a profound
conviction on his part of the supremacy of God. Spirit, he declares,
rules in the universe. In Spirit evil is "an und fflr sich -ilberwunden.
"
4
However far short of the ideal individual human beings may be, God is, and
is what he ought to be. No power is great enough to thwart his purposes.
"Es ist keine Macht, die ihm gleich ist, die ihm gegenttberstehen kann; es
5
ist kein geistloses Verhfiltnis des Mechanismus." Through this power of
the Spirit, moreover, the sins of men are forgiven and men themselves are
redeemed.^
In this affirmation Hegel penetrates to the very depths of religious
faith. The God of ethical religion is at once a mighty fortress and a
heart of love. Grounded in the religious consciousness is the conviction
that, in spite of the disappointments and failures of men, there reigns a
V, ENC, pp. 37-38. Cf. II, PDG (3d ed.), p. 168.
Cf. above, pp. 35-38, 72-73.
XII, BR, p. 259.
XIV, AR, p. 205.
XIV, AR, p. 207.
XIV, AR, pp. 206-207.
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King of kings and Lord of lords whose truth fades not away. Again,
the
religious man who, ceaselessly pursuing an ideal which is ever heyond his
grasp, falters and sins, yet knows that on his side is a God who is per-
fect goodness, through whose forgiving love his own weakness may he re-
deemed.
From this standpoint Hegel»s interpretation of the ought is in com-
plete harmony with the facts of religious experience. Seen, however, in
the light of his personalistic pantheism,
1 his conception involves a con-
tradiction which even his own dialectical logic cannot satisfactorily re-
move. It is impossible to reconcile the point of view of the Ahsolute
Spirit with that of finite spirits. The Absolute, as Ahsolute, is perfect-
ly good and free from moral wrong; as particular finite self, it is genu-
inely sinful. In other words, the same act of will which is evil in me is
good for the Absolute. Here lies an irreconcilable contradiction: the
same person cannot both sin and not sin in the same act; the same experi-
ence cannot be at once both evil and good. The Absolute cannot, therefore,
i
experience my sinfulness precisely as I experience it and still remain ah-
2
solute. It follows that either the Ahsolute Spirit is not morally perfect
or man is not really sinful. Either absolute goodness or finite evil is
an illusion. In so far, therefore, as Hegel tends to underestimate the
ethical factor in individual human beings, he is simply carrying out, per-
haps unconsciously, the logical implications of his own metaphysics.
With regard to the Absolute itself, a further difficulty emerges at
this point. Hegel* s treatment of the ought, separated from its pantheis-
1 Cf. below, p. 177, n. 1.
The criticism here offered is essentially that of Edgar S. Bright-
man, An Introduction to Philosophy . (N.Y. : Holt, 1925), p. 244. Cf. he-
low, pp. 94-95, 188, 210-211.




tic background, is adequate so long as the life of the Absolute is con-
ceived as timeless. But the process of self-realization of the Absolute
Spirit is for Hegel not only logical but also historical and chronologi-
cal. In the process of history, however, the good is never completely
realized at any one moment. The historical march of Spirit is in Hegel
1 s
view one of infinite toil and struggle.
1
Something always remains to be
done. 2 Thus although God is at a given moment perfectly good, although at
a given time there is nothing which God ought to be and is not, there re-
mains always something which he has not done but at some future time ought
to do. This temporal element is not sufficiently recognized in Hegel's
treatment of the ought from the standpoint of the Absolute. In fact, He-
gel never adequately reconciles the logical and the historical aspects of
the Absolute. 3 The gap between the two is all the greater in view of He-
gel's stress on the element of conflict and struggle in the life of Spirit,
which we have now to discuss.
C. The Principle of Negativity in Religion
1. The Experiential Origin of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion
No aspect of Hegel's thought is more revealing with regard to his
view of religious experience than is the principle of negativity, the dia-
lectic which forms the living core of his whole system. As the careful
investigations of Dilthey, Haering, and Wahl in Hegel's early writings
have shown, the key to Hegel's philosophy is to be found in his own early
struggle with the religious problem. The dialectic is less a method than
4
an experience, in which the "unhappy consciousness" of the soul divided
1 II, PDG, p. 13.
~ See the closing lines of the EncyclopSdie
.
3 For further treatment of this point, cf. below, pp. 188-189.
"Das unglttckliche Bewusstsein" is one of the aspects of experience
in Hegel's Phttnomenologle (cf. pp. 139-151). Wahl regards it, "la con-
science malheureuse," as the root of Hegel's thought.
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in itself and separated from God gives way to reconciliation and profound
happiness. This movement of cyclical synthesis, experienced in his own
life and thought, becomes for Hegel the key to reality itself. In the very
bosom of being, he finds, is an eternal rent which is eternally healed.
This movement, rationally formulated as the dialectical process of opposi-
tion and synthesis, is applied by Hegel to all aspects of experience.*
2. Conflict and Reconciliation in Religion
Already in one of the fragments of the late Berne period (1797) Hegel
finds in experience an opposition between subject and object, the transcendence
of which is typified in man's relation to God and the love relation among
men.
2
In the fragment on "Die Liebe" (1797) he writes, "In ihr findet
sich das Leben selbst, als eine Verdoppelung seiner Selbst, und
Einigkeit desselben." Two years later he reaches the conclusion that
"Freiheit ohne Entgegensetzung ist nur eine Moglichkeit."4 In 1800 he
recognizes the elements of both separation and union in defining religion as
an elevation of man "vom endlichen Leben zum unendlichen Leben. "^
The dialectic which is foreshadowed in the Jugendschriften becomes
in the Phanomenologie the center and controlling idea of Hegel's whole in-
terpretation of consciousness. The life of spirit is here depicted as an
1 The experiential origin of Hegel's philosophy of religion and of
his philosophy as a whole is obviously significant for the present study.
However, a detailed investigation of the psychological springs of Hegel's
philosophy of religion lies outside the scope of our inquiry. Accepting
as reasonably well established the results of the research by Dilthey,
Eaering, and Yfahl, the dissertation will concentrate at this point on Hegel's
own development of the principle of negativity in its bearing on his view
of religious experience.
2 Fragment on "Religion, eine Religion stiften" (1796). Nohl, TJS,
pp. 376-377.
3 Nohl, TJS, p. 379; cf, above, p. 53.
4 Fragment on "Das Grundkonzept zum Geist des Christentums." Nohl,
TJS, p. 395.
5
"Systemfragment von 1800." Nohl, TJS, p. 347. Cf . above, pp. 52-53.

84
eternal battle "between contradictories in which victory can he won and rec-
onciliation attained only through infinite struggle, patience, and labor.
Consciousness finds its completion, Hegel writes, "in der Gestalt des un-
glflcklichen Bewusstseins."* To be sure, he describes the life of Absolute
Spirit as "a play of love," hut hy love he means no irresponsihle, light-
hearted emotion, out the love which bears witness to its genuineness in
patient endurance of pain and suffering.
Das Lehen Gottes und das gOttliche Erkennen mag
also wohl als ein Spielen der Liehe mit sich selbst aus-
gesprochen werden; diese Idee sinkt zur Erbaul ichkeit
und selbst zur Fadheit herab, wenn der Ernst, der Schmerz,
die Geduld und Arbeit des Negativen darin fehlt.
The elements of opposition and estrangements are central in Hegel's
interpretation of religion. At the beginning of his discussion of the
speculative notion of religion he declares "die unendliche NegativitSt" to
3
be the "Grundbestimmung." How deeply he recognizes the division and con-
flict in human consciousness is even more clearly seen in his description
of the difference between finite and infinite Spirit, which closes as fol-
lows:
Ich bin der Kampf : denn der Kampf ist eben dieser
Widerstreit, der nicht eine Gleichgttltigkeit der beiden
als Verschiedenen ist, sondern der das Zusammengebunden-
sein beider ist. Ich bin nicht einer der im Kampfe Be-
griffenen, ich bin beide KBmpfende, ich bin der Kampf
selbst. Ich bin das Feuer und Wasser, die sich berfthren,
und die Bertthrung, Einheit des sen, was sich schlechthin
flieht; und eben diese Bertthrung bald Getrennter, Ent-
zwelter, bald VersBhnter, Einiger ist selbst diese dop-
pelt, widerstreitend seiende Beziehung als Beziehung.
1 II, PDG, p. 435.
\ II, PDG, p. 13; cf. p. 140; XIII, HE, p. 5; IX, PWG, p. 937.Z XII, BB, p. 149.
4 XII, BB, pp. 241-242. Cf. Hegel* s definition of the dialectic as
given in a conversation with Goethe. Here he says that its essence is "im
Grunde nichts weiter als der geregelte, methodisch ausgebildete Wider-
spruchsgeist , der jedem Menschen innewohnt. ,* (Eckermann, GesprSche mit
Goethe
.
October 18, 1827.) Hegel would apply to all men the saying used
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Hegel criticizes the religion of his day because it fails to recog-
nize and include in its account of experience the reality of pain. One
hears no more, he laments, of "die Lehre von Liehe in unendlichem Schmerz,
[yom] substanziellen Bande der Welt." Instead, people seek "Genuss, Liebe
ohne Schmerz. 1,1 In Hegel's view, on the contrary, love by its very nature
entails pain and sacrifice. 2 In fact, the elements of sorrow, suffering,
and conflict run through the whole of experience, characterizing the life
of both God and man. True peace of the spirit is possible only after dead-
ly battle. To live spiritually is to struggle incessantly and suffer pro-
foundly. Perhaps the most lucid expression of this idea, so characteris-
tic of Hegel, is found not in his Philosophie der Eeligion . but in a re-
markably illuminating passage in his Aesthetik . Here he writes,
Selbst die ewigen GOtter des Polytheismus leben
nicht in ewigem Frieden, sondern sie gehen zu Parteiung-
en und KBmpfen mit entgegenstrebenden Leidenschaften und
Interessen fort, und mttssen sich dem Schieksal unterwerf-
en, ja selbst der christliche Gott ist dem tfbergange zur
Erniedrigung des Leidens und Schmach des Todes nicht ent-
nommen, und wird von dem Seelenschmerze nicht befreit, in
welchem er rufen muss: nmein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast
du mich verlassen;** seine Mutter leidet die ahnliche herbe
Pein, und das menschliche Leben ttberhaupt ist ein Leben
des Streits, der KMmpfe und Schmerzen. Denn die GrBsse
und Kraft misst sich wahrhaft erst an der GrOsse und Kraft
des Gegensatzes, aus welchem der Geist sich zur Einheit in
sich wieder zusamnenbringt , die Intensitivitttt und Tiefe
der Subjektivitfit thut sich urn so mehr hervor, je unend-
licher und ungeheurer die Umstlnde auseinandergezoger, und
je zerreissender die Widersprttche sind, unter denen sie
dennoch fest in sich selber zu bleiben hat. In dieser Ent-
faltung all ein bewfthrt sich die Macht der Idee und des
Ideal en, denn Macht besteht nur darin, sich im Negativen
by one writer to characterize the apostle Paul (Adolf Deissman, Paulus
.
Tubingen: Mohr, 1925, p. 14):
Ich bin kein ausgeklflgelt Buch,
Ich bin ein Mensch mit seinem Widerspruch.
J
XIV, AH, p. 250.'




Nowhere in the literature of the philosophy of religion is to be
found a clearer recognition of the tragic character of human life or of
the anguish of the soul in religion than in the passages just quoted.
Words like these could he written by no armchair philosopher spinning cat-
egories out of his own brain, but only by a thinker intimately acquainted
through close observation with what religion and life really are.
By this time it is evident how unjust and erroneous is the charge
that Hegel never felt or appreciated the element of moral struggle in re-
ligion, the fact of evil, or the presence in man of contradictory tenden-
cies.^ As a matter of fact, he recognized just as clearly and probably
experienced just as profoundly as any other writer the terrible reality of
moral discord and estrangement from God* But there is an important differ-
ence in this respect between Hegel and some others. He recognizes the re-
ality of struggle, but does not stop there. In his view separation is
followed by union, suffering by surpassing joy, conflict by peace. The op-
position is genuine, but it is not final. It is present, but it is over-
1 JUB, XII, pp. 244-245. In Die Absolute Religion Hegel finds pain
and suffering to be the attestation of God* s appearance in the world: "Das
Leiden der Seele ist das Zeugnis von dem Geist. . . . In dem Schmerz ist
die Beglaubigung der Erscheinung Gottes." (XIV, AR, p. 149.)
" Ott, for example, writes as follows: "Es war von je her das Char-
akteristikum eines einseitigen Idealismus, dass kein Verstftndnis fttr den
Zwiespalt in Natur und Geistesleben vorhanden war. Hegel hat nie die tfber-
wSltigende Macht der tJbel und des BOsen an sich selbst erfahren, und wie er
war, so war sein Anblick der Welt, Bei allem PrSvaleren des Denkelements
war also Hegel eine in sich durchaus geschlossene und einheitliche PersOn-
lichkeit, fttr welche die SeelenkrSfte nicht auseinander fielen, sondern
stets in harmonischer Symphonie wirksam waren. n (EHG, p. 20.) Cf. also
Richert, HR, p. 50.
' For example, Glockner points out that Hegel experienced as immedi-
ately as Schleiermacher the stringency of the difference between faith in
God and rational knowledge of God, but that while Schleiermacher kept this
opposition continually before him, Hegel brought his system to a harmonious
completion by means of the conceptual reconciliation of the contradictories.
("Hegel und Schleiermacher," pp. 255-256.) Cf. IX, PWG, p. 734.
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come. In spite of all their differences, spirit and Spirit are in funda-
mental unity. Because of this fact, the human individual who will may he,
and is already, reconciled with God.
But neither is this reconciliation permanent, in the sense of stati-
cally abiding. The achievement of unity is not a mere abstract negation
or cancellation of difference, hut rather a living unification which yet
preserves the elements of difference and enriches itself through them. In
short, the religious life, like the life of Spirit in general, is a rhythm,
an alternation between opposition and reconciliation.^" Just as in music
the vibrant combination of meter and pitch produces a harmony of the two
without destroying either, so the identity of God and man in religion, or
of any genuine opposition in the life of Spirit, is a rhythm which does not
annihilate the difference between them, but rather preserves while tran-
2
scending it in a harmonious whole. The opposition is reconciled only to
appear again and be once more overcome. The religious life is thus a con-
tinual alternation.
Das Lebendige hat Bedttrfnisse und ist so Wider-
spruch, aber die Befriedigung ist Aufheben dieses Wider-
spruchs. Im Triebe, Bedttrfnisse bin ich mir selbst von
mir unterschieden. Aber das Leben ist dies, den Wider-
spruch aufzultJsen, das Bedttrfnis zu befriedigen, es zum
Frieden zu bringen, aber so, dass der Widerspruch auch
wieder entsteht; es ist die Abwechslung des Unterscheid-
ens, des Widerspruchs und seines Aufhebens. 3
3. Hegel's Theory of Sin
The opposition inherent in human nature appears on its highest level
as the consciousness of sin, the recognition that man is naturally evil.
Far from overlooking the awful reality of sin, Hegel takes it so earnestly
1 XII, BR, p. 65.
I II, PDG, p. 42; cf. pp. 39, 40.
XIV, AE, p. 79. For further treatment of the element of negativity
in Hegel, cf. below, pp. 181-186.
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as to hold that the doctrine that man is by nature good destroys the
Christian religion.
1 The opposition between the divine and the worldly
reaches full reality for the first time in Christianity, which actually
starts from an absolute estrangement.
[pie] heidnische Religion enth&lt (das] heitere
VersBhntsein von Haus aus. So heiter ist die christ-
liche Religion nicht; [sie] erweckt selbst das Bedttrf-
nis, fttngt von dem Schmerze an, ruft ihn wach, zer-
reisst die natttrliche Einheit des Geistes, (die] Ein-
heit des Menschen mit der Natur, zerstUrt den natttr-
lichen Frieden. [|ier ist gleich] Erbsunde, (der
Mensch ist] bOse von Haus aus, also in seinem inner-
sten ein Negatives mit sich selbst. 2
The basis of this negativity is man f s knowledge of the distinction
between good and evil, and it is precisely this recognition which makes
man spirit. But this knowledge is a two-sided and dangerous gift, for it
involves freedom, and a free spirit may choose evil as well as good. If
man is to be truly man, he must be exposed to the possibility of sin. The
passage from the natural to the spiritual consciousness is that from ig-
norant, childish innocence to mature, discerning knowledge, which brings
with it, however, the possibility of wrongdoing. This paradoxical advance
3
"ist die ewige Geschichte und die Natur des Menschen. n
This is according to Hegel the essential truth at the heart of the
Genesis narrative of the fall of man. The account is, of course, figura-
tive, and like all imaginative representations expresses its speculative
truth only imperfectly. The knowledge of the distinction between good and
evil is represented as something which ought not to be attained: Adam and
Eve are forbidden to eat of the tree which would yield this knowledge.
That the insight into the nature of right and wrong is what makes man spir-
it is indicated in the promise of the serpent that Adam and Eve will be-
1 XII, BR, p. 23.
2 XII, BR, p. 23.
3 XIII, RGI, pp. 86-87.
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come like gods if they eat of the forbidden fruit, as well as in the ad-
mission by God that "man is become as one of us, to know good and evil."
But this profound truth is suppressed by the narrative; man is punished for
attaining the very thing which makes him man.
In spite of its defects, however, the account reveals the innermost
nature of man himself. It is the knowledge of good and evil which, though
it opens up the possibility of sin, makes man the spirit that he is. The
representation that the act of Adam and Eve trespassed a divine command is
only formal. The important thing is the content, the truth that the knowl-
edge of moral right and wrong, with its attendant freedom, is at once the
root of sin and the essence of man's spiritual nature. The Old Testament
story thus concerns not merely a particular individual, but the nature of
man as man. This is the basic truth in the doctrine of original sin, which
simply expresses in figurative fashion the fact that man as man has a funda-
mental dissonance in his nature, his knowledge of the difference between
good and evil, and that he is man precisely because of this opposition.
It is this discord which for Hegel lies at the heart of sin. Sin,
according to him, is the will on the part of the individual to pursue his
own particular ends out of relation to the rest of the universe, the choice
to be a part rather than a whole, estrangement from God.
Wollen des Nattlrlichen ist, naher bestimmt, bUse,
Y/ille der Trennung, Setzen seiner Einzelheit gegen anderes.
[So ist der] Gegensatz in ihm, aber unmittelbar auch
[der] seiner Einzelheit und seiner Allgemeinheit. Mensch
fist] Bewusstsein, auch Denken; , , , er unterscheidet
Gutes und BCses. ... Beides QstehtJ vor ihm; fer
hat die] Wahl zv/ischen beiden, und btJse ist sein Wille.
[So ist das BBseJ seine Schuld. Dies BCse ist
seine Selbstsucht. [Er hat] Zwecke nur seiner Einzel-
heit, insofern [aie] dem Allgemeinen entgegengesetzt
Genesis 3:5, 22.






ist, d.i. insofern er natttrlicher [Mensch) ist. Dass er
natttrlicher [Mensch] ist, ist sein Wille, sein Setzen. 1
While this had will is a necessary stage, it is not final, hut rath-
er transitory. Though the religious life begins with the insight that man
in himself is evil, it moves on "by way of repentance and remorse to recon-
ciliation with God. The discord of sin is followed by the restored unity
of man and God. In this reconciliation man becomes conscious of that which
is in and for itself universal as his own true essence, of his own substan-
tial infinity, of his participation in the divine. The individual throws
off his partiality and enters into genuine relation with the whole. The
good life is therefore a passage from innocence through temptation and sin
to virtue, from simple unity through discord to harmony.
However, as previously seen, this reconciliation is not uninterrupted.
Instead, it is continually replaced by returning temptation, which in its
turn is repeatedly transformed into a higher harmony. Inasmuch as man is
a moral being, he is ever open to the possibility of new sin. The reli-
gious life is a life of struggle, in which victory and progress are won on-
ly through suffering and pain. Fellowship with God seems to come only aft-
er estrangement from God. Only after the dark night of temptation and bit-
ter despair does the soul experience the dawn of supreme joy.
In reconciliation, as in separation, knowledge is the basic fact.
If man's recognition of the difference between good and evil is that which
makes him sinful, it is also that which makes him divine. The very thing
which makes evil possible contains also the power of triumph over evil.
Only knowledge, the differentiation of the natural will from the infinitely
free divine will, makes possible the elevation of the spirit above the
state of natural selfishness. 2 As in Wagner's Parsifal , the same spear
1 XIV, AH, p. 104; cf. p. 105. Cf. JUB, XX, PHPB, p. 98.
2 XIV, AH, pp. 130-131.
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which inflicts the wound also heals it. "Erkennen heilt die V/unde, die
es selher ist."1
. .
. Im Erkennen liegt dann ehensosehr das
gBttliche Prinzip der Wendung, Rtlckkehr zu sich
selhst; es schlttgt die Wunde und heilt sie, (weilj
das Prinzip Geist und Wahrheit ist. 2
What happens in reconciliation is, however, more than an attainment
hy man of an intellectual insight into his relation to God. Hegel makes
this plain repeatedly in his discussions of repentance. In remorse, man
throws off his particularity and elevates himself to the universal through
purifying his heart and will. Repentance is essentially man's sincere ded-
ication of his will to God, the making of God* s will his own. The individ-
ual renounces his appetites and merely natural instincts, not "by suppress-
ing the living activity of his will, hut rather hy purifying its content
and making it moral. The repentant soul destroys its evil act in the sense
of renouncing the disposition or attitude which makes the act possible.
• • • Der Geist kann diese Entsagung leisten, da
er die Energie hat, sich an sich zu verttndern und die
Maximen und Intentionen seines Willens in sich zu ver-
nichten. Venn der Mensch in dieser Y/eise seiner Selbst-
sucht und der Entzweiung mit dem Guten entsagt, dann ist
er der VersOhnung teilhaftig geworden und durch die Ver-
mittlung in sich zum Frieden gelangt. 3
Reconciliation has meaning for God as well as for man.
Dieses Bewusstsein vollendet die Religion als Er-
kenntnis Gottes als des Geistes; denn Geist ist er in
der Unterscheidung und Rttckkehr, die wir in der Idee
gesehen, welche enthftlt, dass die Einheit der gtJttlichen
und menschlichen Natur nicht nur Bedeutung hate ftir die
Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur, sondern ehensosehr
der gBttlichen.4
From the side of God, innocence represents God* s undifferentiated
1 XIV, AR, p. 124.
2 XIV, AR, p. 105; cf. p. 126.
3 XII, BR, pp. 276-277; cf. pp. 162, 236, 247, 259, 273; XIV, AR,
p. 206. t
4 XII, BR, p. 131.
(
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unity; sin, his self-differentiation; and virtue, his return to himself.
Man's anguish of soul is God's anguish, his attainment of harmony, God's
return to unity with himself. This progress from unity through discord
to higher unity is the eternal history of the Absolute Spirit. In the
Christian religion it is represented "by the life, death, and resurrection
of Christ as the God-man. The experience of Christ brings graphically be-
fore the consciousness of man the profound truth that Spirit externalizes
itself and becomes finite, descending to the uttermost depths of human
pain, in order to achieve a richer unification in which man is taken up
into God. 1
It is now evident that Hegel's theory of sin, like his account of
the religious life in general, is grounded in a close observation of liv-
ing religious experience. His emphatic recognition of the facts of temp-
tation, moral struggle, and sin, his insight into the part played by free
choice between alternatives, his strong emphasis on the reality of repent-
ance, forgiveness, and reconciliation, his insistence that an apprehension
of the distinction between good and evil is at once the basis of sin and
the condition of true spiritual life, his recognition that reconciliation
has a meaning for God as well as for man, all of these aspects of hie treat-
ment reveal a profound insight into the human religious consciousness, its
struggles and its triumphs.
But Hegel's view of sin is by no means merely empirical, as indeed
no genuine interpretation of sin can be. The rational factor plays a large
and important part, especially in Hegel's insistence on knowledge as the
1 XIV, AB, pp. 163-164. Cf. XII, BR, p. 23; XIV, AB, pp. 134, 157,
159. For further treatment of Hegel's view of the significance of opposi-
tion and reconciliation in God, cf. below, pp. 181-186.
2 XIV, AB, pp. 104, 125. Cf. above, pp. 88-89.
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necessary condition of moral wrongdoing. A purely empirical investigation
could do no more than discover that in the ohserved instances of sin the
recognition of a difference between right and wrong is present. It could
not go on from this, however, to the inference that this knowledge is a
necessary element in all sin whatever. Only by rational thought can Hegel
draw the universal conclusion which forms the center of his doctrine of
sin: that sin is possible because of man's progress from moral ignorance
to moral knowledge. Hegel's view is therefore distinctly a rational one.
Yet it is not a rationalistic construction in isolation from the facts, but
rather a rational interpretation of the facts grounded in a careful study
of the religious life. Hegel begins with experience, but penetrates be-
neath it.
In at least one respect, however, Hegel carries this rational treat-
ment of the facts of sin too far. There are actually two kinds of discord
or estrangement in his theory of sin: that involved in the recognition by
the individual of the difference between right and wrong; and that involved
in the choice of wrong which sets up the human individual as a being-for-
himself separate from God. The first is the condition of the possibility
of evil, the second the actual fulfillment of this possibility. Hegel,
however, tends to identify the two.* He fails to distinguish between sin
and its possibility, and thereby makes sin itself necessary. Now it is ev-
ident that a recognition of moral distinctions is a necessary prerequisite
of all real sin, but it is not at all clear that the actual choice of evil
must of necessity follow. It is profoundly true that all moral development
* This tendency to regard the appearance in consciousness of a dis-
tinction between right and wrong as itself sinful recalls Anaximander*
s
view of the separation and differentiation of things as evil: "Anfang der
Dinge ist das Unendliche (Vnctfovl* Woraus aber ihnen die Geburt ist, da-
hin geht auch ihr Sterben nach der Notwendigkeit . Denn sie zahlen einander
Strafe und Busse fttr ihre Etlchlosigkeit nach der Zeit Ordnung. H (Hermann





is from ignorance through temptation to virtue, hut temptation is not it-
self sin. It cannot he demonstrated that possihle sin must "become actual.
Tet this is what Hegel implies, in fact, explicitly asserts. Knowledge is
for him not only the source of the possihility of evil, hut for this very
reason itself evil. The fact that man has eaten of the tree of knowledge
of good and evil is not only that which makes sin possihle, hut is sin it-
self. 1 The content of the representation of the fall, writes Hegel, con-
sists in this:
. . .
Der Mensch ha"be sich zur Erkenntnis des Unter-
schiedes erhohen, und diese Erkenntnis sei die Quelle des
BOsen, das BOse selhst. Es wird in den Akt des Erkennens,
in das Bewusstsein das BOsesein gelegt. Allerdings liegt
. . .
das BCsesein im Erkennen; das Erkennen ist die Quelle
des BOsen. Denn Erkennen, Bewusstsein ttherhaupt heisst
dies Urteilen, dies sich in sich selhst Unterscheiden. . . .
Die Entzweiung ist das BOse, ist der Widerspruch; sie ent-
hfilt die zwei Seiten, das Gute und das BOse. In dieser
Entzweiung nur ist das BOse enthalten, und darum ist sie
sel"bst das BOse. 2
On this hasis, actualized as well as possihle evil hecomes a neces-
sary stage on the road to virtue. Sin itself hecomes a necessity. But
here Hegel* s theory overthrows itself. The freedom of the human spirit
which he prizes so highly altogether disappears. Sin which is necessary
is properly no longer sin. He who chooses evil "because he cannot choose
anything else has no genuine choice at all. His action is perhaps unfor-
tunate and regrettahle, even imperfect, hut it is not sin. In the last
analysis, therefore, Hegel's view undermines the very reality of that
which it seeks to interpret.
The reality of sin is endangered also hy Hegel's identification of
finite spirits and the Ahsolute Spirit. As already shown, 3 the same act
\ XIV, AR, p. 127.
- XIV, AR, p. 127.
3 Cf. ahove, pp. 81-82; helow, pp. 188, 210-211.
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of will which is evil for the finite individual must on Hegel's theory he
regarded as good for the Ahsolute. But this involves an insoluble contra-
diction, for it implies that the Ahsolute wills "both evil (as finite) and
good (as Absolute) in the same act. This is impossihle. Either, there-
fore, the Ahsolute is ethically imperfect, or man sins only in appearance.
In the former case, Hegel's conception of an ethical Ahsolute is overthrown
and the ultimate validity of all moral distinctions at least called into
question; in the latter, the reality of human sin is completely destroyed.
V. The Concrete Wholeness of the Beligious Life
A. Hegel's Broad Use of "Thought" and "Knowledge"
The present chapter began hy pointing out that for Hegel thought is
the basic thing in religion, then considered in order his treatments of
feeling, will, and the principle of negativity in the effort to determine
more precisely what his view of religious experience is and what he means
by making thought central in it. In spite of certain defects in his con-
ception, it is now clear that he accords a far larger place to the emotion-
al and volitional aspects of religion than is generally supposed. Neither
is excluded hy his emphasis on reason. For Hegel feeling is constantly
present in genuine religion, hut it is feeling guided hy thought. Will is
likewise active in all religion worthy of the name, hut it is reasonahle
will. When, therefore, Hegel calls thought central in religion, he does
not exclude other factors, hut rather gives them a deeper meaning hy re-
lating them to an organizing intelligence. The religious life is for Hegel
an affair of the whole man.
Only from this inclusive standpoint can Hegel's use of Denken in the
Philosophie der Religion he clearly understood. 1 Thought for Hegel is not
1 As Kiss Calkins has shown, Hegel uses "thought" in three main
senses: (1) to refer to the mediating process of reason as opposed to in-
#
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mere intellect in the strict psychological sense, not a separate
part or
function of the human mind, hut the all-organising activity of conscious-
ness, the synoptic comprehension, the organic unification of all experi-
ence. It is the conscious apprehension of the concrete universal. As
such, thought may include not only discursive intellect, hut perception,
feelings of awe and reverence, volitional activity, and so on.
1
In making thought the locus of religion, therefore, Hegel is simply
taking into account the rich fullness of religious experience. Religion
he treats not as a feeling of God»s presence, or as a resolution to per-
form God 1 s will, or as any other partial aspect of the conscious life, hat
as the "Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott,** the relation of the whole mind to
the Absolute Spirit.
2
In short, Hegel* s philosophy of religion is not so
much intellectual ism as synopticisra.
Hegel* 8 use of such words as Erkenntnis , Wissen, and Bewusatsein is
similarly concrete. Knowledge he interprets broadly to include activity,
faith, meditation, trust, and obedience, as well as cognition. It describes,
in short, a taking up of the object into subjectivity, a personal appropri-
ation of the object by the whole subject. It cannot be denied that Hegel's
aversion to subjectivism leads him at times to emphasize too strongly the
tultive or immediate apprehension; (2) to signify the unifying or relating
as opposed to the sense consciousness; and (3) to describe the total con-
sciousness which any individual has of the absolute individual as inclusive
of all reality. It is thought in the last-named sense which Hegel finds to
be the essence of the religious consciousness. Cf. Mary Whiton Calkins,
Persistent Problems of Philosophy (N.Y. : Macmillan, 1915), pp. 388-389, n #3.
1 "We can feel and act," writes J. S. Mackenzie, "from the point of
view of the whole, just as we can think from that point of view. The
'thought* which is emphasized by Hegel is not thought as opposed to feel-
ing and will, but thought as the conscious grasp of the universal, in what-
ever form it may appear; and it is only in this sense that he seeks to in-
terpret art and religion and morality, and the world as a whole, in the
light of thought." "The Hegelian Point of View, n p. 70.
2 Cf. Haym, HSZ, p. 403.
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theoretical side of religion and undervalue the unique significance of the
other factors. In the main, however, knowledge is for him1 just as inclu-
sive as it is for the writer of the Fourth Gospel, who finds eternal life
to consist in the knowledge of God. Hegel does not oppose intuitive knowl-
edge of God, hut only the sub jectivistic view that immediate knowledge is
self-justifying and the only kind possible. In fact, he admits on one oc-
casion the one-sidedness of purely cognitive knowledge:
Das Erkennen mag einseitig sein, und zur Religion
noch mehr und wesentlich Bnpfindung, Anschauen, Glauben
gehOren, sowie zu Gott noch weiteres als sein denkender
und gedachter Begriff. 4
B. Ver3tand versus Vemunft
Hegel's insistence on the concrete wholeness of the mind in reli-
gious experience is nowhere better revealed than in his criticism of the
Verstand as opposed to the Vernunft . His attack on the abstract under-
standing characteristic of the thought of the Aufklftrung is no less vig-
orous and penetrating than that on the theology of feeling to which the
5Yerstandesmetaphys ik gives rise*
Hegel's fundamental criticism of the "Bildung der Reflexion" is
that it is purely abstract, external, and analytical.
Das Denken als Verstand bleibt bei der festen Be-
st immtheit und der Unterschiedenheit derselben gegen an-
dere stehen; ein solches beschrflnktes Abstraktes gilt
ihm als ftlr sich bestehend und seiend.?
Taking as its supreme criterion the law of identity and contradic-
„ As Lasson suggests, EHR, p. 137.
Z John 17:3.
XII, BR, p. 93, How little Hegel rules out intuitive apprehension
from the knowledge of God is shown when he writes, "Die Religion besteht
als unbefangener Glaube, Geftthl, Anschauung tiberhaupt im unmittelbaren
Wissen und Bewusstsein." (XII, BR, p. 62,)
Quoted in Haym, HSZ, p. 403.
jj
Cf. above, pp. 25-27.
Foreword to Hinrichs* Religionsphilosophle




tion, the Verstand "breaks up reality into "bits. It need not wonder,
therefore, if it finds itself incapable of attaining ultimate truth or,
in religion, knowledge of God. Its very method prevents it from appre-
hending true reality, which is not a collection of separate parts, hut
an organic, concrete whole. The understanding destroys this original
unity at the very outset, then struggles vainly to regain it hy means of
an external process of joining part to part.
Die konsequente und selbststftndige Entwicklung des
Princips des Verstandes fuhrt aher dahin, alle Bestimmung
und damit alien Inhalt nur als eine Endlichkeit zu fassen,
und so die Gestaltung und Bestimmung des GOttlichen zu
vernichten. 2
The identity of the understanding, which in the Kantian philosophy
is advanced as the highest principle of thought, is "das Leere der atom-
3istischen Philosophic" For such a procedure God can have no predicates
or qualities, and is inevitably "in das Jenseits des Wissens hinaufge-
4
setzt, oder vielmehr zur Inhaltlosigkeit herabgesetzt." Such a philos-
ophy, Hegel points out, is quite right in holding that the understanding
cannot know truth; its error lies in regarding mind as nothing more than
this abstract understanding, and therefore in maintaining that man can
know nothing of God, "als ob es ausser Gott Hberhaupt absolute Gegen-
5
stflnde und eine Wahrheit geben kBnnte."
Hegel, no less than Bnerson after him, protests against "die Kon-
sequenz seichter Seelen." (XII, BE, p. 26.)
~ Foreword to Hinrichs* Beligionsphilosophie . JUB, XX, p. 14.
Loc. cit. An interesting example of this atomism of the under-
standing is found in his comment on an excerpt from Schleiermacher*
s
Glaubenslehre. The quotation is this:
. . Die kirchliche Lehre ver-
theilt die GesamttStigkeit Christi in drei Anter, das profetische, das
hohenpriesterliche und das kBnigliche." (II, p. 268, par. 123.) Hegel
comments: "Mit den trockensten, hohlsten, unfruchtbarsten Yerstandesdis-
tinktionen lttsst sich der Verfasser ein und ergeht sich in einer ebenso
leeren Verstandesdialektik in denselben." (G. Lasson, KBH, p. 39.)
Foreword to Hinrichs» Rel igi
o
nsphil osophi e . JUB, XX, p. 14.
Loc. cit. "~

Life in its concrete fullness is the continually repeated resolution
of contradictions, the repeated satisfaction of ever-recurring needs, the
continual harmonization of constantly appearing discords. The understand-
ing sees only half of this alternating process. It recognizes the contra-
dictions hut is unable to grasp the higher unity in which they are pre-
served yet transcended.
Wenn nun der Verstand dahin gekommen ist, so sagt er:
dies ist ein Widerspruch, und er bleibt dabei, bleibt bei
dem Widerspruche stehen gegen die Erfahrung, dass das Leben
selbst es ist, den Y/iderspruch aufzuheben. . . . Denn das
Prinzip des Verstandes ist die abstrakte Identitfit mit sich,
nicht die konkrete, dass diese Unterschiede in einem sind.*
Verstand is according to Hegel "endliche Vernunft," "menschliches
Denken," and must therefore be carefully distinguished from that other
thought
welches, obwohl im Menschen, doch gOttlich ist, von dem
Verstand, der nicht das Eigene, sondern das Allgemeine
sucht, von der Vernunft, welche nur das Unendliche und
Ewige als das allein Seyende weiss und betrachtet.^
Thought must rise to the plane of reason, where it sees oppositions not as
absolute, but as moments in a totality, as related aspects of a concrete
whole. True reason is for Hegel the relating activity of the whole mind,
Das unbestimmte Wort Vernunft und vernunft ige Ein-
sicht reduziert sich darauf, dass mir ... etwas ...
fur sich selbst feststehe, objektiv an und fttr sich in
1 XIV, AR, p. 79. Hegel' 8 polemic against the understanding is at
this point in complete harmony with Bergson's attack on discursive intel-
lect. The two thinkers are at one in their dissatisfaction with mere anal
ysis. Both seek to preserve the developing whole of life. As a matter of
fact, Bergson's definition of intuition as "instinct that has become disin
terested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of en-
larging it indefinitely" ( Creative Evolution . N.Y.: Holt, 1911, p. 177.)
makes it essentially the same synoptic intelligence for which Hegel argues
so vigorously.
^ Foreword to Hinrichs* Beligionsphilosophie
. JUB, XX, p. 6; cf. pp
9-14. For further significant treatments of the Verstand by Hegel, cf.
XII, BE, pp. 41, 62, 299-302; XIV, AB, pp. 71, 217-231; II, PDG, pp. 366,




mir befestigt, d. i. in sich selbst begrundet sei. . . •
Solches aber ist der reine Begriff. . . . Dies ist das
Substanzielle . dass solcher Inhalt so als in sich ge-
grflndet von mir gewusst werde, dass ich darin das Be-
wusstsein des Begriffes habe, d. i. . . . die Wahrheit
darin als Wahrheit, d. i. in der Form der Wahrheit, in
der Form des ahsolut konkreten, schlechthin und rein in
sich Zusammenstimmenden habe.
This emphasis on the unity of things, on the concrete wholeness of
reality, is a Leitmotiv which appears and reappears throughout the writings
of Hegel. ". • • Nur das Ganze," he writes in the Phgnomenologie . "hat
2
eigentliche Wirklichkeit." Elsewhere he writes, "In einem Satz lflsst sich
j
nicht Wahrheit aussprechen." Everything, to he properly understood, must
4he viewed in its relationship to a larger whole. Nature, life, and Spir-
it are throughout organic. Every distinct thing is a reflection, an indi-
vidual manifestation of the one Absolute; it stands, therefore, in integral
relation to everything else.^
C. Religion an Activity of the Whole Personality
In the sphere of religion, this connectedness of things means not on-
ly that religion must be related to other human interests, but also that as
religion it is an affair of the total personality. It is impossible to
pick out any one side of man's nature and say, "Here is the essence of re-
c
ligion." "Der menschliche Geist ist nicht ein so Geteiltes." Man is re-
ligious with his whole being, "in dem ganzen Umfange seines Selbstbewusst-
7
seins." When, therefore, Hegel writes that only on the basis of reason
p
can religion be at home, he does not mean intellect as opposed to faith,
but rather a broad, synoptic attitude toward reality in which feeling and
1 XII, BE, pp. 294-295; cf. XIV, AH, p. 69.
2 II, PDG, p. 496.
3 XIV, AH, p. 38.
^ And ultimately, of course, to the Absolute.
\ XIV, AH, p. 37.6 XII, BE, p. 55.
7 XII, BE, p. 181.
8 XII, BE, p. 149.
I
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„d .111. far from oeing excluded, fulfill en
integral end necessary
function.
Alles fteistige 1st konkret ; hier haben
wir das-
selbe in~"s7iner tiefsten Bestimmung vor
uns, den Geist
namUcn als das Konkrete des Glaubens und
Denkens; beide
sind nicht nur «af die mannigfaltigste
Y/eise, in unmit-
telbarem Herttber- und Hinttbergehen. vermischt,
sondern
so innig verbunden miteinander, dass es kein
Glauben
riM, welches nicht Reflekt ieren, Rftsonnieren oder Denk-
en uberhaupt, sowie kein Denken, welches nicht
Glauben,
wenn auch nur momentanen, in sich enthalte. . • .
The main difference between Hegel and his ant
i-intellectualistic
opponents is not that he fails to recognize the emotional
factors in
religion, but that he insists that religious experience is
also intel-
lectual. In this concrete view of the religious life Hegel is more
broadly empirical than Schleiermacher. Religion for him is the eleva-
tion of the human spirit, in all the many-sided richness of its life,
to God.
VI. Appraisal
It is now possible to draw certain broad conclusions regarding the
empirical and the rational factors in Hegel's view of religious experience.
In the first place, there is in Hegel little trace either of the em-
piricism which uncritically accepts the psychological facts of religion
as in themselves complete, or of the rationalism which relies on thought
apart from experience.
Secondly, there is nevertheless evident on Hegel's part an earnest
effort to base his conclusions on the facts. The rational, he recognizes,
1 XIV, BDG, pp. 8-9. The italics are the present writer's.
2 At this point Glockner's comparison of Hegel and Schleiermacher is
suggestive enough to merit quotation. "Hegel ist," writes Glockner, "am
Ganzen seines Systems gemessen, glftubiger als Schleiermacher. Er glaubt
an den Geist in der ganzen Fulle seiner Selbstoffenbarung: sowohl in Reli-
gion wie in Wissenschaft . Aber Schleiermacher ist frttmmer als Hegel. In
einer brtlchig gewordenen Welt vertraut er auf die unmittelbare Gewissheit
seines Gottesempfindens und er bleibt durchaus nicht etwa bei der Sehn-
sucht stehen." ("Hegel und Schleiermacher," p. 255.)
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must be based on the empirical. His discussions reveal at once a deep per-
sonal acquaintance with religion and a careful objective study of histori-
cal and contemporary religious experience. In some instances rational con-
siderations have produced a certain amount of distortion, but in the main
he has preserved the original factual ity of religion.
Thirdly, however, there is in Hegel a ceaseless insistence on inter-
preting the facts in the light of reason. The empirical, he insists, is
important, but it is not sufficient; it must be supplemented by the ration-
al. Only when the facts have been organized and evaluated by thought do
they take on meaning and significance.
The standpoint of Hegel's philosophy of religion is thus to a sur-
prising degree a genuine harmony of experience and reason. Both factors
are essential; neither alone is enough. Experience without reason is neu-
tral and meaningless; reason without experience is fruitless and empty,^"
The concreteness of this approach to religion enabled Hegel to avoid both
of the extremes which dominated the religious thought of his day, the ir-
rational emotionalism of the theology of feeling and the barren rational-
ism of the Aufklttrung. In fact, as we have seen, his chief negative crit-
icisms are directed against these two tendencies which, though closely re-
lated, stand at opposite poles. He opposes one as vigorously as the other
and, by making philosophy of religion the working of synoptic reason on
the soil of concrete experience, corrects in large measure the errors of
2both.
* Cf. "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal." Nohl, TJS,
p. 332.
^ An instructive example of the significance of this synthesis is
found in the influence of Hegel on the British clergy, as reported by
J. A. Smith. Through the translations of Wallace and the teaching and
writing of Green and Caird, says Smith, Hegel* s main doctrines were made
accessible and even familiar to many generations of English students, and
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strongly attracted them. "In particular they formed the minds of most
thoughtful young men in their attitude to Religion, and to this is due
the very remarkahle diffusion among them of a dislike to the resting of
the claims of Religion upon mere feeling or emotion and of a conviction
of its essential reasonableness. In this connection it may he noted that
even among the better educated clergy in Great Britain there has till re-
cently been exceptionally little tendency to any form of either emotional
Irrationalism or of dry and sterile Rationalism. Hegelianism has there
worked constructively, but has not been much used either in defense of
traditional orthodoxy or, on the other hand, subversively." ("The Influ-
ence of Hegel on the Philosophy of Great Britain." Verhandlungen des erst-







HEGEL* S VIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF RELIGION
I. The Dual Development of Religion
In its deepest meaning, the relation of man to God which for Hegel
constitutes religion is not a static condition, hut a living process which
involves, on the one hand, the elevation of the human spirit to the Abso-
lute Spirit, and on the other, the attainment by the Absolute of full con-
sciousness of itself.* This process, moreover, is something far more than
a movement of abstract thought; essentially two-sided, it is not only log-
ical and notional, but chronological and historical. As we have seen, it
is the very nature of Spirit to objectify or manifest itself. It is essen-
tial to religion to exist not only potentially, as idea, but actually, in
human consciousness. The notion of religion, therefore, must determine it-
self and become manifest in the history of religion, which in turn advances
ever forward in the effort to become adequate to its notion.
Die verschiedenen Formen, Bestimmungen der Religion
sind einerseits als Momente des Begriffs Momente der Reli-
gion "flberhaupt Oder der vollendeten Religion. ... Aber
zweitens haben sie die Gestalt, dass sie fflr sich in der
Zeit und geschichtlich sich entwickeln. Wenn wir die Reihe
der Religionen determiniert nach dem Begriffe betrachten,
so geht uns zugleich die Reihe der historischen Religionen
daraus hervor, und wir haben die Geschichte der Religion
vor uns.4
Hegel* s religious thought is therefore intimately concerned with the
history of religion. His presentation of the historical development of re-
ligion, from its earliest beginnings to its complete manifestation in the
absolute religion, as a dialectical movement in the self-consciousness of
1 II, PDG, p. 437; XII, BR, pp. 66, 150.
j? Cf. II, PDG, pp. 485, 520-521.
Cf. above, pp. 33-34, 38-39.4 XII, BR, p. 72; cf. pp. 64-65, 70-71.
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the Absolute Spirit involves frequent reference to the facts of religious
history.
1
It is our present task to discover the relative parts played "by
empirical and rational elements in this interpretation. Does Hegel, as has
teen charged,
2 distort the empirical facts of history hy forcing them into
an artificial arrangement determined hy a preconceived theory? Or does he
take history as he finds it and "base his rational conclusions on a careful
observation of the facts? In other words, does Hegel work out a priori
what the history of religion ought to he to accord with the notion, ration-
ally arrived at, and then apply this theory to historical religion, or does
he rather derive the notion itself from empirical study of the actual his-
tory of religion? If his approach is a combination of these two methods,
which preponderates?
II. Hegel* s Regard for Historical Data
Even a cursory reading of the second and third parts of the Philos-
ophic der Religion reveals in Hegel a high regard for the facts of history
.
This is shown both by the frequency ,of his references to historical sources
and by the usual accuracy of his descriptions of the historical religions
as known in his day.
A. Hegel* s Interest in Historical Research
Hegel* s writings on religion manifest a deep interest in and reliance
on the results of the best historical research of his own and previous gen-
erations. He makes constant use of the best available knowledge of the his-
* In two of the three main phases of his philosophy of religion the
historical element bulks large. Properly speaking, the phrase historische
Religion refers only to "die bestimmten, die ethnischen Religionen** (XII,
BR, p. 72), as the finite manifestation of the notion. But inasmuch as the
absolute religion is in Hegel* s view the unity of the notion and its mani-
festation, it also has its historical side, the difference between it and
the definite religions being that in it the manifestation fully expresses
the notion, while in the finite religions the notion is only imperfectly
and inadequately realized.
2 Cf. above, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 12-13.
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tory of religions. He appeals frequently to such ancient authorities
as
.
Josephus, Herodotus, and Eusebius, as well as to the Germans Neander and
Creuzer. In Die Naturreligion alone there are no less than twelve cita-
tions by name of historical sources and twelve indirect references.
1
Hegel's interest in historical investigations in religion is partic-
ularly well illustrated by his relations with Friedrich Creuzer, probably
the outstanding historian of religion in the first half of the nineteenth
century. 2 In a letter dated October 30, 1819, thanking Creuzer for his re-
cent gift of two books, Hegel writes as follows:
Zuerst also meinen vielfachen Dank ftfr die beyden
schOnen Werke, die mir hCchst wichtig sind, und aus den-
en ich schon viel gelernt habe; Ihre neue Darstellung wie
Ihre Behandlungsweise der Mythologie flberhaupt, hat un-
endlich viel Interesse fflr mich und die Welt.*
Hegel then goes on to praise Karl Bitter , s Die Erdkunde ira Verhflltnls zur
Natur und zur Geschlchte des Menschen (Berlin, 1817-1818); mentions that
he has a sixteen-page advertisement of Bitter* s Yorhalle europ&lschen VBlk-
ergeschlchte von Herodotus urn den Kaukasus und an den Gcstaden des Pontus
(Berlin, 1820), in which the author traces a marked Buddhist influence in
Greek religion; and expresses his eagerness to know what Creuzer 's opinion
1 For sample references to historical sources, cf. TJS, pp. 244, 245,
253, 372; XII, BB. p. 283; XIII, NB, pp. 43, 70, 83, 85, 90, 99, 100, 101-
102, 117, 125, 152, 153, 155, 157, 161, 165, 170, 171, 173, 181; XIII, BGI,
pp. 175, 190, 191, 211, 217, 218, 221; XIV, AB, p. 63.
Creuzer' s most famous work is the Symbol Ik und Mythologie der alt-
en YOlker . besonders der Griechen
.
1810-1812; 2d ed. , 6 vols, with atlas,
1819-1823 (the edition known and used by Hegel); 3d ed. , 4 vols., 1837-
1842. Writes George Foot Moore, "The discredit into which Creuzer*s the-
ory of 'symbolism* has fallen
. . .
should not lead us to ignore the fact
that his volume furnished a useful and comprehensive collection of what
was then known about the principal religions of the world.** (**The History
of Beligions in the Nineteenth Century,** p. 434.)
3 Probably the first volume of Creuzer's Symbol Ik . 2d ed.
,
1819; and
Abbildungen zu Friedrich Creuzer' s Symbol ik der alten VClker








of this theory will be.
No less interesting and significant is Creuzer's own testimony con-
cerning Hegel and his knowledge of history. Creuzer writes:
Mit dem Meister der neuesten Schule (of German phi-
losophy] hatte ich keine M&he, mich -ffber . • . meine Stell-
ung und Stimmung [that is, Creuzer»s renunciation of sys-
tematic philosophising] zu versttadigen. Bei seiner Kennt-
nis und Achtung der Altertumskunde und bei der grossartigen
Weise, Menschen und Dinge zu wttrdigen, entschuldigte er
freundschaftlich das Beschrtaken meiner Studien auf dieg
Philosophie des Altertums und war mir darin fBrderlich.
Such evidence reveals a mind completely at home in the known history
of religion and eager to learn the results of the latest historical re-
search. On the basis of the external evidence, one can only conclude that
Hegel gathered his facts as all philosophers of religious history must who
lack opportunity for direct observation, namely, by going to the works of
the best historical authorities. His philosophy of religion is based on a
careful, painstaking study of the empirical facts as reported by the most
competent investigators. No merely rationalistic apriorist would be so
concerned as is Hegel with ascertaining the historical data.
B. The General Accuracy of Hegel's Historical Accounts
It is now clear that Hegel conscientiously sought to make the de-
scriptions in his philosophy of religion historically accurate. We have
now to ask how far he succeeded. To what extent do his religious writings
reflect faithfully the facts of religious history?
Georg Lasson, NBH, pp. 22-23.
Foreword to 3d ed. of Creuzer*s Symbol Ik und Mythologie (Leipzig
and Darmstadt, 1837), I; quoted in Lasson, NBH, p. 22, n. 5.
3 For a convincing argument that Hegel's philosophy in general grew
partly out of a laborious study of history and of Greek literature and phi-
losophy, cf. David C. Bitchie, "Philosophy and the Study of the Philoso-




Hegel's presentation of the development of religion is at several
points marred by historical inaccuracies. He makes the mistaken assertion
that in the East religion is always connected with nationality.
1
In Hegel's
scheme, Buddhism antedates Hinduism, which is the reverse of the truth; and
his treatment of Buddhism is highly inadequate. He makes no mention what-
2
ever, in his Philosophie der Religion , of Babylonian religion, which today
is regarded as the fundamental type of all Oriental religion, and passes
over Syrian religion with only seven words. He grossly underestimates the
significance of Jewish religion in general and of the Hebrew prophets in
particular. In Hegel's dialectical classification of religion, moreover,
Roman religion stands higher than Judaism, and Christianity is treated as
springing not from Judaism, but from Roman imperialism. Finally, Hegel of-
fers no adequate account of Mohammedanism, treating it as merely a modifi-
cation of Judaism.
2. Interpretation of These Defects
a. The Influence of Hegel's Purpose and the
Limitations of His Knowledge
In interpreting these inaccuracies several things must be borne in
mind. In the first place, it must be remembered that Hegel communicated
his philosophy of religion only in university lectures and never published
it in book form. This fact, involving as it does definite limitations of
time and the consequent need of restriction in the scope of the material
covered, may partly explain some of the gaps noted.
* XIII, RGI, p. 95. Buddhism and Mohammedanism are notable excep-
tions.
In his lectures on the philosophy of history, however, Hegel does
consider the Babylonians and their cultus.
3 In his Philosophie der V/eltgesch icht
e
Hegel devotes eight pages to
Mohammedanism. (VIII, pp. 789-797.)
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Secondly, it would be unjust to Hegel to expect from him a detailed
account of the history or even of the teachings of all the world's reli-
gions. He is from first to last a philosopher, not an historian. He ex-
pressly states that it is not his aim to give an historical survey.
1 He-
gel's primary purpose is the philosophical interpretation of historical re-
ligion; he seeks primarily not to describe religion, but to understand it.
He is not thereby committed to giving a thorough account of all the details
of religious history. He is not concerned with painting a complete picture
of every individual religion, but rather with selecting certain typical ex-
amples and tracing in them the broad outlines of the history of religion
in order to show the connection which runs through it and the rational mean-
ing which underlies it.
Finally, some of the defects in Hegel's account of the various reli-
gions are easily understood when the state of historical knowledge in his
day is borne in mind. In Hegel's lifetime the science of the history of
religion, begun only at the end of the eighteenth century, was still in its
infancy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, says George Foot Moore,
the religions of Greece and Home, Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam were the only religions which were known through
native sources or their own sacred books, unless we make a
partial exception of Chinese texts translated by Jesuit
missionaries. For Egypt and Babylonia, India and Persia,
the chief or only sources of information were the fragmen-
tary and often conflicting reports in Greek and Latin au-
thors. ... On all sides the authentic knowledge of the
chief historical religions of the world has been immeasur-
ably enlarged by the discoveries and investigations of the
nineteenth century. 2
XII, BE, p # 164. At the beginning of his discussion of the Chris-
tian Ganeinde, Hegel says, "In konkreter Gestalt, mit Geschichte und empir-
ischen Dasein verbunden [sie zu betrachteifj
, fuhrt uns zu weit, so ver-
fHhrerisch es sein kBnnte." XIV, AR, p. 175.




These researches have "brought to light and rendered accessible to the
West a mass of religious literature which has revolutionized our knowledge
of Eastern religions, while the discovery and methodical use of monuments
and other remains have gone far to enlarge and correct the information
gained from literature alone. Sheer lack of knowledge accounts largely for
Hegel's identification of Oriental religions with nationality, his unsatis-
factory presentation of Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism, and his omis-
sion of Babylonian religion, and partly for his inadequate treatment of Mo-
hammedanism,
b. Rationalistic and Empirical Influence
1), Hegel* s underestimate of Hebrew religion . There remain, however,
other defects which are not explained by any of the above factors. Fore-
most among these is perhaps Hegel's lack of appreciation of Jewish religion.
From the beginning he shows a marked misunderstanding of the Hebrew spirit.
In the introduction to "Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal," he
portrays the Hebrew religion as that of a people in conflict with itself
and with nature, a nation not at home in the universe, and lacking the ca-
pacity for love and harmonious life. The flood story, Hegel points out, re-
veals a clear-cut disruption of man and nature which is not healed by what
follows.* Abraham's first recorded act, which made him ancestor of the na-
tion, was an act of estrangement. Abraham was so lacking in the desire for
love and freedom that he was willing to sacrifice the only love he ever had,
2that for his son. Moses, it is true, freed his people, but straightway
laid on them a new burden. The Old Testament contains no truth about God,
1 This Hegel contrasts with the Greek story of Deucalion and Pyrrha.
(Nohl, TJS, p. 245.)
2 This, too, stands in contrast with a Greek story, that of Cadmus





All the misfortunes of the Jewish people were simply
consequences of their early estrangement from nature, their slavish depend-
ence on a God who should have emhodied the ideal of freedom and fullness
2
of life.'
Es sentially the same view is revealed in Hegel's later writings. Na-
3
ture, he holds, was regarded "by the Jews as undivine. The world and man
are altogether dependent on the free subjectivity of God. Though God as
power is infinite, in objectifying himself he produces only limitation and
particularity. God is creator, hut as such, only the Lord or ruler of his
creation.4 Man»s relation to God is therefore not one of freedom, hut one
5
of obedience to fixed, external laws. Both God and man are spirit, hut
they still stand over against each other in unreconciled particularity.
"Judische Religion Qst so] Religion des hartnftckigsten totfesten Ver-
standes."^
In all of this Hegel gives a fairly accurate account of an important
aspect of Jewish religion, its ceremonial, legalistic emphasis. But the
religion of the Hebrews is far more than legalism. Hegel gives almost no
7
consideration to the great literary prophets, with their profound ethical
and religious message, or to the lofty spiritual insights found in the
Psalms and Job. Tet these are precisely the highest and most significant
1 Nohl, TJS, p. 254.
2 Nohl, TJS, p. 260.
3 IX, PWG, pp. 453-454.
* XIII, RGI, p. 107.
° XIII, RGI, pp. 73, 104-106.
® XIII, RGI, p. 201.
When he does mention the prophets, Hegel usually betrays a radical
misunderstanding of them. For example, in MDer Geist des Christ entums und
sein Schicksal" (Nohl, TJS, p. 259), he says that in their mixing in poli-
tics the prophets were only limited, ineffective fanatics, who could only
recall past times and thereby confuse the present, but were unable to usher
in other and better conditions.
(
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elements in the civilisation of the Jews. Estrangement there is in the Old
Testament, hut there is genuine reconciliation too. Disruption there is,
hut there is healing also. Hegel apparently forgets the tender words of
Rosea, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him."
1
He overlooks the
Psalmist' 8 intimate trust in the mercy and love of God: "The Lord is gra-
2
cious and full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy." "As the
heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy toward them that fear
him. As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our trans-
gressions from us." He ignores Ezekiel's message of inner reconciliation:
"I will seek that which was lost, and will hring hack that which was driven
away, and will bind up that which was broken, and will strengthen that which
4
was sick." "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put
5
within you." Obedience to the law, moreover, is not always the external
compliance which Hegel justly opposes. The Old Testament includes, to be
sure, the codes of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, 6 but it contains also the new
covenant of Jeremiah: "I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their
heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people:
. . .
they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of
them,
. . .
for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remem-
7ber no more." Furthermore, in regarding nature for Judaism as undivine
and foreign to man, Hegel overlooks the oft-repeated idea of the Psalms,




\ Psa 103:11, 12.
* Ezek 34:16.
6
Ezek 36:25. Cf. also Hos 3:1; Psa 46:1.





AU 0f this leaves unmentioned Hegel's undervaluation ofthe high moral teachings of the Old Testament prophets. Probably Hegelplaced their moral teaching in the same class with that of Kant and Fichte,
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In his treatment of Judaism Hegel clearly disregards his own princi-
ple of concrete wholeness. He judges the religion of the Jews on the "ba-
sis of one aspect of it. Even the fact that this legalistic side was of-
ten typical, and in the Roman period predominant, does not excuse Hegel for
his failure to recognize the significance of that prophetic stream which,
if displaced "by ceremonialism, remained "by all odds the greatest thing in
the Jewish religion.
Hegel's failure to appreciate the true greatness of Hehrew religion
cannot he laid to ignorance of the facts: the Hehrew scriptures lay "before
him in complete form. His error is prohahly due to one or "both of two fac-
tors: the operation of personal or national prejudice against Judaism, or
the intrusion of rationalistic considerations. It is difficult to esti-
mate how large a part prejudice has played, though in view of Hegel's mark-
ed Prussianism and his conviction that Christianity was the ahsolute reli-
gion,^" it is possihle that he shared to some extent the low regard of many
of his countrymen for the Jews. In so far as this factor operated Hegel
may he said to he too empirical, failing to penetrate "beneath the prejudices
of his time concerning the Hehrews to the real significance of the Jewish
2
religion. At the same time, he was prohahly led "by his theory, arrived at
on other grounds, to overlook in Judaism some of the facts which ran coun-
ter to the theory. Such rationalistic influence appears especially prohahle
when Hegel's view of Jewish religion is regarded in the light of his theory
of the genesis of Christianity.
which to him was inadequate "because it centered in a mere unrealized Sollen
.
(Cf. ahove, pp. 78-82.)
1 Cf. below, pp. 149-157.
2 This circumstance affords an excellent example of how mere empiri-
cism may actually stand in the way of a true account of the empirical facts.
Seen through the colored glasses of uncriticized prejudice, facts appear as
other than they actually are. Cf. "below, p. 116.
•
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2) . Hegel ' 9 view of the genesis of Christianity . According to He-
gel' s arrangement, not Judaism, hut Roman religion is the forerunner of
Christianity. The Christian religion grew out of the unhappy social and
political conditions of the age, the negation of the spirits of the peo-
ples "by the fate embodied in Roman imperialism. Greek and Roman religion
was basically a religion for a free people; with the loss of freedom under
the Roman empire the power and suitability of the Greek and Roman reli-
gions was also lost. Hence the time was ripe for the appearance of the
religion of universal freedom.
*
The unhappiness of the age was undoubtedly an important preparation
for Christianity, but no merely negative condition affords an adequate ex-
planation of so influential a phenomenon. Hegel says nothing concerning
the fact that Christianity sprang directly out of the Hebrew religion and
is truly to be understood only in the light of the Jewish Messianic hope.
Judaism, and not Roman emperor-worship, was the cradle of Christianity.
p
Hegel's error at this point, as Pfleiderer has shown, is a clear instance
of the substitution of the dialectic of the notion for historical insight,
Hegel's rational scheme requires him to derive the religion of universal
freedom from the negation of free self-consciousness. This negation he
finds not in Hebrew, but in Roman religion. In thus following the dictates
of his logic, however, he distorts the facts of history, Hegel's regard
for dialectical formulation overcomes his respect for history.
3) . Hegel's inadequate treatment of Mohammedanism . Hegel's treat-
ment of Mohammedanism is regrettably sketchy. He discusses it in a brief
section of his Philosophie der Weltgeschichte
.
5 characterizing its intel-
1 Nohl, TJS, pp. 220-224.
2 Pfleiderer, PRBH, p. 103. Cf. Rosenkranz, HDN, p. 216.
3 VIII, PWG, pp. 789-797.
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tectual and spiritual foundations with masterful accuracy. For Hegel,
however, Islam is basically no more than the negation of the Christian
principle of free and infinite subjectivity , and abstraction and fanat-
icism are its essential features. Hence he gives it only "brief attention.
In his Philosophic der Religion Hegel almost completely overlooks Moham-
medanism; four scattered references to it are the only sign that he knew
of its existence. He first mentions it in a few sentences as a modifica-
tion of Judaism, 1 and later speaks briefly of its formalism and abstract-
2
ness while criticizing the abstractions of the Aufklftrung . Such passing
mention falls far short of doing justice to a religion whose native
strength and vigor have won it dominance over half of two continents.
What is the reason for this failure to give Mohammedanism its just
due? Lack of information may have played a part, but this alone is not
sufficient explanation. G-eorg Lasson is perhaps right in suggesting that
a personal antipathy to the rationalistic rigidity, abstractness , and ar-
tificiality of Mohammedanism may have interfered with Hegel* s usual objec-
3
tivity. Hegel's deficiency at this point may be likewise partly due to
his dialectical arrangement, which leaves room for three "religions of
spiritual individuality,** but hardly for four. It is also possible that
Hegel regarded Mohammedanism as enough like Judaism to render unnecessary
any special treatment. How far any one of these factors was responsible
is impossible to trace.
Two factors now bulk largest as possible explanation of the histori-
cal inaccuracies in Hegel* s religious thought not accounted for by simple
lack of knowledge: on the one hand, the operation of personal prejudice;
1 XIII, RG-I, p. 100.
| XIV, AS, pp. 147, 152, 222-223.
G. Lasson, EHE, pp. 101-102, Lasson points out, too, that Islam's
mysticism alone would have been well worth closer study by Hegel.
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and on the other, the unjustified intrusion of rationalistic considera-
tions growing out of the nature of the dialectic. As previously indicat-
ed,
1
to the extent to which the former element is active Hegel is actually
over-empirical, while in so far as the latter prevails he is over-rational.
The latter tendency is perhaps the stronger in the instances studied.
It may he questioned whether reaching conclusions on the hasis of
suhjective prejudice may properly he termed empiricism. However, if to he
empirical in the strict sense is to derive knowledge from experience and
not from reason, any acceptance of the immediate data of consciousness, un-
accompanied hy rational criticism, may he called empirical. This remains
true whether such uncritical procedure springs from prejudice or from some-
thing else. To the extent, therefore, that Hegel through personal antipa-
thy overlooks Mohammedanism and underestimates Judaism, he is over-empiri-
cal. Unwittingly, he illustrates the fallacy of all thorough-going empiri-
cism. For the facts as given are not always the significant facts. He
who unreflectively accepts as valid the data afforded hy his own immediate
experience is strictly empirical, hut hy this very procedure he is often
prevented from knowing the facts as they actually are. In short, mere em-
2piricism, which entirely excludes the rational, stands in the way of what
might he called true empiricism, which insists on loyalty to the facts hut
invites the cooperation of reason in discovering what those facts are and
mean. The only way to he truly empirical is to he rational.
1 Cf. ahove, p. 113.
^ The term "over-empirical" used in this and in the preceding para-
graph denotes an approximation to the extreme of "mere empiricism" as here
defined. Both terms imply an insufficient use of reason, the difference
"being purely one of degree. The term "over-rational" hears the same rela-
tion to the phrase "merely rational," "both denoting, in less or greater
degree, the exaggerated rationalism which proceeds without due regard for
the facts of experience. Cf. ahove, p. 113.
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3. Hegel' b Habitual Loyalty to History
The historical defects just considered mast not obscure, however, the
more important fact of Hegel* s general loyalty to the actual history of re-
ligions. Such defects are the exception rather than the rule. In the main,
Hegel* s accounts of the various religions are remarkably accurate. He is
usually true to the facts as known in his day, and often succeeds amazingly
well, even on the basis of inadequate knowledge, in bringing to light the
characteristic features of a given religion. This appears in the case of
the Chinese state religion, the only one of the "nature-religions" consid-
ered by Hegel for which detailed information was available in his time.
Though later researches have greatly added to our store of knowledge con-
cerning the Chinese religion, certain Catholic missionaries, notably the
Jesuits, had published fundamental studies of it. As well-known investi-
gators of Chinese history have since recognised, Hegel used these materials
conscientiously and grasped the Chinese spirit with remarkable discernment.*
The same can be said for Hegel* s treatment of the history of Christianity,
and for his discussions of Buddhism and Hinduism as they were known to him.
We may conclude, therefore, that in spite of certain important de-
fects, Hegel is for the most part faithful to the empirical facts of the
history of religion.
1
IX, FWG, pp. 520-331; and LasBon*s foreword to XIII, KB, p. VIII.
The testimony of D. Witte, director of the German Ostasi en-Mission, is sig-
nificant. In an essay, "Hegel* s religionsphilosophische Urteile fiber Ost-
asi en, beleuchtet durch die Ergebnisse der newer en China-Forschung" ( Zeit-
schrift fur Missionskunde . 37 (1922), pp. 129-151), written on the basis
of Hegel's Philosophie der Weltgeschichte . Witte concludes not only "dass
Hegel sich sehr grflndlich unterrichtet hat und in allem Wesentlichen durch-
aus auf dem Boden des Besten steht, was seine Zeit von Ostasien wusste,"
and that "sein stolzes Wort, dass wir jetst durchaus fiber China Bescheid
wissen," is "durch die neuere Forschung, wexm man von Einzelheiten und ein-
zelnen Gebieten absieht, ale zu Recht bestehend erwiesen;" but also that
Hegel "kraft seines Genies aus den Kexmtnissen fiber China die Grundzflge
seines innersten Wesens so fein herausgearbeitet hat^Sas vorher noch nicht
geschehen war und auch bisher nicht wieder geschehen ist." (Quoted by Las-




III. The Philosophical Interpretation
of the Historical Data
A. The Limitations of Historical Study
1, The History of Religions as a Rational,
Unitary Development
To say that Hegel is generally loyal to the facts of religious his-
tory is far from saying that he is content with reproducing those facts.
As already indicated, * his primary concern is not to record the history of
religions, "but to show how that history is the expression of divine reason,
the ongoing, many-sided development of a unitary principle. Each stage of
religious history grows naturally and logically out of the preceding one,
"either'as a reaction from its one-si dedness , or as a reconciliation of
2its contradictions." The successive stages exhibit a rational connection,
and express with increasing adequacy the notion of religion, the true na-
ture of the Absolute Spirit. The world* s religions are not unrelated, ac-
cidental growths, "but essentially the work of a God who is immanent, cease-
lessly active in human life and history. "Es geht vernflnftig zu."3
. . • Der Geist, insofern er Geist Gottes ist, ist
nicht ein Geist jenseits der Sterne, jenseits der Welt,
sondern Gott ist gegenw&rtig und als Geist im Geiste und
in den Geistern. Gott ist nicht der Gehaltlose, sondern
ein lebendiger Gott, der wirksam und ttttig ist. Eine
Religion ist Erzeugnis des gOttlichen Geistes, nicht Er-
findung des Menschen, sondern Produktion des gBttlichen
Wirkens, Hervorbringens in diesem. Diese Uberzeugung
ratlssen wir zuerst festhalten, sonst ist der Ausdruck Vor-
sehung sinnlos.
1 Cf. above, pp. 108-109.
McTaggart, SHD, p. 237.
3 JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 48. Cf. further.
* XII, BR, pp. 43-44. Elsewhere Hegel says that his conception of
rational movement in history is "nichts Anderes, als der Glaube an die Vor-
sehung, nur in anderer Weise. Das Beste in der Welt ist, was der Gedanke
hervorbringt." (JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 65.) This conviction that the world
is the rationally ordered work of God is all that Hegel means in his oft-
quoted words, "was wirklich ist, das ist vernuhftig." Cf. V, ENC, pp. 56-
37; VI, GPR, p. XIX; XII, BR, p. 73; VIII, PWG, p. 15.
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Here, of course, Hegel is simply applying to the history of religion
the principle which in his view holds for general history.
Nur die Einsicht kann den Geist mit der Weltge-
schichte und der Wirklichkeit versBhnen, dass das, was
geschehen ist -and alle Tage geschieht, nicht nur von
Gott kommt und nicht ohne Gott, sondern wesentlich das
Werk Gottes selost ist. 1
Die Weltgeschichte ist . . . ttberhaupt die Aus-
legung des Geistes in der Zeit, wie sich im Raume die
Idee als Natur auslegt. 2
Hegel's thought, therefore, leads him to the magnificent affirmation
that God is in history, that the events of the human as of the natural
world are the realization of divine reason. In fact, everything that oc-
curs is part of the struggle of Spirit for complete self-fulfillment.
This, of course, is a rational judgment. No mere recounting of empirical
data could yield such a conclusion. According to Hegel, we cannot find the
actual until we see the realm of fact in the light of thought. The appli-
cation of this principle to religious history constitutes perhaps Hegel's
greatest contrihution to the philosophy of religion. In treating the his-
tory of religion as an unfolding of divine reason, the diversified forms
of religion as connected manifestations of a central principle, he opened
the way for a new understanding of religion and "brought to light a meaning
Which must remain hidden as long as attention is confined to the empirical
4
alone.
A VIII, PWG, p. 938. Cf. JUB, XVII, GDP, pp. 48, 52; Vera, PDB, II,
pp. CXXIV and CXV; Hammacher, BPH, p. 44; Vowinckel, ERSH, pp. 56-57;
Troeltsch, GS, II, pp. 747-748. This "grosse Prttsumption" of a rational
development in history is also the only thing which makes the history of
philosophy truly interesting. (JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 65.)
2 VIII, PWG, p. 134.
* JUB, XVII, GDP, p. 52. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 937.
It is significant that leading recent historians of religion are
at one with Hegel in finding this unity and rational connection in reli-
gious history. Harnack, after maintaining that a "complete understanding
of one religion cannot possihly he obtained without a knowledge of others,"
quotes with approval the words of an unnamed poet:
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2 # The Necessary Function of Historical
Manifestation in Religion
Hegel's view of historical religion can be "best understood, perhaps,
if we recall his dialectical formulation of the notion of religion, which
comprises three stages: (1) the ahstract idea of religion; (2) the deter-
minate historical embodiment of this idea; and (3) the concrete union of
the idea and its manifestation in the faith of the religious community.
Religious history is thus the second of three phases in the dialectic of
religious truth. This appearance of truth in historical form is necessary,
"but transitory. It is an Ausgangspunkt for faith, * a point of departure
and transition, through which truth must pass if it is to become the uni-
versal property of mankind. It sets forth the idea of religion
wie die ewige Idee ftlr die unmittelbare Gewissheit des
Menschen geworden, d.h. wie sie erschienen ist. Dass
sie Gewissheit ftlr den Menschen werde, dazu ist notwen-
dig sinnliche Gewissheit, die aber zugleich in das geist-
ige Bewusstsein ubergeht und ebenso in unmittelbar Sinn-
liches verkehrt ist, so aber, dass man darin sieht die
Bewegung, Geschichte Gottes, das Leben, das Gott selbst
ist.2
But religion is something more than a conviction on the part of the
subject that others have entered into a relationship with God. The indi-
vidual must apprehend divine truth for himself, must know God in his own
She es sich rundet in einem Kreis
Ist kein Wissen vorhanden;
Ehe nicht Einer Alles weiss
Ist die Welt nicht verstanden.
(Adolf Harnack, "The Relation between Ecclesiastical and General History."
Congress of Arts and Science . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906. II, p. 628.)
George Foot Moore also agrees: "Between the religions of the lowest peoples
and those which have reached the highest level in intelligence and spirit-
uality there is an unbroken connection; not only do survivals and supersti-
tions persist in the most advanced religions, but the germs of their own
loftiest conceptions may sometimes be recognized in barbarous surroundings.
The field, wide as it is, is one; the history of religions points onward to
a history of religion." ("The History of Religions in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury," p. 437.)
1 Cf. below, pp. 121, 129.
2 XIV, AR, p. 174.
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inner experience. In genuine religion, therefore, knowledge of particular
facts in the history of religion is essentially a "bridge leading the reli-
gious consciousness to a direct personal awareness of the eternal truth of
God.
Um was es zu tun ist, das ist die Gewissheit des
Subjekts von der unendlichen, unsinnlichen Wesenhaftig-
keit des Suhjekts in sich selbst, das sich unendlich,
das sich ewig unsterblich weiss. Pas Weitere ist, dass
dies Subjekt erftlllt wird mit der Wahrheit, dass diese
Wahrheit sei im Selhsthewusstsein als Selhsthewusstsein
und sei nicht als ttusserliche, sondern als in sich sei-
ende Wahrheit des Gedankens, die Vorstellung der Inner-
lichkeit flberhaupt.^
This does not mean that on the third level the historical appearance
of the idea is no longer important. On the contrary, truth and its histor-
ical manifestation are here welded into a aynthesis in which the latter is
simply aufgehoben in typical Hegelian fashion: it is transcended, yet pre-
served as a necessary moment in the reality of religion. Knowledge of the
sensuously present content of religion is
der Ausgang, bei dem es nicht bleibt, eine Form, die
aufgehohen werden soil, die nicht nur als vergangene
sich bestimmt, sondern als ewig der geistigen Natur
Gottes angehOrig.
3. The Inadequacy of History and
Historical Investigation
However, while thought thus grants to the historical form in which
truth is clothed a legitimate and essential function, it likewise recog-
3
nizes "die Schranken der Form." A purely historical investigation of re-
ligion is in Hegel's view highly inadequate as a means toward a true knowl-
edge of God. History is not self-sufficient or self-explanatory. There-
fore the study of history, though valuable and necessary, must he supple-
XIV, AB, p. 182.
XIV, AB, p. 182; cf. p. 228. Cf. above, p. 120, and oelow, p. 129.
XIV, AE, p. 228.
1
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mented by philosophical inquiry. History is deficient, thinks Hegel, in
two main respects.
a. Its Externality
In the first place, historical inquiry is external. It concerns on-
ly truths known to other people, not truths which are our own inner posses-
sion. It deals only with the religion which others have had in the past,
not with that of the investigator in the present. It is concerned not with
infinite thought in and for itself, hut only with thought as a finite fact,
opinion, or representation.* The most elaborate historical study may still
fail to yield a true knowledge of religion. Just as a blind man may know
to the last detail the history of a picture and its painter and yet see
p
nothing of the picture itself, so may a historian be perfectly familiar
with the events of church history, the formulations of the various councils,
and the origin of these views, and still come short of the knowledge of God.
Was diese geschichtliche Behandlung betrifft, so
hat sie es zu tun mit Gedanken, Vorstellungen, die andere
gehabt, aufgebracht, bekampft haben, mit tfberzeugungen,
die andern angehOren, mit Geschichten, die nicht in unserm
Geiste vorgehen, nicht das Bedurfnis unsers Geistes in An-
spruch nehmen, sondern bei denen das Interesse dies ist,
wie es sich bei andern gemacht hat, die zufttllige Ent-
stehung.
The revelation of God is not something which occurred at one partic-
ular time in history, but an eternal occurrence. "Es kommt dem Glauben




... Gott ist als Geist wesentlich dies, fur ein
anderes zu sein, sich zu offenbaren; er erschafft nicht
einmal die Welt, sondern ist der ewige SchBpfer, dies
ewige sich Offenbaren. Dies ist er. dieser actus : das
ist sein Begriff , seine Bestimmung.°
XII, BE, pp. 27, 28.
XII, BR, p. 28. Cf. above, p. 49.
XII, BE, p. 27. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 738.
JUB, III, PHPE, p. 226.
XIV, AS, p. 35.
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Revelation is a present, eternally repeated experience. History of
religion must therefore be supplemented by philosophy of religion, which
deals not with past events, or with the empirical origin of religious ide-
as, but with the absolutely, eternally present, with content in and for
itself.
Die empirische Weise solcher Hervorbringung durch
Kirchenversammlungen, Konzilien usf. geht uns hier nichts
an. Pttr uns handelt es sich darum: Was ist der Inhalt an
und f-ttr sich? Dieser Inhalt ist zu rechtfertigen durch
die Philosophie, nicht durch die Geschichte; was der Geist
tut, ist keine Historie. Es ist ihm nur darum zu tun, was
an und fftr sich ist, nicht Vergangenes, sondern schlechthin
Prfisentes.^
God constantly speaks to the human mind. The main evidence of the
truth of Christianity, therefore, is not any information transmitted ei-
ther orally or in writing, but rather the Spirit himself bearing witness
to my spirit. Our religion, our knowledge of God, is not dependent on the
often accidental transmission of correct historical records, which them-
selves must have their claim to truth tested at the bar of reason, but on
a direct and eternally possible contact between man and God, spirit and
Spirit, a contact which is made especially when man thinks and cannot be
2
made unless he thinks. No amount of historical knowledge of religion can
take the place of this direct inner relation between the individual and God.
Though Christ a thousand times
In Bethlehem be born,
If he* s not born in thee,
Thy soul is still forlorn.
b. Its Lack of a Criterion of Truth
Secondly, historical study lacks an immanent criterion of truth.
I
XIV, AE, p. 198; cf. also pp. 194, 196, 230.c
VIII, PWG, p. 849.
Johannes Scheffler, "The Cherubic Pilgrim." Caroline Miles
The World* s Great Religious Poetry . N.Y.: Macmillan, 1926. P. 755.
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Fact and truth are not identical. The difference appears in Hegel* s dis-
cussion of the Christian religion:
Wenn von Wahrheit der christlichen Religion {in dem
Sinne gesprochen wirdj, dass es richtig geschichtlich ist,
[bo istj dies hier nicht [gemeintj, sondern das Y/ahre ist
ihr Inhalt; denn sie hat, weiss das Wahre, erkennt Gott,
wie er ist. 1
Questions of fact can often be readily settled by history, but no appeal
to historical origin or development can solve problems of truth or value.
History may set forth with unerring accuracy the changing panorama of re-
ligious events, hut it cannot penetrate "behind these events to their truth-
content or their meaning, in short, to the reason in them.
Die G-eschichte der Religion . . so viel sie ge-
sammelt und hearbeitet ist, lftsst vornehmlich so nur das
Aussere, Erscheinende sehen. Das holier e Bedttrfnis ist,
den Sinn, das Wahre und Zusammenhang mit Wahrem, kurz,
das Verntinftige darin zu erkennen,^
"Das Interesse des trockenen Phttnomens," writes Hegel to Goethe, "ist
fttr mich weiter nichts als eine erweckte Begierde, es zu verstehen,"3 But
this understanding is possible only through thought. "Die Geschichte er-
hftlt erst im Gedanken die Form, durch die sie das absolute Interesse fur
4den Geist hat." Only when the hare facts of the history of religion are
subjected to concrete thought do they take on significance; only then does
their rational connection, their ideal meaning appear. It is self-evident
that a certain historical appearance is a necessity in religion. True re-
ligion must exist in time and space if it is to become the common property
of humanity as a whole. Yet the sensuous appearance gains significance on-
ly as it embodies or expresses an eternal truth. No mere reciting of his-
1 XIV, AR, p. 34.
~ XII, BR, p. 164; cf. XIV, AR, p. 230.
Feb. 24, 1821. Werke (orig. ed.), XIX. BVAH, II, p. 34.
XIV, AR, p. 197; cf. p. 27.
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torical facts, however correct, can "bring to light this truth-element.
Philosophical thought alone is equal to the task.
It is for this reason that Hegel, while eager to learn the results
of the latest historical research,
1 is unwilling to give to history the
final word. No verdict rendered by historical study, either for or against
the truth of religion, can be regarded as final. Thus the church is right,
says Hegel, in opposing investigations into the factual data of Christian-
ity carried on with an anti-religious bias.
Was die empirische Weise betrifft und die Unter-
suchungen, welche Bewandtnis es mit dem Erscheinen
Christi nach seinem Tode habe, so tut die Kirche inso-
fern recht daran, wenn sie solche Untersuchungen nicht
anerkennen kaim; denn sie gehen von dem Gesichtspunkt
aus, als ob es auf das Sinnliche der Erscheinung an-
komme, auf dies Historische, als ob in solchen Erzfihl-
ungen von einem als historisch Vorgestellten nach ge-
schichtlicher V/eise die Beglaubigung des Geistes liege.
Such investigations tacitly assume that the truth of the gospel depends on
its sensuous origin and transmission. But this assumption is false. Even
if the opponents of Christianity were able to remove every shred of histor-
icity from the miracles of Jesus, his physical resurrection, and his re-
ported post-resurrection appearances, they would still have said nothing
vital as to the truth of Christianity.
It also avails nothing, as an argument against Christianity, to point
out the earlier and lowly origin of some of its features. The historical
origin of an idea decides nothing whatever as to its truth.
Man hat die christi iche Religion [damitj verklein-
ern wollen, dass diese ihre Bestimmungen schon alter jjsei-
en]]» dass sie dieselben da oder dort hergenommen (habej.
Dies Geschichtliche entscheidet ohnehin gar nicht s -fiber
die innere Wahrheit.
Cf. above, pp. 105-107.
XIV, AB, p. 196. Cf. TJS, pp. 292, 334.
XIV, AR, p. 194. Cf. also above, pp. 121, 122.
XIV, AE, p. 59. Cf. also above, p. 123.
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We must admit, for example, that the church fathers were influenced "by-
Greek philosophy, hut this fact cannot determine whether their ideas are
true or false. It is "gleichgttltig, woher jene Lehre gekommen sei; die
Frage ist allein die, ob sie an und fur sich wahr ist."1
"Ebensowenig ist es das rechte Verhttltnis," writes Hegel,
wenn wir uns Christi nur als einer gewesenen historischen
Person erinnern. Man fragt dann: Was hat es mit seiner
Geburt, mit seinem Vater und seiner Mutter, mit seiner
hauslichen Erziehung, mit seinen Wundern usf. fttr eine
Bewandtnis? d.h. was ist er geistlos hetrachtet? Be-
trachtet man ihn auch nur nach seinen Talenten, Charakter
und Moralitttt, als Lehrer usf., so stellt man ihn auf
gleiche Linie mit Sokrates und anderen, wenn man auch
seine Moral hBher stellt. Vortrefflichkeit des Charakters
aber, Moral usf., dies alles ist nicht das letzte Bedttrf-
nis des Geistes, dass nHmlich der Mensch den spekulativen
Begriff des Geistes in seine Vorstellung bekomme. Wenn
Christus nur ein vortreffliches, sogar unstindl iches In-
dividuum und nur dies sein soli, so ist die Vorstellung
der spekulativen Idee, der absoluten Wahrheit geleugnet.
Urn diese aber ist es zu tun, und von dieser ist auszu-
gehen. Macht exegetisch, kritisch, historisch aus Christ-
us, was ihr wollt, ebenso zeigt, wie ihr wollt, dass die
Lehren der Kirche auf den Konzilien durch dieses und
jenes Interesse und Leidenschaft der BischOfe zustande
gekommen, Oder von da oder dorther flossen,—alle solche
Urns tande mOgen beschaffen sein, wie sie wollen; es fragt
sich allein, was die Idee oder die Wahrheit an und fur
sich ist. 2
More important than the origin and history of Christianity is the
significance of the historical phenomena as apprehended by the conscious-
ness of the Christian church at any given time.
Geschichtliches, ob die Sfitze so in der Bibel Oder
in Tradition sich finden, ist nicht die Hauptsache; die
Gemeinde hat die unendliche Macht und Vollmacbdzu ihrer
Portbildung, zur Fortbestimmung ihrer Lehre. 3
If men are truly to find God, the attention of Christians must be fixed
1 XII, BE, p. 47. Cf. VIII, IWG, p. 742: "Wo etwas hergekommen ist,
das ist vollkommen gleichgttltig; die Frage ist nur: ist es wahr an und fur
sich?"
2 DC, FWG, p. 737. Cf. Glockner, Hegel . I, pp. 138-139.3 XIV, AB, p. 201.
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not on the first sensuous manifestation of their religion, "but on their
own direct apprehension of the eternal truths of the Spirit. Too often
the former is allowed to take the place of the latter. The Fourth Gospel
recognizes this in the words of Jesus, "It is expedient that I go away,
for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you."
1 Only when
interest is diverted from the vehicle of truth, the letter that killeth,
to the truth itself, the spirit that giveth life, only then can "the Spir-
2
it of truth" guide us into all truth.
Hegel's attitude is now clear. In his treatment of historical reli-
gion, he is primarily concerned not with mere factual accuracy, hut with
the truth and meaning which the facts express. To discover this he finds
that he must transcend the merely historical or empirical and utilize the
rational, philosophical approach,
4. Estimate of Hegel's View
a. The Extent to which He Underestimates
the Historical Element
With Hegel's fundamental thesis regarding the inadequacy of the pure-
ly historical treatment of religion the open-minded student can hardly fail
to agree. It is nevertheless true that Hegel, in his eagerness to place
the emphasis where it "belongs, sometimes seems to underestimate the impor-
tance of the historical aspect of religion. If it is part of the very na-
ture of the idea of religion, as Hegel maintains, to express itself in his-
torical form, it is inevitahle that the appearance should afford some clue
to the idea which appears. If thought is the ultimate cause or ground of
a historical manifestation, is it reasonable to suppose that the empirical
phenomenon is wholly without meaning as to the nature of the thought behind
\ John 16:7.2 John 16:13.
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it? Are historical origins, then, totally without significance? Granting
that the judge of truth must always he the rational living mind, this mind
must consider not only its own experience, but also the entire past experi-
ence of the race. Does this racial history reveal nothing concerning the
ultimate reality which expresses itself through it? For example, is not a
world which can produce a Jesus and a Buddha ultimately different from one
which lacks such characters? We have more reasonable grounds for belief
in a good God if at a given time in history a perfectly good man really
lived, and if many other human beings of exalted character have lived, than
we have if such persons are pure fictions. Were there no good men, belief
in a fatherly God of perfect love and goodness would have little foundation
indeed. The empirical circumstances in which truth appears do make a dif-
ference. They may not be constituted nwie sie wollenw^ and reflect accur-
ately the truth which is in them. On the contrary, "die Wahrheit an und
ftlr sich" must not be separated from its empirical appearance, but is im-
mediately connected with it. if we wish to know the truth, we must seek
it in its relation to the psychological, sociological, and historical facts
of human life. Objective truth cannot be separated from its historical
manifestation.
This real bearing of historical fact on truth Hegel does not make
sufficiently clear. This undervaluation is, however, more apparent than
real. There is good ground for believing that Hegel would admit every-
2
thing that has just been said. In all probability, he is so much con-
cerned with exposing the fallacy of mere historicism in questions of truth
and value that he falls easily into over-statement of the primary claims
1 Cf. above, p. 126.
2 Cf. above, pp. 105-107, 117.
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of philosophical thought and understatement of the
importance of empiri-
cal fact. His true attitude toward the latter is
found less in verhal
statements than in his earnest effort to master the known
facts of the
history of religion1 and in the prominence which he gives to
religious
history in his treatment as a whole. In his general philosophy
and in his
philosophy of religion in particular Hegel proceeds as one who takes his-
tory seriously.
"b. The Importance of Hegel's Insight into the In-
sufficiency of History
Only through misapprehension can Hegel he taken to mean that the way
in which a phenomenon has arisen tells nothing concerning its nature. He
would prohahly admit that historical origins are significant in revealing
accurately a certain aspect of a given reality, its earliest manifestation.
What Hegel opposes is the practice of taking the "beginning, or any phase
of development, as telling the whole story. Reality is progressive, for-
ward-moving, developmental. More important than how a thing arose is what
it is moving toward, its ultimate origin, the truth which it expresses.
Thus everything must he seen in its entirety, as a whole, if its true mean-
ing is to he understood. This whole view requires that each phenomenon he
viewed not only historically, in the light of its chronological develop-
ment, hut also philosophically, in the light of eternity. History does un-
doubtedly reveal something regarding the truth which breathes through it,
and furnishes a necessary key to that truth. It is an Auagangspunkt which
2
cannot be avoided. But no mere recounting of historical data, whether
they concern either beginnings or later development, can ever "bring to
light the true significance and value of the data or make of them anything
1 Cf. ahove, pp. 105-107.
Cf. above, pp. 120, 121.
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more than a collection of discrete, unrelated units. To historical de-
scription must he added the unifying activity of concrete, critical thought.
It is not history, hut reflection on history, which is decisive in all con-
siderations of truth.
This insight constitutes one of Hegel* s greatest contributions to
human thought. Its fundamental correctness is amply attested by experi-
ence. Were historical origins determinative in questions of value, not on-
ly religion, but also science and art, in fact, every phase of modern hu-
man activity whatsoever, would stand discredited. Beligion would be dis-
missed because of its early connections with mythology and magic, astron-
omy because it grew out of astrology, painting because it began with crude
markings on the walls of caves, industrial civilization because it sprang
out of an era of hand labor. The gyroscope is an evolution from the spin-
ning top, a mere child's toy, but is not therefore relegated to insignifi-
cance. Rockets, which are beginning to prove useful in propelling automo-
biles and airplanes, were originally a mere means of amusement, but are
not thereby deprived of value. In all these instances it is clear how mis-
leading would be a value-judgment reached on the basis of historical ori-
gins alone. No less dangerous is such a standard in the field of philos-
ophy in general. The significance of a phenomenon can never be determined
by its empirical origin, but only by its fundamental and essential reason-
ableness.
The purely empirical method offers no standard by which a phenomenon
might be philosophically evaluated. Such a method is always inevitably de-
pendent on other methods, which provide the decisive norms and criteria of
judgment, Bnpirical observation can only collect the relevant facts, and
is unable to criticize and evaluate these facts. Indeed, it alone cannot
V
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even determine which are the relevant facts. Philosophical thought must
accompany observation from the very beginning. While, therefore, histor-
ical study is absolutely necessary as a first step, it is philosophically
insufficient.
1
At this point Hegel is clearly, and inevitably, a ration-
alist
.
c. Hegel's Synthesis of the Historical and the Rational
It must be pointed out, however, that this rationalism seldom in-
volves disloyalty to the empirical facts. To a remarkable degree Hegel
does justice to both factors. He recognizes that thought about religion
must deal with what religion is psychologically and has been historically.
But this very pursuit demands something more than the mere collection of
facts: the mind must bring to its work of observation some conception of
what it is that it wishes to observe. Historical study and critical phi-
losophising must therefore move forward together, constantly supplemrnting
one another. Only where the historical and the rational interpenetrate
2
can the study of religion yield the maximum of fruitfulness.
A This is the reason why Paul Tillich, in his classification of the
forms of western philosophy of religion, mentions three types, the ration-
alistic, the critical, and the intuitive, but recognizes no empirical meth-
od as such. Bnpirical philosophy of religion, he says, accompanies all
three types, "kann aber hier ausser Acht bleiben, da sie konsequenterweise
nur fiber die Verwirklichung der Religion im seelischen und geschicht lichen
Leben, nicht liber sie selbst etwas aussagen kann. Sobald sie es versucht,
macht sie Anleihen bei einer der anderen Methoden." ("Die Uberwindung des
Religionsbegriff s in der Religionsphilosophie." Kant-Studien . 27 (1922),
p. 450J
Indeed, in consistency with the notion of religion with which he
begins, he cannot avoid relating the historical and the rational in this
integral fashion. (Cf. above, pp. 32-40, 45-47, 104-105, 120-122). The
idea of religion and its manifestation, it will be recalled, are not sep-
arate entities, but two aspects of one and the same reality. It is the
very nature of the notion to externalize itself and appear in history. In
the course of history, moreover, this manifestation fulfills more and more
nearly its basic idea. Side by side with the development of the idea as
idea moves the historical development of its manifestation, until both are
united and the manifestation becomes "adequate" to its notion. On the one
hand, the notion is nothing apart from its objectification in history; on
the other, the historical phenomenon is meaningless apart from the idea
which it expresses. This being the case, it is inevitable that for Hegel
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How clearly Hegel recognized the need of this synthesis is illustrat-
ed in his view of the Gospel of John. The Fourth Gospel, he maintains, con-
tains a deeper conception of Christianity than the synoptic gospels, for
der tiefste Gedanke ist mit der Gestalt Christi, mit dem
Geschichtlichen und Ausserlichen vereinigt. Und das ist
ehen das Grosse der christi ichen Religion, dass sie hei
aller dieser Tiefe leicht vom Bewusstsein in ausserlich-
er Hinsicht aufzufassen ist und zugleich zum tieferen Ein-
dringen auffordert. Sie ist so fur jede Stufe der Bild-
ung und befriedigt zugleich die hOchsten Aufforderungen. 1
B. The Relation of the Notion to the Facts of History
1. Hegel's Seeming Apriorism
At first sight Hegel* s whole approach to religion seems to "belie all
that has "been said regarding his loyalty to historical fact. For though
he prefaces his Philosonhie der Religion with a "brief and penetrating dis-
cussion of empirical religion, he devotes the first and most fundamental
of the three divisions of his work to an exposition of the notion or idea
of religion in general. Only later does he consider the successive histor-
ical embodiments of the idea.
... Die ganze Abhandlung, selhst auch die unmittel-
bare Religion, ist nichts anderes als die Entwicklung des
Begriffs und diese nichts anderes als Setzen, was in dem-
selhen enthalten ist, und dies Setzen macht die RealitSt
des Begriffs aus, erheht, vollendet denselhen zur Idee. 2
Likewise, in dealing with each individual religion, Hegel always discusses
first its characteristic idea, then the temporal manifestation of this idea.
In his consideration of the religion of magic, for instance, he passes from
its basic concept to its historical appearances with the following remark:
Die erste Religion ist also, wie gesagt, die roheste,
einfachste Form der Naturreligion, und die Frage ist nur
historical description of religion should proceed in closest connection
with philosophical interpretation.
1 Philosophie der Weltgeschicht
e
. In Glockner, Hegel, I, p. 143.




nach dem Orte, wo sie, das sun&chst nur geistig Vorausge-
setste, su suchen sei, und nach der Form ihrer Exist ens. 1
Hegel's usual procedure is perhaps best summarised in his own words
regarding the approach to the absolute religion:
Indem wir nun diese Religion betrachten, gehen wir
nicht historisch zu Werke nach der Weise des Geistes, der
vom lusserlichen anftagt, sondern wir gehen vom Begriff aus. 2
In short, in his lectures Hegel appears to build up the general idea
of religion and the logical system of the religions demanded by this idea,
after which he learns from observation that the empirical religions, as he
confidently expected, actually do correspond to the conception which he has
worked out. He then fits these religions into the scheme of the notion,
and the structure is complete. Some of Hegel's critics have so interpreted
his procedure; recalling the inaccuracies which are evident in Hegel's his-
torical accounts, they have accordingly charged him with an indefensible
attempt at a. priori construction of the facts of religious history.^5
2. The Actual Empirical Foundation of the Notion
This view is far from the truth. Though Hegel's exposition of reli-
gion does repress, as it were, the reference to experience, every step of
his reasoning is profoundly influenced by his knowledge of the empirical
facts. This empirical influence is indicated by several considerations.
In the first place, Hegel's concern for and intimate knowledge of his-
tory preclude in him all possibility of a merely a priori approach to reli-
gion. His early writings show that he was from his youth a painstaking stu-
dent of history, and especially of the history of religion.4 His later utter-
1 XIII, NB, p. 80; cf. p. 200.
2 XIV, AB, p. 27.
Cf. above, pp. 314, 6-7, 12; particularly Drews, HBP, p. 409;
Pfleiderer, PBBH, pp. 101-102; Troeltsch, OS, III, pp. 133-134.
4 Cf. above, pp. 10, 107, n.3. In Hegel's dialectical method, writes
Seth, nwe have a principle, not of arbitrary invention, but drawn from the
heart of things,—-from the nature of the self-conscious spirit itself.
. . .
Barely logical as the principle seems, it is a matter of biography
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ances reveal a mind eager to know the facte of history before forming judg-
ments about it. "Die erste Quelle unserer Erkenntnis." he writes, "ist
die Erfaiming. n1
Die Geschichte hat nur das rein aufzufassen, was
ist, was gewesen ist, die Begebenheiten und Tat en. Sie
ist urn so wahrer, je mehr sie sich nur an das Gegebene
halt und
. . .
je mehr sie dabei nur das Geschehene zum
Zwecke hat. ... Die Geschichte aber haben wir zu
nehmen, wie sie ist; wir haben historisch, empirisch zu
verfahren. 2
The principle of dialectic which Hegel applies so fruitfully to the history
of religion he derives not from a priori thought, but from life itself. It
is Erfahrung . he writes, "dass das Leben selbst es ist, den Widerspruch auf-
zuheben.
"
For a mind so concerned about experience and history any effort to
carry on thought about religion in isolation from experience would have
been most unlikely. Furthermore, such a pursuit would have been impossi-
ble even if Hegel had attempted it. His mind was already too well stocked
with historical knowledge of religion to allow him to think his way clear
4
of it. Once attained, this knowledge was bound to influence all his think-
ing on religion.
Secondly, Hegel's speculative development of the idea of religion
corresponds too accurately with the actual historical growth of religion,
as known in his day, to have been deduced from any root-idea without ref-
erence to the empirical facts. His beginning with the religions contain-
that Hegel formulated it in its breadth only after the profoundest study
of man and history, and, in particular, of the religious consciousness."
SP, p. 196. Cf. also Haering, HWW, passim .
\ JUB, III, PHPR, p. 30.
2 VIII, PWG, pp. 3, 7„
XIV, AH, p. 79. Cf. also above, pp. 49-51.
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lag a large element of magic is completely in accord with modern scientif-
ic scholarship »^ His characterization of Chinese religion we have seen to
be remarkably accurate. His sections on Greek and Roman religion are pen-
etrating accounts of what these religions actually were. In regarding
Christianity as the highest religion and treating it last, Hegel adopts
the classification of nearly all historians of religion.* Perhaps more
significant than these positive agreements is the fact that Hegel, in
accord with the accepted practice of the historians of his day,
erroneously places Buddhism before Hinduism. He who would argue that
these agreements are all accidental coincidences of concepts arrived at
a priori with facts later ascertained assumes a tremendous burden of
proof. Significant ideas never arise in this way. No philosopher of
account has ever been able to deduce from a mere idea the world of fact.
3. Hegel's Lectures as Results, not Processes
Y/hat, then, is the actual relation of the notion to the historical
facts which which it deals? This relation is not hard to discover. The
idea of religion which Hegel expounds in his Philosophie der Religion is
not the starting-point for his consideration of historical religion, but
rather the result of long, hard thinking about facts empirically ascer-
tained. Hegel does not read his theory into the facts, but arrives at it
in an earnest attempt to explain the facts. The Philosophie der Religion
is thus essentially product, not process. Hegel simply states in synthetic
form what he has gradually arrived at by analytic means. Out of con-
1 Cf . above p. 41.
2 Cf. above, pp. 41, 117-118.
3 Cf . above, pp. 43-44
4 Cf • above, pp. 45-47




centrated reflection on the facts of religious history, especially of
Christian history, 1 he has attained his conception of the history of reli-
gion as the progressive, unfolding self-revelation of the Absolute Spirit.
This central idea he then. seeks to apply to the actual development of hu-
man religion, fitting each particular religion into that stage in the con-
ceptual structure to which he finds it corresponding. It is this last
which appears in Hegel* s lectures. He simply leaves behind the mental
processes which have led up to his view and seeks to present to his hear-
2
ers the results of his thought.
In lecturing on the philosophy of religion Hegel does essentially
what a company of actors does when, after months of private rehearsing, it
presents its drama in public; or, to draw on an illustration of Hegel him-
self, what the great pianist does when, after long and arduous practice in
the studio, he gives a public recital. "Ein schweres Klav i ersttick, w writes
Hegel
,
kann leicht gespielt werden, nachdem es oft wiederholt
einzeln durch gegangen ist, es wird gespielt mit unmit-
telbarer Thtttigkeit als Resultat so vieler vermittelnd-
er Actionen. Dasselbe ist der Pall mit der Gewohnheit,
die uns als zur zweiten Natur geworden. Das einfache
Resultat der Entdeckung des Columbus ist Resultat viel-
er vorhergegangener, einzelner Thfttigkeiten, TJberleg-
ungen.3
1 Hegel* s fundamental idea of religion is evidently drawn primarily
from the Christian conception of it. Taking as his norm this religion in
which, as he thinks, the actual really expresses the ideal, he arranges
the other religions in an ascending scale leading up to it. Cf. below,
pp. 149-157.
2 Essentially the same view as the one here advanced is held by Seth
and Romang regarding Hegel's philosophy in general, and by Alexander re-
garding Hegel's treatment of religion. Even William James, arch-enemy of
Hegel and rationalism, came near at the close of his life to substantially
the same view of Hegel's method. Cf. Seth, DKH, pp. 166-167; Romang, "fjber
die Abgrenzung des Christlichen und der christlichen Gemeinschaften."
Theol . Stud , u. Krit . . 45 (1872), p. 399; S. Alexander, Space . Time , and
Deity
.
I, p. 204; W. James, "Hegel and His Method." Hibb. Jour . . 7 (1908-
1909), p. 67.
3 JUB, XV, p. 207.
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It would "be absurd to expect a lecturer in philosophy to set forth
his thought precisely in the order in which it arose in his own conscious-
ness. Such a procedure would "be just as tedious and distasteful to the
listener as would attendance at a concert in which the artist preceded his
hour of delightfully rendered music with several hours of finger exercises,
or at a theater where the play was presented only after the actors had
staged several laborious rehearsals to show the audience how it was all
done. Hegel's primary concern, therefore, and quite rightly, is to present
the conclusions of his mature thinking, together with their logical grounds,
in systematic form. This does not commit him to retracing with his hearers
the steps which led up to his conclusions.
If in the Philosophie der Religion the particular religions actually
conform to the development of the Begriff of religion, it is simply because
they themselves are the raw material out of which the idea was fashioned.
Hegel* s philosophy of religion is nothing more or less than his reading of
the facts of religious history, his interpretation of the empirical sub-
ject-matter. It is none the less so because he has chosen to exclude from
his university lectures an account of their psychological origin.
Whether Hegel himself was fully aware of the empirical origin of his
view of religious history is not altogether certain. It is possible that
here, as in his treatment of religious experience,^" he does not realize
how empirical he is. Yet there are indications that he understood full
well the important part played by his empirical knowledge. For example,
he writes that the Phgnomenologie des Geistes is
die Wissenschaft des Bewusstseins, die Darstellung da-
von.
. ., dass das Bewusstsein den Begriff der Wissen-
schaft, d.i. das reine Wissen, zum Resultate hat. Die
1 Cf. above, p. 76.
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Logik hat ins ofera die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden
Geistes zu ihrer Voraussetzung, welche die Notwendig-
keit und damit den Beweis der Wahrheit des Standpunkts,
der das reine Wissen ist, wie dessen Vermittlung fXber-
haupt, enthttlt und aufzeigt. In dieser Wissenschaft
des erscheinenden Geistes wird von dem empirischen,
sinnlichen Bewusstsein ausgegangen; und dieses ist das
eigentliche unmittelbare Wissen.
Regarding the notion of religion in particular, Hegel writes,
Dieser Begriff [wird von uns] aus der Vor-
stellung zunftchst Qfberaommen] , um damit bekannt zu
werden und ntther mit dem [GangeJ , wie unsere Abhand-
lung angestellt werden wird. 2
In considering the necessity of the development of religion from the pre-
vious stages of the natural and spiritual world, says Hegel, "fangen wir
selbst wieder mit der Form der Brscheinung an und hetrachten zunSchst das
Bewusstsein.
"
3 Elsewhere he writes, quoting the Fourth Gospel, wAls die
Zeit gekommen war, sandte Gott seinen Sohn," and immediately adds, "und
4
dass die Zeit gekommen war, ist nur aus der Geschichte zu erkennen."
There is therefore good ground for concluding that Hegel was well
aware of the empirical basis of his religious thought, hut intentionally
adopted, for the purpose of presenting most effectively in the classroom
the results of his mature thinking, the approach which we find in the
Philosophic der Religion . The appearance of apriorism in the lectures as
delivered, as Brightman has suggested concerning Hegel's Logik
.
5 is main-
ly due to Hegel's confidence in his conclusions reached by empirical means.
Again it becomes clear that Hegel's actual procedure is both empir-
ical and rational, historical and philosophical. He is neither a mere em-
piricist of religion nor an a priori expositor. To a close study of the
III, WDL, p. 53.
XII, BR, p. 80.
XII, BR, p. 173.
XIV, AR, p. 149.





facts of religious history he brings the creative, critical, organizing
activity of rational thought.
1 The keynote of his approach is well ex-
pressed in the sentence: "Wir mttssen in der Geschichte einen allgemeinen
Zweck aufsuchen;"
2
especially when the emphasis is laid alternately on the
phrase, in der Geschichte . and on the words, einen allgemeinen Zweck. His-
tory is Darren apart from the universal purpose which it expresses, hut
this eternal meaning is nothing apart from history.
C. Exceptions to Hegel* s General Synthesis of
History and Reason
The fact that Hegel* s philosophy of religion in general is character-
ised hy this relation of mutual supplementation "between experience and rea-
son does not mean that he always preserves the balance in all the details
of his thought. Occasionally, as has already "been shown, he errs on one
side or the other. Two such instances, which have not "been mentioned
heretofore, are important enough to demand consideration at this point.
The first is his emphasis on necessity, the second his view of the rela-
tion between Christianity and the absolute religion.
1. Hegel* s Emphasis on Necessity
a. The Necessity in Religion
From beginning to end Hegel emphasizes the element of necessity in
religion. The appearance of religion as an activity in the total life of
Spirit and the various phases in the development of religion itself are
alike construed by Hegel as logically necessary. Philosophy, he writes,
hat wohl die Notwendigkeit der Religion an und ftlr sich
selbst zu entwickeln und vorzustellen; [sie hat] zu be-
1 Georg Lasson points out that it is possible for thought to grasp
the notion of religion "von sich aus, aber selbstverstftndlich auf Grund
der gemachten Erfahrungen." (EHR, p. 91.) This is precisely what Hegel
has done.
2 VIII, PWG, p. 5.
Cf. above, pp. 109-117.
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greifen, dass der Geist von den andern Weisen seines Wol-
lens, Vorstellens und Fuhlens zu dieser seiner absoluten
Weise fortgeht und fortgehen muss, dass sie das Schick-
sal, die Notwendigkeit , die Wahrheit des Geist es ist.
This necessity, Hegel thinks, is adequately demonstrated by his phi-
losophy as a whole, as set forth in the Phftnomenologie and the Encyclopft-
die.
2
The dialectical advance of the Absolute to the religious standpoint
is not merely accidental, hut necessitated by the very nature of Spirit.
The same necessity characterizes the development of religion itself.
The task of the philosophy of religion, it will be recalled, is according
A
to Hegel to understand religion, to discover the reason and meaning in it.
With reference to the history of religion, however, this is essentially
synonymous with showing the necessity in each historical form. Season and
necessity seem to be for Hegel largely interchangeable terms, as shown when
he writes of the historical religions, HEs muss also Vernunft darin sein,
5
in aller Zufftlligkeit eine hOhere Notwendigkeit."
The movement of the notion of religion from stage to stage is a nec-
essary movement, and the development of the historical religions is deter-
XII, BR, p. 9. Likewise, immediately after indicating the empiri-
cal origin of the notion of religion, Hegel goes on to say, "Aber>3) {istj
die Notwendigkeit dieses Begriffs, d.i., des religiBsen Standpunktes tlber-
haupt [zu entwickelnj . " (XII, BE, p. 80; cf. above, pp. 137-139.)
j~~XII, BE, pp. 174, 185.
3 Cf. above, pp. 28, 30-32; XII, BE, pp. 164-186. Hegel is careful
to point out that by the necessity of religion he means not mere external,
practical necessity, but an inner, metaphysical, absolute necessity ground-
ed in the nature of the Absolute. Considering that reverence for God or
the gods secures and preserves individuals, families, and states, while
contempt for God or the gods destroys law and duty and leads to the down-
fall of human institutions, one may conclude that religion is therefore
necessary. But this is a purely external inference, and though true, is
in danger of being misinterpreted to mean simply that religion is useful
for the purposes of individuals and governments. Thus to make religion a
mere means, and thereby a mere contingent condition of something else, is
to pervert its true significance. Such a necessity is not what Hegel has
in mind. (XII, EE, pp. 176-180.)
* Cf. above, p. 24.
5 XII, BE, p. 164.
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mined "by the nature of the notion. The whole course of religious history,
from the object ificat ion of the idea of religion in the definite religions
to its return to itself in the absolute religion, is subject in no way to
contingency, hut fully determined from within.
Was durch den Begriff hestimmt, im Begriffe notwen-
dig ist, hat auch existieren ratlssen, und die Religionen,
wie sie aufeinander gefolgt sind, sind nicht auf zufttllige
Weise entstanden. Der Geist ist es, der das Innere re-
giert, und es ist abgeschmackt , nach Art der Historiker
hier Zufttlligkeit annehmen zu wollen. Die Religionen, wie
sie aufeinander folgen, sind determiniert durch den Be-
griff, nicht ftusserlich hestimmt; sie sind hestimmt durch
die Natur des Geist es, der sich gedrttngt hat in der Welt,
um sich zum Bewusstsein seiner selbst zu bringen.*
The very nature of Spirit demands that it attain full self-conscious-
ness. This happens only in the absolute religion, but it cannot happen
there unless Spirit makes the long, laborious journey through the succes-
sive imperfect religions. This course is necessary in order that religion
9
may come to its absolute truth.
Diese bestimmten Religionen sind bestimmte Stufen
des Bewusstseins , des Wissens vom Geiste. Sie sind not-
wendige Bedingungen fur das Hervorgehen der wahrhaften
Religion, fur das wahrhafte Bewusstsein des Geistes.*
Hegel's classification of the definite religions, therefore, is "durch den
Begriff an und fur sich notwendig; sie folgt dem objektiven Begriff, ge-
4
mHss der Natur des Geist es. M
The same applies, of course, to the revealed or absolute religion.
Even the time of its appearance is determined.
Das ist nicht eine zufttllige Zeit, ein Belieben, Ein-
fall, sondern im wesentlichen, ewigen Ratschlusse Gottes ge-
grttndet, d.h. es ist eine in der ewigen Vernunft, Weisheit
Gottes bestimmte Zeit, und nicht auf zufttllige Weise he-
stimmt, sondern es ist Begriff der Sache, gOttlicher Be-
griff, Begriff Gottes selbst.5
XII, BR, pp. 72-73.
XIII, NR, p. 8.
XIII, NR, p. 8.
XIII, NR, pp. 16-17.
XII, BR, p. 76.
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The course of religion as a whole, as plotted in the Philosophic der
Religion , is the true theodicy; for it "zeigt alle Erzeugnisse des Geistes,
jede Gestalt seiner Selbsterkenntnis als notwendig auf."
1
It is also objectively necessary that God appear to human "beings in
one man, Christ, The idea of religion demands that man become conscious
of the unity of divine and human nature. For the great majority of human
"beings this consciousness can come not through philosophical thought, but
only in the form of certainty. However, this can happen only if the unity
of God and man is given external existence and presented to man's immedi-
ate sensual view. Hence arises the necessity of God's appearance in the
flesh.
Gewiss ist nur, was auf unmittelbare Weise ist, in
innerer oder Sasserer Anschauung ist. Pass es dem Mensch-
en gewiss werde , musste Gott im Fleisch auf der Welt er-
scheinen
. Die Notwendigkeit , dass Gott im Fleisch auf der
Welt erschien, ist eine wesentliche Bestimmung, es ist
nach dem Vorhergehenden notwendig abgeleitet, aus dem Vor-
igen bewiesen—
—
; so nur kann es dem Menschen zur Gewiss-
heit werden, so ist es die Wahrheit in der Form der Ge-
wissheit.
Moreover, this unity of God and man had to appear "in einem Mensch-
en." We are not dealing with the idea of universal man, but rather with
sensual certainty; therefore the unity must be visible to all in one par-
ticular human individual.
b. The Difficulties in This View
Nowhere in Hegel's philosophy of religion is the rational element
more prominent than in this doctrine of necessity. Moreover, it is prob-
ably also true that no element of his religious thought rests on shakier
foundations. Critical study reveals several defects.
I XII, BR, p. 76.c
XIV, AR, p. 141.
3 XIV, AR, pp. 141-142; cf. p. 137.
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1) . It makes necessary "facts " which have not existed. In the first
place, the circumstance that Hegel was actually mistaken regarding the
character of some of the facts which he describes as necessary casts ser-
ious doubt on the validity of the whole doctrine. According to Hegel's
account, religion in the East has always followed national boundaries;
Buddhism antedated Hinduism; the Hebrews treated nature as undivine; the
prophets were narrow fanatics; obedience to law among the Hebrews was mere
external compliance; and Christianity sprang primarily from Roman emperor-
worship, not from Judaism.
1 On the basis of Hegel's theory, the facts in-
volved in these judgments were not only as he describes them, but necessar
ily so. But history shows that he was actually mistaken in each case cit-
ed. Thus Hegel is placed in the absurd position of insisting on the nec-
essity of facts which never existed. It helps not at all to point out
that some of the errors are due to the imperfect state of historical knowl
edge in Hegel's day, for this only accentuates the fallacy in his proce-
dure. When the available information is so meager, he who says, "This is
the way it had to be," is treading on dangerous ground.
This, of course, serves to confirm the conclusion previously reached
that Hegel's religious philosophy is the product of thought about facts
empirically ascertained. It becomes increasingly clear how dependent He-
gel was on his empirical knowledge, how large a part that knowledge played
in determining his conclusions, and how little he actually deduced histor
ical facts from the notion.
2 ) . It, overlooks the hypothet ical character of all knowledge . Yet
nothing that has been said thus far renders untenable the necessitarian
interpretation of religious history. Hegel might reply, and probably
£ Cf. above, pp. 108, 111-114.
Cf. above, pp. 132-139.
Cf. Arthur Drews, HEP, pp. 409, 471.
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would: "I may be mistaken as to some of my facts, out that doesn't
over-
throw my fundamental view. My theory does not compel me to show
what are
facts and what are not (this is the task of the historian), but only to
demonstrate that whatever the facts may be, they spring necessarily from
the idea of religion and, ultimately, from the nature of Spirit. This
demonstration is given in general by my Encvclopftdie , and in particular by
my Philosophic der Religion." Here is the crux of the matter: has Hegel
actually given this demonstration or not?
It may help if we distinguish between two kinds of necessity. The
one we may call practical or circumstantial necessity; the other, ration-
al necessity.
1
It was practically necessary that Greek and Roman polythe-
ism should be replaced by Christianity; polytheism was dead, the people
were spiritually dissatisfied with it, and Christianity, the only other
non-ethnical religion on the scene, was very much alive and aggressively
missionary. It is rationally necessary that air be a material body, pro-
vided that it be admitted that air gravitates and that only material bod-
ies gravitate. In the first case it is impossible to offer any logically
conclusive argument to show that Christianity must follow polytheism: Why
must there be any religion at all? On the other hand, in the second case
circumstantial factors have no bearing whatever; that is to say, given the
premises, the conclusion is absolutely inevitable.
Now it is probable that at various stages of religious history cer-
tain developments, such as idol-worship, polytheism, sin, the crucifixion
of Jesus, religious persecution, and the like were necessitated by the
sheer force of circumstance, just as such things as crime, civil law, in-
dustrial injustice, and racial oppression are to a certain extent inevita-
Hegel, it will be recalled, distinguishes between external and in-




ble, the present imperfections of human nature being what they are. Like-
wise, if God is to he revealed increasingly to man and man is to he lifted
up to God, the ethnical religions must give way to Christianity; and if
the unity of God and man is to become real for the masses, it must he in
the form of imagery, such as in the personality of Christ. But it is a dif-
ferent thing to ascribe to these events rational necessity. No empirical
event can be shown to be rationally necessary; such demonstration is possi-
ble only in the realm of formal logic and mathematics. There is no demon-
strable logical reason why Christianity should supersede the earlier reli-
gions, or even that God should be revealed to man. True, if we assume a
reasonable world and a reasonable and good God, it is certainly rational
to hold, as Hegel does, that revelation is inevitable.* But there is no
a priori reason why this must be a reasonable world with a rational and
good power behind it. That it is such is an affirmation which we must make
if there is to be any science, or if life is to have any meaning at all.
But why must there be any science, and why must life have meaning? Simply
because we find meaning in experience, and in general it is more reason-
able to suppose that the universe is favorable to the realization of val-
ues than that it is unfavorable. The great weight of experience and reason
seems to be on the side of meaning and rationality as having ultimate ground-
ing, but there is no complete rational proof of this. Demonstration is pos-
sible only where a premiseis given and accepted as valid. When we deal with
the nature of the world, our first premise is not a proven fact, but must
be an affirmation of faith. While, therefore, we can regard many develop-
ments in the history of religion as necessitated by the circumstances, we
1 Cf. above, pp. 32-37; V, ENC , pp. 480-481.
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can never ascribe to them an ultimate rational necessity. The limited
facts at our command do not justify this further step.
Hegel nowhere clearly recognizes this hypothetical character of
knowledge. In fact, he frequently and explicitly denies to presuppositions
all place in true philosophy. When we have advanced to philosophical
thought, he holds, we have reached "die letzte Analyse, wo keine vorausge-
setzten Prinzipien mehr Bind." 1
Das Zeugnis des Geistes in seiner hBchsten Weise ist
die Weise der Philosophic, dass der Begriff rein als solch-
er aus sich ohne Voraussetzungen die Wahrheit entwickelt
und entwickelnd erkennt und in und durch diese Entwicklung
die Notwendigkeit der Wahrheit einsieht. 2
The only thought which philosophy "brings to the study of history is
der einfache Gedanke der Vernunft, dass die Vernunft die
Welt beherrscht, dass es also auch in der Weltgeschichte
vernunft ig zugegangen ist. Diese ffberzeugung und Einsicht
ist eine Vorausset znng in Ansehung der Geschichte als
solche ttberhanpt. In der Philosophie selbst ist dies keine




In religion, likewise, "der wahre, richtige Geist" which comprehends
the true meaning of the Bible
kann nur der sein, der in sich selhst nach der Notwendig-
keit verffihrt, nicht nach Voraussetzungen. Dieser Geist,
der auslegt, muss sich fflr sich selbst legitimieren, und
diese Legitimation ist die Sache selbst, der Inhalt, das,
was der Begriff dartut. 4
Anselm's ontological argument, holds Hegel, suffers from the defect
5that in it the unity of Begriff and Sein is bloss Voraussetzung. whereas
this unity is really involved in the very nature of Spirit. Similarly,
Pichte and Kant's view that human morality is possihle only on the assump-
XII, BE, p. 264.
2 XIV, AB, p. 22.
3 VIII, PWG, p. 4.
4 XII, BR, p. 39.
5 XII, BR, pp. 222-223.
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tion of a moral order represents the standpoint of an abstract
subjectivity
which fails to see concretely the unity of idea and reality.
1
This disavowal of presuppositions is one of the weakest points in He-
gel's philosophy. As already indicated, all knowledge, whether based on
ordinary formal logic or Hegel's synoptic logic, is ultimately hypothetical.
Hegel's contention "dass die Vernunft die Welt beherrscht" is itself a pre-
supposition. Nothing in his philosophy demonstrates it. In the last analy-
sis, neither Hegel nor anyone else can be cognitively certain that his reason
yields objective truth or that man finds a real God in religion. Our best
reason may create a strong presumption in favor of these judgments, but this
presumption is based finally on faith in the trustworthiness of reason.
Hegel, like every other thinker, must assume at the outset that his mind can
be depended on to yield truth. Occasionally he himself seems on the verge of
admitting this, as when he writes, HDer Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die
Hacht des Geistes, ist die erste Bedingung des philosophischen Studiums."
But to the end he firmly believes that he has demonstrated his conclusions.4
Two further difficulties in Hegel's view may be mentioned at this point,
though a more detailed consideration of them must be reserved until later.
3). rt leaves no room for human freedom . In treating the history of
religion as a development whose stages are completely determined by the nature
of the Absolute, Hegel rules out the element of free spontaneity and novelty
which seems to characterize religion. If the various religions are what they
are wholly because the Begriff is what it is, there is no room for free de-
termination on the part of individuals. The simultaneous affirmation of
some degree of freedom in human beings and of complete control by the Abso-
1 XII, BE, pp. 136-137.
~ Cf. above, pp. 144-146.
* V, MC, p. LXXVI; cf. XII, BR, pp. 42, 57; below, p. 197.
4 For further discussion of this point, cf. below, pp. 173-174.
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lute involves an irreconcilable contradiction.
1
4). It makes the Absolute non-moral . Finally, Hegel's conception
raises very serious doubts as to the morality of the Absolute. If all that
has happened in the history of religion is alike necessary, demanded by the
nature of the Absolute, there is no genuine distinction between right and
wrong. The history of Christianity includes not only such events as the
life of Christ, the missionary activities of Paul, and the magnificent work
of St. Francis, but also such things as the wars of religion and the Inqui-
sition. If Hegel is right, the latter events were just as necessary as the
former. If this is true, Spirit is neither good or bad, but ethically neu-
tral, neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral. Such a Spirit is not the
2
good God which Hegel himself, as a Christian, affirms.
c. Hegel's Abiding Insight
In view of the objections raised, the necessitarian element in He-
gel's interpretation of religious history must be rejected. This does not
mean, however, that his basic insight is overthrown, Ktfhat Hegel is primari-
ly concerned with saying is that God is in the history of religion, that the
long, slow growth of religion in human experience has not been merely a
blind groping of man after a shadow, but a purposive seeking after a God
who is actually there, and who in fact takes the initiative in reconciling
the world to himself. The history of religion has been, on the one hand,
the growing discovery of God by man; on the other hand, and even more tru-
ly, it has been God's increasing revelation of himself to man.
God is in control of the universe. Providence is a reality, not in
the superficial form of intervention by God at exceptionally critical times,
1 Cf. below, pp. 213-217.
2 Cf. below, pp. 187-188.
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but as an abiding, purposive plan increasingly working itself out in
history.
Den Glauben und Gedanken muss man zur Geschichte
bringen, dass die Welt des Wollens nicht dem Zufall anheim-
gegeben ist. Dass in den Begebenheiten der VBlker ein
letzter Zweck das Herrschende, dass Vernunft in der Y/eltge-
schichte ist ... ist eine Wahrbeit, die wir voraussetzen;
ibr Beweis ist die Abbandlung der Weltgeschiehte selbst: sie
ist das Bild und die Tat der Vernunft. 1
The history of religion is not an accidental growth, but the product of the
immanent activity of God. This is the abiding insight in Hegel's account.
His mistake consists in thinking that that which is not all accident must be
wholly necessitated. Fortunately, we are not confined to a choice between
these extremes. Human history may be ultimately in the rational control of
and increasingly a fulfillment of the reasonable purpose of God, yet also
subject to modification for good or ill by human choice. By conceiving the
history of religion in this way, we avoid the shortcomings of Hegel's de-
terminism, yet remain true to his fundamental insight.
2. Hegel's View of the Absoluteness of Christianity
a. Christianity as the Absolute Religion
In his necessitarianism Hegel's departure from his customary balance
between history and reason is on the side of the rational. His religious
thought reveals another such departure, but in the opposite direction. In
treating Christianity as absolute, Hegel seems to lay undue weight on the
empirical and accept the status quo as final.
"Die christliche Religion," he writes, "wird sich uns als die absolute
Religion zeigen;"2 and his whole treatment of the absolute religion fulfills
this prediction. In Christianity Spirit has attained full self-conscious-
1 VIII, PWG, p. 5. Cf. JTJB, XVII, GDP, p. 48; above, pp. 118-119.
2 XII, BR, p. 75.
%
150
tiess; in it notion and manifestation have "become one.
Der bestimmte TTbergang der Idee Die zur sinnlichen
Gegenwart (1st im Christentum] herausgebildet worden. Eben
dies [1st] das Ausgezeichnete des Christ enturos und der
Religion des Geistes. Alle Moment e [sind hierj entwickelt
"bis zur ihrer Vollstftndigkeit
.
The "basic ideas of the absolute religion, moreover, are essentially
the central doctrines of historical Christianity, especially of the Luther-
an Christianity of Hegel's day.
Das Denken hat sich frei in sich zu bewegen, wobei
jedoch sogleich zu bemerken ist, dass das Resultat des
frei en Denkens mit dem Inhalt der Christlichen Religion
ffbereinstimnt, da diese Offenharung der Vernunft ist.
2
In the Christian doctrines of creation, sin, and the fall, and of the recon-
ciliation of God and man through Christ, God's incarnation of himself, Hegel
finds expressed the very dialectical movement of abstract unity, estrange-
ment, and reconciliation which is the essence of absolute religion. The
whole process of religion Hegel finds summarized in the doctrine of the Trin-
ity, the "Grundbestimmung der Christ lichen Religion.
Because of this fundamental agreement of his religious thought with
church doctrine, Hegel regards himself and his philosophy of religion as the
primary defender of Christianity in his day. Regarding the views of many
contemporary theologians, such as Tholuck, who treated the Trinity as a scho-
lastic doctrine and in whose theology Hegel detected the mere morality of the
Aufklttrung,4 Hegel writes,
Durch solch endliches Erfassen des GOttlichen, dessen,
was an und fflr sich ist, durch dies endliche Denken des ab-
soluten Inhalt s ist es geschehen, dass die Grundlehren des
Christentums aus der Dogmatik grOsstenteils verschwunden sind.
Nicht allein, aber doch vornehmlich die Philosophie ist es,
die jetzt wesentlich orthodox ist; die S&tze, die immer ge-
gelten haben, die Grundwahrheiten des Christentums werden von
XIV, AR, p. 175; cf. p. 106.
JUB, VIII, SDP, p. 113.
XII, BR, pp. 41-42. Cf. below, pp. 179-180.
Cf. V, MC, pp. 16-17n.
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ihr erhalten und aufbewahrt. 1
There can "be no doubt that Hegel identifies the Christian religion
with the absolute religion. In it he finds that reconciliation of nature
and Spirit, man and God, toward which the whole history of religion moves.
As Lasson suggests, the Protestant faith contains for Hegel the universal-
2
ly valid knowledge of absolute truth.
b. Hegel* s Attitude toward Further Development
Here a question arises. The empirical Christian church is not a per-
fect institution. In fact, it has often contradicted the notion of the ab-
solute religion. At times it has been the agent of intolerance and persecu-
tion which have actually hindered the elevation of man to God. Excessive
other-worldliness, far from reconciling nature and Spirit, has sometimes sep-
arated them. Denominational divisions have rent Christianity so that the
very existence of such a body as "the Christian church" is open to serious
question. Such facts indicate the real possibility of a decline even of
what was to Hegel the absolute religion and its replacement by a higher reli-
gion. Does Hegel's thought leave room for such development? In what sense,
for him, is Christianity "absolute"? Does he regard it as the final reli-
gion, beyond which no further progress can be made?
There are frequent indications that Hegel does regard Christianity as
ultimate. The Christian religion, he writes, is "die Religion der Offenbar-
ung," for "in ihr ist es offenbar, was Gott ist, dass er gewusst werde, wie
er ist." 3 It is, further, the Religion der Wahrheit. , . . Das Wahre ist ihr
Inhalt; denn sie hat, weiss das Wahre, erkennt Gott, wie er ist."4
1 XIV, AR, pp. 26-27; cf. p. 70n. ; and below, pp. 179-180.
2 XIV, AE, p. 10.
3 XIV, AR, p. 32.
4 XIV, AR, p. 34.
* • »
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Die geoffenbarte Religion ist die offenbare, weil
Gott in ihr ganz offenbar geworden ist, est ist nichts
Geheimes mehr an Gott. Es ist hier das Bewusstsein von
dem entwickelten Begriff des Geistes.
2
In the church universal truth is vorhanden , vorausgeset zt .
In der bestehenden Gemeinde ist die Kirche die Ver-
anstaltung tlberhaupt, dass die Subjekte zu der Wahrheit
kommen, die Wahrheit sich aneignen und dadurch der heilige
Geist in ihnen auch real, wirklich, gegenwftrtig werde
. . ., dass die Wahrheit in ihnen sei und sie im Genusse,
in der Betfltigung der Wahrheit des Geistes seien. 3
At the close of his lectures Hegel treats explicitly the question of
the finality of the Christian religion;
Fonnell £besteht ftlr geschichtliche Bildungen das
Schema *3 Entstehung, Erhaltung und Untergehen; letftes
reiht sich daran, Sollte hier davon gesprochen werden,
[da ein] ewiges Reich Gottes etabliert £worden ist}? So
w&re das Untergehen ein TTbergang zum Himmelreich—
-
nur fftr die einzelnen Suhjekte, nicht fflr die Gemeinde.
JjDerJheilige Geist als solcher lebt ewig in seiner Ge-
meinde. Christus tsag*]l ' die Pforten der HClle werden
meine Lehre nicht ffberwlltigen, Vom Vergehen sprechen,
hiesse mit einem Misston endigen.4
In short, a passing away of the absolute religion is for Hegel unthinkable.
Individual Christians disappear from the sensual world and particular groups
pass through times of decline, but the religious community and its religion
go on as the eternal habitation of the Spirit.
Yet there are also evidences that Hegel leaves room for further devel-
opment in religion. "Die Gemeinde," he declares, "ist innerhalb ihrer ein
ewiges Werden." The absolute religion is a present reality as the body of
Christian thought which forms the basis of Christian life and action. But
the empirical church does not always express fully the notion of the Chris-
1 XII, BR, p. 75.
2 XIV, AR, p. 208.
3 XIV, AR, pp. 207-208.
4 XIV, AR, p. 231.




1 There ie therefore need of an ever closer approximation of
the actual church to its true idea. In this sense growth within the abso-
lute religion is inevitable.
For example, individual Christians may progress toward greater free-
dom. The religious subject often does not fully realize the idea of his re-
ligion. Many believers are prevented by an over-emphasis on feeling from
attaining true objectivity. They are therefore not free, but bound by their
own subjective desires. The notion of the absolute religion
enthftlt, dass Religion nur die ist, die sich objektiv, dass
die Religion das Objektive ist. Aber das ist nur der Be-
griff der Religion; ein anderes ist dieser Begriff und ein
anderes das Bewusstsein dieses Begriffes. Es kann also auch
in der absoluten Religion der Begriff dies Ansich, dabei
aber das Bewusstsein ein Anderes, es kann unfrei sein.
This lack of freedom and objectivity affords wide opportunity for further
development in religion.
Hegel goes even farther than this. "Die Gemeinde," he writes, "hat die
tmendliche Macht und Vollmacht zu ihrer Fortbildung, (zur] Fortbestimmung
ihrer Lehre." Moreover, this right seems to be implied in all that Hegel
says, in opposition to mere historicism, about the constant availability of
4
God and the eternality of Spirit* s self-revelation. Here Hegel seems defi-
nitely to admit the possibility of change and growth in the absolute religion.
Tet it is important to note that the development which Hegel recognizes
occurs only within the absolute religion itself. He nowhere admits that a
new and higher religion may arise which will reveal God more completely. In
this sense the absolute religion is final.
Indeed, in view of Hegel's assertions that in Christianity all moments
1 XIV, AR, pp. 230-231.
I XIV, AR, p. 17.
I
XIV, AR, p. 201.
Cf. above, pp. 121-123.
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of religion are completely developed, and that in it God is revealed "wie
er ist,"
2
it is difficult to accept literally his statement concerning the
right of the Gemeinde further to develop its doctrines. Here Hegel prob-
ably has in mind simply the personal appropriation by successive generations
of Christians of the eternal and changeless content of the Christian reli-
4
gion. This is indicated by the passage which immediately follows the de-
scription of the Gemeinde as an ewiges Werden. Hegel goes on:
Geist ist Sicherkennen im Selbstbewusstsein, sich
Ausscheiden zum endlichen Lichtpunkte des endlichen Be-
wusstseins und die RUckkehr in das, was er wirklich ist,
die Ruckkehr, in der das gOttliche Selbstbewusstsein her-
vorbricht. Das Habere ist, dass in dem Bestehen der Ge-
meinde die Lehre schon fertig ist und dass das Individuum
nur ssur fertigen Lehre herangezogen wird.
The idea of eternal progress in religion, involving an ever richer
idea and an ever fuller revelation of God, is foreign to Hegel. For him
there can be no real advance beyond the absolute religion, but only a growth
in individual apprehension within the established framework of Christian
thought.
c. Criticism
With regard to Hegel's view of the absoluteness of Christianity two
main criticisms may be passed:
1). Hegel overlooks the values in other religions. Modern investiga-
tions have made increasingly clearer the fallacy of regarding any one reli-
gion, as over against others, as containing complete truth. ^ The great re-
1 Cf. above, p. 150.
j: Cf. above, p. 151.
^
Cf # above, p. 155.
In fact, the point he is making concerns the ability of every indi-
vidual to have a direct present experience of God, and has no direct bearing
on the question of the finality of the Christian religion.
XIV, AE, p. 202.
As Troeltsch writes, "Der ganze Gedanke der Konstruktion einer his-





ligions of the East, for example, far from being mere nature-religions, are
not only in many respects similar to Christianity, but also have their own
peculiar ethical and religious values. The true relation between Christian-
ity and the other world-religions seems to he not that of superior and infe-
rior, hut that of supplementary agencies working side by side in search of
the truth about God,
2). Secondly, Hegel arbitrarily limits the very development which
plays so large a part in his religious thought. His emphasis on advance
from lower to ever higher forms of religion should have led him to allow at
least the possibility that a still higher religion than Christianity might
emerge. Open-minded interpretation of the fact of development up to Chris-
tianity would seem to indicate the probability of continued growth beyond it.
p
Eut this Hegel denies. In Lutheran Christianity at its best he finds the
full and final revelation of God, the highest possible form of religion.
All the development recognized by him takes place within the absolute reli-
gion itself; and even here it involves no actual attainment of new truth,
but only more complete assimilation of the truth already delivered to the
saints. Already, in its modern emphasis on the social gospel, the church
has transcended the absolute religion of Hegel* s philosophy. There is, of
windenden erscheint fraglich und bedenklich,'1 ("Die Dogmatik der religions-
geschichtlichen Schule." XrS, II, p. 508.)
1 This criticism is obviously not a condemnation of Hegel. Consider-
ing the knowledge of other religions available to him, it would have been a
miracle if he had achieved an attitude toward these religions which is only
very slowly winning acceptance among Christians today and is even now held
by comparatively few. Cf. Re-thinking Missions
.
W. E. Hocking, ed. (U. Y.
:
Harpers, 1932), pp. 29-59.
2 Hegel* s view here stands in marked contrast +o his words at the close
of his Geschichte der Philosophic where he writes, "Diess ist nun der Stand-
punkt der .jet gig-en Zeit, und die Eeihe der geistigen Gestaltungen ist fgr
.ietzt damit geschlossen." He also points out that Hdie letzte Philosophic
einer Zeit H is the result of all preceding stages, and contains the truth in
the highest form given to it by Spirit. (JUB, XIX, p. 690. Italics mine.)
Though Hegel does claim, with more certainty than any other philosopher, that
the truth of his system is identical with truth in and for itself (cf. V, ENC,
p. 202), he here opens the way to the emergence of a higher philosophy. But
in his treatment of religion the path to a fuller revelation is closed.
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course, evidence that this social concern is simply a return to a neglected
side of the teachings of the prophets and Jesus. It is, nevertheless, a dis-
tinct advance over the Christianity which Hegel had in mind,
1
an advance the
possihility of which his view would deny.
In behalf of Hegel it must be said that if the finality of the Chris-
tian religion cannot be proved, neither can its surpass ibility be demon-
strated. Many non-Hegelian philosophers of religion would agree with Hegel
in regarding Christianity as the highest religion known to man, and there-
fore normative. No religion seems to offer a truer conception of God than
that of the fatherly God of redemptive love revealed in Christ. To him who
has found in the Christian religion the power for living radiantly the eter-
nal life in the midst of time, it is inconceivable that his religion should
some day prove to be incompletely true. For such a person Christianity is
for all practical purposes absolute.
Hegel may be right. No one can say what the future may bring forth in
the realm of religion. There can be no decisive proof either for or against
the finality of Christianity. However, the weight of the evidence points to
continued development. There is no good ground for thinking that the Spirit
has already revealed all that is to be known concerning himself. Since there
has been marked progress in the past, there is every reason to expect it in
the future, Hegel gives insufficient recognition to this possibility.
Hegel* s conviction that Christianity is absolute and final is perhaps
partly due to his idea of religion: the nature of the notion forces him to
look for an empirical religion in which Spirit has attained full self-con-
sciousness, and this he naturally finds in Christianity. In all probability,
however, empirical considerations have a much larger influence. As we have
* Cf. XIV, AE, p. 201.
Cf. Kurt Kesseler, "Hauptprobi erne der Religionsphilosophie. H Zeit
.







already discovered, his notion of religion itself is not an a priori con-
struction, but the result of a profound study of religious experience and
history. In treating Christianity as absolute Hegel merely carries to ex-
tremes his normal respect for the empirical. It is not through accident,
still less through the processes of cold, impartial logic, that he accords
finality to the religion of his own day and country. He is simply yielding
to the tendency, natural to all men, to regard as best, and even as absolute-
ly final, the religious beliefs most familiar to himself. Hegel* s error is
only the exaggeration of his sound belief that philosophy must deal with what
already exists. From this belief it is only a short step to the view that
the best that exists is final. Hegel has made this step. His critical acu-
men and the developmental nature of the dialectic should have guarded him
against it, but in this instance the force of empirical fact is too great




HEGEL'S VIEW OF THE ABSOLUTE
I. The Importance of the Idea of God
At the center of Hegel's general philosophy stands his
conception of
the Absolute. All other aspects of his thought are hut
outgrowths of his
idea of God. Since the purpose of philosophy is the discovery of truth
and
God is absolute truth, no other task of thought can compare in importance
with the effort to unfold the nature of God.
1 The field of philosophy is
the whole of human experience and history, which is essentially the develop-
ment or manifestation of the life of God: "so ist Gott der eine und einzige
2
Gegenstand der Philosophie."
Naturally this emphasis appears with particular force in the philoso-
phy of religion. Hegel never tires of exposing the one-sidednese of the
Yerstandestheologie which, holding that we can know nothing of God, confines
itself to the subjective side of religion. This subjective emphasis, thinks
Hegel, deprives religion of its holy of holies, its central reality, leaving
it empty and meaningless. In his estimation God is the very heart of reli-
gion. Apart from a clear idea of God, therefore, there can be no adequate
conception of what religion is or of what it means to live a religious life.
Was der Mensch in Beziehung auf Gott zu tun zu haben
meint, httngt mit seiner Vorstellung von Gott zusammen, sein-
em Bewus8tsein entspricht sein Selbstbewusstsein, und er
kann umgekehrt nicht irgend etwas Bestimmtes in RUcksicht
auf Gott zu tun zu haben meinen, wenn er keine Kenntnis,
flberhaupt keine bestimmte Vorstellung von ihm als Gegen-
stand hat oder zu haben meint.*
1 XIV, AB, p. 225; cf, above, p. 30.
2 XII, BR, pp. 29-30. Hegel continues, "Die Philosophie ist daher
Theologie, und die Beschttftigung mit ihr oder vielmehr in ihr ist fflr sich
Gottesdienst."
3 XII, BR, pp. 159-160; cf. p. 157, n.l.
4 XII, BR, p # 231. Cf. V, ENC, p. LXXV.
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II. The Way to God
A. The Xnowableness of God
Implicit in this insistence on the importance of a clear conception of
God is the "belief that such an idea is possible, and further, that it truly
describes the nature of God. The Absolute is not a barren being about which
nothing can be affirmed, but is knowable to the human mind. Man's religious
life is not a vague search for something he knows not what, hut a living fel-
lowship with the real God*
So viel soli die Religion doch sein, dass sie ein An-
kommen unseres Geistes bei diesem Inhalte, unseres Bewusst-
seins bei diesem Gegenstande sei, nicht hloss ein Ziehen
von Linien der Sehnsucht ins Leere hinaus, ein Anschauen,
welches lichts anschaue, nichts sich gegenfiber finde.
If all that we can say about God is that he exists, we are in precise-
ly the same situation as the Athenians who long ago erected an altar "to an
2
unknown god!" If, moreover, as the Yerstand maintains, we are limited to
knowing that God is but cannot know what he is, we do not even know that he
is. We know only "das 1st; derm das Wort Gott fflhrt sine Vorstellung und da-
mit einen Gehalt, Inhaltsbestimmungen mit sich, ohne solehe ist Gott ein
m
leeres Wort.**
He who holds consistently that God cannot be known must speak exclu-
sively of our relation to God, never of God* a relation to us. "•
. • Ein
einseitiges VerhaTtnis ist aber gar kein VerhaTtnis." For the understanding,
therefore, God loses all independent reality and dissolves into a mere sub-
jective projection of the human mind. If religion means anything, it means
at least this, "dass nicht nur wir in der Besiehung su Gott stehen, sondern
auch Gott in der Besiehung su uns stehe."* If this relation between man and
J XIV, BDG, p. 46.
~ V, ESC, p. 100. Cf. Acts 17:25.
f XIV, BDG, p. 47.





Cod is real, knowledge of each by the other is also real. Cod is not jeal-
ous, hut communicates himself to man. He is not, like Schelling's Absolute,
the night "worin . . . alle Kuhe schwars sind,"
2 hut a Spirit with definite
and knowahle characteristics. Of all who deny man's knowledge of Cod Hegel
asks the pointed question which he answers himself:
Was wire die christliohe Cemeinde noch, ohne diese
Srkenntnis? was ist eine Theologie ohne Erkexmtnis Gottes?
Sben das, was eine Philosophic ohne dieselbe ist, ein tori-
end Srs und eine klingende Schellel 3
On the side of Cod nothing hinders man's knowledge of God.
Wenn dem Erkennen Gottes Ton seiner Seite nichts ent-
gegensteht, so ist es menschliche Willkttr, Affektation der
Demut, Oder was es sonst sei, wenn die Endlichkeit der Er-
kesntnis, die menschliche Ternunft nur im Gegensatse gegen
die gOttliche, die Sehranken der menschlichen Vernunft als
Bchlechthin fest, als absolut fixiert und behauptet werden.*
If man does not know Cod, it is not Cod's fault but man's own.
Hegel is not content with affirming the possibility of knowing Cod.
It is the basic principle of philosophical knowledge, "dass das Wis sen vom
5
Sein Gottes dem Menschen schlechthin gewiss sei." In the absolute reli-
gion, moreover, this knowledge is complete and exhaustive. "Die geoffen-
barte Religion ist die offenbare, well Gott in ihr gans offenbar geworden
1st,—es ist nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott."^
B. The Arguments for the Existence of God
1* llan's Immediate Awareness of God
Hegel is sure that God can be found. The question arises, then. How
is he to be found? What is the path from man to God? To him who reads He-
1 XIV, BDG, pp. 46-48; XIV, AR, pp. 225, 226, 229. Cf. Nohl, TJS, pp.
289-313; above, p. 27.
| II, PDC (3d ed., 1928), p. 19.5 Foreword to Hlnrlchs' Bellgionsphllosophie . JUB, XX, pp. 26-27.
Cf. XIV, AB, p. 34.
* XIV, BDG, p. 49.
A
XII, BE, p. 49. Cf. above, p. 27.6
XII, BE, p. 75. Cf. below, p. 173.
.« * p
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gel and notices the frequency with which he discusses the traditional argu-
ments for God, the seemingly obvious answer is, Through thought alone, and
particularly by way of the so-called "proofs" of the existence of God. Yet
Hegel himself expressly states that it is a misunderstanding to regard re-
flection as the only way "auf welchem wir sur Yorstellung und Fttrwahrhalten
des Svigen und Wahren gelangten," or the arguments in question as the only
means whereby a conviction of the existence of God may be produced. 1 Such a
view, he declares, would be just as foolish as to maintain that we cannot
eat until we are familiar with the chemical, botanical, or zoological char-
acteristics of our food, and that we must delay our digestive processes un-
til we have completed the study of anatomy and physiology. God is not lim-
ited to one form of self-revelation. He can be found not only in specula-
tion, but in feeling and imagination as well. Man has an immediate aware-
ness of the Absolute.
Die Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott in dem Gefflhle, im
Anschauen, Phantasie und im Denken,-—und sie 1st subjek-
tiv so konkret, dass sie von alien diesen Momenten in sich
hat,—ist eine innere Erfahrung.
2. The Function of the Arguments
Quite apart from speculative thought, therefore, man may be subjec-
tively certain of God. With this subjective certainty, however, contingency
and arbitrariness are mingled. Hence it is necessary, by the methodical
processes of thought, to bring the stages of man*s elevation to God to clear
consciousness, and so to purify it from all contingency by revealing the ob-
jective truth in the subjective Yorstellung of God.4 This the arguments for
the existence of God seek to do. The fundamental meaning of these proofs is
for Hegel simply that they chart for thought the course followed by the hu-
1 Y, BSC, p. 33.
J v. arc, p# 33.
r XIV, BDG, p. 55.




spirit in its rise to God, Mass sie die Brhebung des
Menschengeistes gu
Gott enthalten und dieselbe fttr den Gedanken ausdrttcken sollen."
1 When man




The arguments presuppose, therefore, an immediate consciousness of
God.
But this does not mean that they are superfluous. They perform the impor-
tant function of explicating the implicit, of mediating the immediate, of ob-
jectifying the subjective.
Hegel agrees with Kant that the arguments for God's existence, viewed
as chains of inference in the manner of traditional logic, are not valid.
For Hegel, however, they have a much higher significance: transcending all
merely formal logic, they demonstrate the totality of the Spirit , in which
finite and infinite are both moments of a concrete whole. To prove means
simply to become conscious of the connection and necessity in things and, in
intention, to become conscious of the particular content of that which is in
and for itself universal, as well as of the absolute and final truth of all
m
particular content.
So conceived, proof becomes identical with knowledge.
Dieser vor dem Bewusstsein liegende Zusammenhang
soil nicht ein subjektives Ergehen des Gedankens ausser-
halb der Sache sein, sondern nur dieser selbst folgen,
nur sie, ihre Notwendigkelt selbst exponieren. Solche
Exposition der objektiven Bewegung, der inneren eigenen
Notwendigkeit des Inhalts ist das Erkennen selbst, und
ein wahrhaftes als in der Einheit mit dem Gegenatande. 4
Proof, therefore, is essentially the same as the knowing process. In
neither does the mind stand outside its object, but rather places itself
within its object and follows the necessary movement and connection in the
1 XIV, BDG, p. 15. Cf. XII, Bfi, p. 219; XIII, TO, p. 43; XIV, BBG,
pp. 156-157.
2 XII, BR, p. 69.
J XIV, BBG, p. 42.




objective order itself. This it can do because it is actually one with the
object. 1 Idea and object are but different aspects of the same reality. In
the case of religion the human mind simply traces the steps whereby it be-
2
comes conscious of the divine mind with which it is ultimately one.
3. Hegel's Formulation of the Arguments
The traditional arguments for the existence of God approach the prob-
lem from two complementary angles.
5 We may begin with the being of the world
and argue from it to a necessary Being behind it. This is the general proce-
dure in the cosmological and the teleological arguments. Or we may begin
with the idea of God and argue from it to his existence. This occurs in the
ontological proof.
a. The Cosmological Argument*
In its traditional form the cosmological argument reasons from the con-
tingency of the world to an absolutely necessary essence. What is contin-
gent, it is argued, is not self-supporting, but presupposes as its essence.
ground, or cause an existence which is in itself necessary. The world is
5
contingent, since it is only an aggregate of contingent particulars. There-
fore it must hare a self-supporting and necessary being as its ground. The
finite presupposes the infinite. The finite is. Therefore the infinite
must also be. 6
Hegel is not satisfied with this statement of the argument. The affir-
mation of being involved in both premises is self-contradictory, one-sided,
and untrue.
1 Hegel points out, Mass die Betrachtung des Erkennens von der Be-
trachtung seines Gegenstandes nicht rerschieden sei." XIV, BDG, p. 13.
2 XIY, BDG, pp. 42-43.
5 XIY, BEG, p. 75.4 Cf. V, HTC, pp. 76-78, 96-97, 463; XII, BR, pp. 207-215; XIII, NB,
pp. 40-56; XIII, HGI, pp. 20-28; XIV, BDG, pp. 1-157.
\ XIY, BDG, p. 88.6 XIII, HH, p. 43.
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D&0 Zufttllige, Endliche wird ala ein Seiendcs aus-
geaprochen, aber die Beatimraung desaelben 1st vielmehr,
•in Ende su haben, su fallen, ein Sein en sein, das nur
den Vert einer M&gliohkeit hat, das ebenso gut 1st, als
nicht ist. 1
The basic defect here is the type of connection involved in the ordi-
nary syllogism, The relation between the major and minor terms is external
and finite; each is thought of as existing for itself quite apart from its
relation to the other. But this is a false separation. In truth, both
terms of the argument in question constitute together "eine Bestimmung, .
g
das absolut Notwendige," which alone is truly real. It is the nature of
this necessary being to mediate itself by producing its own other and thence
to return to itself. The finite world of contingency, therefore, has no pos-
itive existence of its own, but is simply the self-differentiation, the nega-
tive or other of the one absolutely necessary and infinite being in which its
being is negated, aufgehoben . and only ideally preserved. "Das Sein des End-
lichen ist nicht sein eignes Sein, sondern vielmehr das Sein seines Andern,
des T7nendliohen. N Contradictory and untrue by itself, the finite does not
exist independently over against the infinite, but mediately as an aspect of
the infinite. Absolute necessity does not merely make up one side of the re-
lation; it alone has any real being at all. On this concrete foundation He-
gel reconstructs the cosmologies! argument as follows:
Nicht well das Zufftllige ist, sondern vielmehr well
es ein Nichtsein, nur Erscheinung, sein Sein nicht wahr-
hafte Wirklichkeit 1st, ist die absolute Notwendigkeit
;
diese ist sein Sein und seine Wahrheit.
So stated, the cosmologioal argument leads to belief in an absolutely
necessary being. Such a being, however, is far from adequate to the full
thought of God. The cosmological proof provides the general, abstract foun-
\ XIV, BDG, p. 102. Cf. XIII, BGI, pp. 27-28.
\ XIV, BDG, p. 105.
* XIV, BDG, p. 153.
* XIV, BDG, p. 105. Cf. XII, BR, p. 215; XIII, BR, p. 46.
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dation of religion* but only this. To call Cod "das schrankenlose Sein, das
Unendliche, das Ewigc, Unveranderliche," "Weson und Grand, Ganses, Kraft, Ur-
sache," and so on is accurate as far as it goes, nut it does not exhaust his
nature. God is much more concrete, "noch tiefer und reicher in sich . • • ,
als diese Bestimmungen ausdracken. w* The cosmological argument must there-
fore he supplemented by others.
b. The Teleological Argument
The traditional physic otheological or teleological argument reasons
from the signs of purposeful order in nature to the reality of an intelli-
gent, purposing cause. The world of nature, especially organic nature, is
characterised throughout by purposlTe adaptation of its parts to each other.
This purpose, however, does not inhere in the diverse parts themselves, which
alone are mutually indifferent and incapable of harmonising so many different
means to realise definite ends. There must exist, therefore, a powerful,
wise, and purposive cause whose activity transforms the world from a mere
aggregate of contingent parts into a unity of purposeful relations. This
purposive cause is God.'
Hegel criticises this argument from the standpoints of both form and
content. As regards form he finds that it, like the traditional eosmologi-
cal argument, is too abstract. God is represented as shaping to his own ends
a world which is external to him. The argument thus carries over to ultimate
reality the same sharp separation of means and end which characterises human
purpose. That is no true purpose, however, in Which the purposer deals with
1 XIY, BBG, pp. 80-81, 84-85; cf. pp. 74, 100-101, 124, 157; XIII, BGI,
pp. 26-27.
8 Cf. V, BTC, pp. 78-79, 96-97, 465; XII, BR, pp. 210, 215-218; XIII,
BGI, pp. 26-48; XIV, BBC, pp. 158-171.
* XIV, BBC, pp. 159-160; XIII, BGI, pp. 42-47. Hegel here reproduces
Kant's formulation of the argument, which he regards as typical. Cf. Krltlk












a material outside himself. On the contrary,
die Wahrheit der Zweckbest loaning ist die, dass der Zweck
an ihm selhst sein Mittel und ehenso das Material habe,
worin er sieh vollfflhre; so ist der Zweck der Form naoh
wahrhaft, denn die objektive Wahrheit liegt eben in dem,
dass der Begriff der Realitttt entspreche.
For Hegel the passage from finite purpose to God is not an external
connection of two unrelated things, out a dialectical grhebung . a passage
from one moment to another within a fundamental unity. This deration in-
volves the negative moment,
dass dieses Lebendige in seiner Unmittelbarkeit, dlese
Zwecke so, wis sie sind, in ihrer endlichen Lebendig-
keit nlcht das Wahre sind, sondern ihr Wahres 1st viel-
mehr jene eine Lebendigkeit , der eine Sua. 2
The finite thing with which we start, instead of grounding and condi-
tioning the existence of God, is itself grounded in and conditioned by God.
When thought about, it reveals itself as incomplete and untrue, mere nega-
tive particularity which demands its own negation and elevation to the sys-
tem of which it is a part. In this elevation the finite Lebendigkeit dis-
appears, and the object of consciousness becomes the systematic whole, "der
Hue der einen Lebendigkeit, die allgemeine Seele."3
In its true form, therefore, the teleologieal argument moves from fi-
nite purposive activity to absolute, universal purpose. It makes the world
a cosmos, a harmonious system of living activity in which everything is in
mutual and essential relation to everything else, each part contributing to
the life of the whole yet existing and having meaning only through the whole.
Yet even this idea of a living, unifying, organising activity does not
express the full notion of God* God appears here as the activity which works
1 XIV, BDG, p. 163. This, says Hegel, is "die unendliehe [in contrast
to the endllchej Tfttigkelt des Zweckes."
\ III, BE, p. 217.5 XII, BB, p. 217. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 162-163.
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in organio and inorganic nature, uniting than in interdependence;
1 he is the
truth of the relation of purpose. But living activity it not yet Cod, "Cott
let mehr ale lebendig, er iet Cclst."
2
The Creek Nvs is not the self-differ-
entiating Absolute Spirit. **Eine naeh Zwecken wirkende Macht iet ebenso die
Lebendigkeit der Natur, noeh nieht daa, was man PersOnlichkeit Gottee nennt
und Geist,"8
Hegel findi the proof defective also with respect to content. It is in-
evitable that any argument which attempts to pass from Seln to Cod should
yield a Cod afflicted with all the limitations of Seln as known to man. Hu-
man perceptions and experiences "geben nur endllche Zweekmfssigkeit, nicht
4
den freien Begriff tfberhaupt." If Cod*s purposes are as limited as those of
nature and of man, Cod is hardly worthy of worship. Human purposes are more
often frustrated than realised, sometimes through the very vice of man him-
self.5 It is true that there is gweckmass lgkolt in experience, hut there is
also Unsweckmgss lakelt To find the true Cod, therefore, we must go beyond
the purpose observable in experience. In fact, we must adopt an entirely dif-
ferent method of approach.
7
c. The Ontologieal Argument
The preceding arguments begin with finite being and argue from it to
the reality of true and infinite being, conceived as absolute, necessary pow-
er which is also wise and purposive. The ontologieal argument moves in pre-
cisely the opposite direction; beginning with the pure notion of Cod, it in-
1 The organic is the end and meaning of the inorganic, but in turn de-
pends on it for life. Cf. XIV, BBC, pp. 166-169*
\ V, ESC, p, 79.9 XIII, BCI, p. 41. Cf, XII, BB, pp. 217-218; XIV, BBC, pp. 166-169;
V, BHC. pp. 79-eO.
J XIII, BCI, p. 42; cf, p, 41; XIT, BBC, pp. 170, 171.
\ XIY, BBC, p. 170,
I XIII, BCI, p. 41.
XII, BB, pp, 218-226; XIV, AB, pp. 39-63; XIV, BBC, pp, 172-177; V,




fers his existence. As formulated by Anselm, the argument is as follows:
The idea of God is that of the most perfect being. If, however, God is only
an idea, he is not the most perfect being, for that alone is perfect which
is not only imagined, but also exists. Therefore God exists.
In content, says Hegel, this argument is nim gansen richtig;" indeed,
it alone is "der wahrhafte."
5
The other arguments, beginning as they do with
finite experience, can yield only a God who is still afflicted with finite
limitations. The ontologieal argument, moving in the realm of pure thought,
avoids this empirical taint, and so proves the reality of God in his fullness.
Formally, however, the argument is defective. For Anselm nowhere dem-
onstrated that existence is involved in the idea of perfection and truth, but
only assumes it. The unity of notion and being on which the argument de-
pends is "bloss Voraussetsung."5 The most perfect and real being is there-
fore itself an assumption, and the reality of God remains on the plane of
subjective belief. 6
For Hegel, however, the existence of God is "nicht mehr Voraussetsung,
7
sondern Resultat." It is involved in the very nature of the Gottesbegrlff
itself. For the Notion is
dies Allgemeine, das sioh bestimmt, besondert, diese Tfttig-
keit, su urteilen, sich su besondern, su bestimmen, eine
Endliehkeit su set sen und diese seine Endliehkeit su negier-
en und duroh die negation dieser Endliehkeit identisch mit
sich su eein. Dae 1st der Begriff ftberhaupt, der Begriff
Gottea, der absolute Begriff; Gott 1st eben dieses.8
\ XIV, AB, pp. 44-45; BDG, p. 172.
J XIV, AB, pp. 41, 48; BDG, p. 179.5 XII, BR, p. 219; XIV, BDG, p. 172. Cf. XII, BB, p. 222; XIV, AB, p. 41.
* XIV, AB, p. 43; of. pp. 50-52.
\ XII, BB, p. 223.
* XIV, BDG, p. 176; cf. p. 176.
I XIV, BDG, p. 176.
XII, BB, p. 221. Cf. XIV, AB, pp. 39-43, 50-51. Hegel does not at-
tempt to demonstrate this in his Philosophic der Religion , holding that his
whole system, especially as set forth in his Logik , shows it to be true. Cf.
XIV, BDG, pp. 65, 150, 155.
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Being, therefore, ie not something added to the notion of God, but ii
necessarily involved in it as one of its determinations.
1 The idea and the
existence of God are two aspects of a concrete whole, the unity of the Notion,
Die Gestalt der Religion enthttlt nicht das Dasein des
Geistes, wie er rom Gedanken freie Hatur 1st, noch wie er*
Yom Dasein freier Gedanke 1st; sondern sie 1st das im Denk-
en erhaltene Dasein, so wie ein Gedachtes, das da 1st,
For Hegel, therefore, the ontological argument consists simply in show-
ing how the Notion by its very nature negates its barren subjective unity and
attains objective existence. The true transition from thought to being is
this, "dass der Begriff seine Bestimmtheit, subjektiv su sein, negiert, . ,
3
oder vielmehr, [dass] er selbst diese seine Dialectic 1st,"
Der Gang 1st dieser, dass der Begriff sich ob-
jectiviert , sich sur RealitSt macht, und so 1st er
die Wahrheit, Sinheit des Subjects und Objects*
So formulated, maintains Hegel, the argument is immune to Kant's crit-
icisms (1) that, as regards content, existence adds nothing to the complete-
ness or perfection of an idea, and (2) that the idea of an object does not
guarantee its existence. It is true that any particular idea, such as that
of a hundred dollars, may lack objective reality. But the absolute idea, the
notion of God, is in a class by itself. It is its very nature to exist.
Gott 1st nicht ein Begriff, sondern der Begriff;
dies QstJ die absolute RealitSt, die IdealitSt 1st.
Gott [1st] alle RealitSt, also die des Seins, d.h. im
Begriff 1st enthalten das Sein. 5
1 XII, BR, pp. 221-222.
2 II, PDG, p. 443. Commenting on this in reply to a critic, Hegel
writes: "Also der Gegenstand in der Religion 1st weder das Daseyn abst ra-
ni rt vom Denken (die Hatur als die Idee in der einseitigen Form des Daseyns)
noch der Gedanke abstrahirt vom Daseyn, (der Geist als die Idee in der ein-
seitigen Form des Denkens, also der endliche Geist, oder das Denken abstract
ttberhaupt, was gleichfalls endliches Denken 1st) sondern Daseyn, welches Denk-
en, und Denken, welches Daseyn 1st." ( In a review of, ttber die Hegel* sche
Lehre oder : absolutes Wissen und moderner Panthelsmus . Leipzig, 1829. JUB,
XX, p. 328.) Cf. XIV, AR, p. 42.
J XIV, AR, pp. 42-43.
J XIV, BDG, p. 176.
XIV, AR, p. 42. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 220-221; V, ESC, p. 80.
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Assuming that absolute thought is subject to the same imperfections
found in the thinking of empirical human beings, with their sense-limita-
tions,1 Kant seeks to separate Begrlff and Seln . content and form. Haying
erected a harrier "between the idea and the existence of God, he concludes
that there is no way of surmounting it, and therefore that God cannot he
known. When dealing with the. Kotion, however, this distinction is illegit-
9
imate and untrue. Begrlff and Seln are absolutely inseparable. Being is
actually implied in the Notion. It would he queer, says Hegel, if the con-
crete totality which is God were not rich enough to contain in itself so poor
3
a determination as being, which is the poorest and most abstract of all.
Hegel believes that his formulation of the ontological argument leads
to God in all his fullness, to Geist . For Gelst is essentially the spirit-
ual movement, the thinking activity which, While differentiating itself, re-
turns to self-identity, or which, in other words, produces finite spirits
and reconciles them to itself.4
4. Criticism
Nowhere else, perhaps, does Hegel's essential rationalism appear more
clearly and unmistakably than in his discussions of the existence of God.
His high estimate of the "proofs" for God, his painstaking efforts to re-
store their significance, and more particularly, his avowed preference for
the ontological argument, the least empirical of the three, stamp him as a
rationalist of the deepest dye. There is therefore real ground for the im-
pression that Hegel proceeds to establish the existence of God in disregard
1 XIV, AB, pp. 51-52.
J
XIY, AH, p. 48; BDG, p. 176.
5 XIY, BDG, p. 176; V, ENC, p. 80. By itself, being is a mere inde-
scribable abstraction, "gens bestimmungslose Unmittelbarkeit," "Vermitt-
lungslosigkeit As a determination in the notion of God, it is "die gang
abstrakte, allerdOrftlgste, dass er die Besiehung auf sich selbst 1st."
XIV, AB, p. 45; BDG, p. 176; XII, BR, p. 222. Cf. XIV, AH, p. 40.




of the factf of experience. When he writes. "Wie kOnnte eieh wohl
das phi-
losophises Beweisen besser benehmen, ale eich nur auf reine Begriffe su
stAtson,"
1 he confirms this impression.
In fairness to Hegel it smst be said that orach of his rationalism in-
volves not antagonism to the consideration of experience, hut simply an um-
willingness to stop there. Man can think, and can therefore rise above ex-
perience, though on the basis of it. If he is to find Cod, moreover, he not
only can, but must, transcend experience. For instance, Hegel admits that
we are immediately conscious of God, but insists that thought alone can raise
A
this subjective certainty to the plane of objective truth. The ultimate
ground of our belief in God is not our emotional awareness of him, but our
thinking relation to him. We know God not primarily because we feel him, but
because thought drives us to him.
Hegel further believes that mere empirical observation of the world
around us affords no more adequate support for belief in God than does inner
feeling. Man is a thinking being, and as such cannot be content with seek-
ing God "von und aus der empirischen Weltanschauung. " The elevation to God
"hat niehts anderes su seiner Grundlage als die denkende . nieht blocs sinn-
5
liche, tierische Betrachtung der Welt." As long as we remain on the finite
ground of the exact sciences, we need not expect to find the Infinite. La-
lande was ouite right in saying that he had scanned the whole heaven with his
6
telescope and not seen God.
1 In reply to Kant*s criticism that the arguments are grounded not in
experience, but in bare principles of reason. XIV, BDG, p. 146; cf. p. 60.
2 The arguments for God are movements of thought, "die ... in unserm
Bewas8tsein vorhanden Bind." (XIV, BBG, p. 109.)
3 Bspirieally we can say of God three things: (1) that we know him im-
mediately; (2) that he is present in feeling; and (S) that God and the human
subject, the Infinite and the finite, are regarded in consciousness as sepa-
rate existences. All of these statements, says Hegel, are correct, but so
trivial that they are not worth expressing. (XII, BR, pp. 62-85.)
J Cf. above, pp. 160-162.
? V, HJC, p. 75. Cf. XIV, BDG, pp. 144-145.
v, arc, p. 89.
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In Abort, Hegel insists that the experimental approach must be supple-
mented and transcended by rigorous thinking if metaphysical truth is to be
won. In Hegel this thinking, as far as the existence of God is concerned,
centers in the criticism and reformulation of the traditional arguments.
These very arguments are not rational constructs out of relation to experi-
ence, but only descriptions of the course of the mind in thinking its expe-
rience, 1
Even in emphasising the ontological argument Hegel is beginning with
the mind as he finds it. "Der Inhalt," he writes, nder ihr [this form of
proof} sugrunde liegt, ist der Ceist ."2 The defect of the other two argu-
ments is precisely that they start with external nature, something more re-
mote than self-experience. Ho consideration of living nature alone can yield
God in his fullness. For
Gott ist mehr als lebendig, er ist Geist. Die gelstlge Na-
tur ist allein der wflrdigste und wahrhafteste Ausgangspunkt
fftr das Denken des Absoluten, insofern das Denken sich eln-
en Ausgangspunkt nimmt und den nachsten nehmen will.*
In approaching God we must Begin with what is given, with the mind.
There is therefore evidence that the preference for reason in Hegel's
treatment of the arguments for God is to some extent simply a conviction of
the inadequacy of mere empiricism. His rationalism, however, goes much far-
ther than this. He begins, indeed, with the mind as he finds it, but the
mind which he finds is predominantly intellect. He renders lip service to
imagination and feeling,4 but leaves no doubt that for him the dominant ac-
tivity of the mind in relation to God is thought. Hence his major emphasis
on the ontological argument is quite as rationalistic as it seems* Preoccu-
1 V, ENC
, p. 75. In Hegel* s words, they are "die Bcschrelbungen und
Analyeen des Ganges des GclstcB in sich
. . . , der ein denkender ist und
das Sinnliehe denkt.**
2 XII, BB, p. 218.
* V, ENC
, p# 79.
Cf. above, p. 161.
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pation with the rational side of man's nature prevents him from giving due
recognition to the other aspects*
Hegel's exaggerated claim for reason appears eren more clearly, per-
haps, in his failure to recognise the hypothetical character of knowledge.
1
He is unwilling to admit that he assumes anything. In view of the distrust
of reason which prevailed in the early nineteenth century, Hegel's confidence
in the ability of human thought to fathom reality is commendable. Neverthe-
less, he places on reason a greater burden than it can bear. His conviction
of the knowableness of God does not commit him to the view that God is com-
pletely known, yet he does affirm that in the Christian religion "es ist
2
nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott.*
In the last analysis, Hegel's view of the knowableness of God is based
on the assumption that his reason ean be depended on to yield truth about ul-
timate reality. This, however, Hegel nowhere admits. He criticises Anselm
for founding his argument on a presupposition, and claims to presuppose noth-
ing himself. To be sure, he points out that the nature of the Begrlff to ob-
jectify itself and attain reality is simply carried over from the Logik .8 but
4he insists that "in der logischen Philosophic" it is erwlesen. In the Logik.
however, one looks in vain for a demonstration that the dialectic of thought
as there developed applies to the ultimate constitution of reality. This, of
course, is not surprising* One can never be cognitively certain that one's
judgments are metaphysically valid. In every judgment is the implicit as-
sumption that the laws of the mind are objectively grounded, but this cannot
be proved. One might be able to show conclusively what the human mind is in
| Cf. above, pp. 145-147,
f XII, BE, p. 75. Cf, above, p. 160,5 XIV, BDG, pp. 150, 155. In truth, the ontological argument is the
whole Logik in a nutshell.
4 XIV, BDG, p. 63; cf. p. 176. Note also this passage Which Lasson ex-
cludes from the text proper: "Hier ist es nicht mehr darum su tun, su beweis-
en, dass das Dogma, dies stille Mysterium, die ewige Wahrheit ist: dies ge-




all its activities, jet still be unable to prove rationally that this mind
truly mirror* forth the ultimate nature of things. Our knowledge of the ex-
istence of Cod, like that of the reality of other human individuals, is ul-
timately hypothetical. Hegel can show that if the Begriff is actually self-
objectifying, God must exist. Try as he may, however, he cannot abolish
this hypothetical basis of his argument and prove that the Begriff is really
what he thinks it to be.
If, therefore, Hegel claims to know God, it is because he trusts his
own mind. Implicit in all he says, though nowhere admitted, is his unlimited
faith in reason. He believes that his own thinking leads him to the very
center of reality. For him the whole dialectic is at every stage a descrip-
tion of the Absolute, which he assumes at the outset. 1 He cannot think ex-
cept in terms of its existence. Every step of his argument presupposes its
reality. From this standpoint, far from banishing faith, Hegel is himself
the supreme believer of philosophical history.
III. The Nature of God
A. What the Absolute Is
Having considered what for Hegel is the way to God, we have now to
ask to what kind of God this way leads. The answer is not easy. Hegel
nowhere offers a systematic exposition of the Absolute. He seems to as-
sume that his philosophy as a whole somehow makes clear what God is, thus
rendering specific treatment unnecessary. This much is certain: the Abso-
lute is a being of many-sided richness and diversity. Like Bryant's Na-
ture, Hegel's God speaks a various language. Accordingly, we find the
philosopher approaching the Absolute from varying points of view.
1 For an interesting statement of this view, cf. I. H. Fichte, "Zur
spekulativen Theologie," Zeit




1. The Absolute as Activity
God may be described, for example, as living, creative activity.
The Absolute is "Prosess, Bewegung, Leben,"
1
"THtigkeit, Lebendigkeit, und
Geistigkeit."2 This activity is dialectical in nature; it eternally dif-
ferentiates itself to produce its own other and eternally resolves the re-
sulting contradictions.3 God as "das Wahre und Wirkliche" is "eben diese
4
in sieh kreisende Bewegung," "freie, sich auf sich selbst besiehende, bei
5
sieh bleibende THtigkeit."
2. The Absolute as Thought and Love
To characterise God as movement alone, however, is far from suffi-
cient. He is this, but much more. The activity in question is thinking
activity. God is essentially thought.6
Eben Denken, alles, was in demselben liegt und seine
Wursel darin hat, als in sich unendlioher Selbstsweck, for-
me! 1 oder objektiv aueh dem Inhalte nach, {istj das Absolute.
With similar meaning God may be called the Absolute Idea, which ad-
vances dialect ically from abstract oneness through difference to concrete
unity.
Das Absolute ist die allgemeine und eine Idee,
welche als urtellend sich sum System der bestlmmten
Ideen besondert, die aber nur dies sind, in die eine
Idee, in ihre Wahrheit surttckzugehen. 6
This does not mean, however, that God is to be conceived merely as
cold, barren thought. For the religious consciousness, or "nach der Weise
der ftpfindung," he may be just as well portrayed as "die ewige Liebe."9
I XIV, AH, p. 74.
g XII, BE, p. 147. Cf. XIY, AH, pp. 35, 74.
' XIV, AH, p. 13. Cf. JUB, III, PHPH, p. 226.
7 II, PDG, p# 493; cf. pp. 14, 605, 516, 620.
I XIV, BDG, p. 27. Cf. II, PDG, p. 439.
J XIV, BDG, p. 111.
' XIII, BGI, p. 204.
IT, EEC, p. 190. Cf. XIV, AH, pp. 47-48, 55.





This characterisation, moreover, expresses the same self-differentiating
identity which is implied in all terms applied by Hegel to the Absolute.
It becomes clear how difficult it is to describe the Absolute in a
single phrase. He is at once Activity, Process, Life, Movement, Thought,
Idea, Love. All of these terras mean for Hegel one thing; they express
the same truth in varying ways. All are summed up in the account of the
Idea which Hegel wrote to Buboc.
Meine Ansicht 1st insofern, dass die Idee nur als
Prozess in ihr (wie Werden ein Beispiel ist) als Beweg-
ung ausgedrttckt und gefasst werden muss; derm das Wahre
ist nicht ein nur ruhendes, seyendes, sondern nur als
sich selbst bewegend, als lebendig; das ewlge Unter-
scheiden und die in Einem seyende Redaction des Unter-
schiedes dahin, dass er kein Unterschied ist; was auch
Empfindungsweise aufgefasst, die ewige Liebe genannt wor-
den ist; nur als diese Bewegung in sich, die ebenso ab-
solute Buhe ist, ist die Idee, Leben, Geiat. 1
3. The Absolute as Spirit
a. The Personality of God
When taken in the Hegelian sense, the qualities so far emphasized
are all legitimate characterizations of the Absolute. Yet none of them
is altogether adequate to express the full notion of God. For the Ab-
solute is for Hegel no impersonal principle of any kind whatever; in its
fullest and highest meaning, it is self-conscious Spirit, Personality.
This is suggested by the final word of the passage just quoted, but it
appears more clearly elsewhere. God's highest determination, writes
Hegel, ist Selbstbewvisstseln . 2 God is "nur als Geist zu fassen."3
Bas Absolute ist der Geist, dies ist die hochste
Befinition des Absoluten.
. . . Ber Inhalt der christlich-
en Beligion ist, Gott als Geist zu erkennen zu geben. 4
1 Werke ( orlg. ed.), XIX, BVAH, II, pp. 79-80; Werke (orig. ed.),
XVII, VS, p. 523. Cf. V, ENC, pp. 235-236.
2 XII, BR, p. 156; cf. p. 160.
3 XII, BR, p. 41. Cf. also the passage already quoted above, p.
177 (V. ENC, p. 79).
4 V, ENC, p. 335. Cf. XII, BR, p. 159; II, PDG (3d ed., 1928).
pp. 22, 532; JUB, V, WBL, pp. 327, 349.
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Hegel' s insistence on the personality of God appear* also in his frequent
criticisms of various pantheistic systems, such as those of the Hindus and
Spinosa. Such views make God a mere undifferentiated substance, not the
personal Spirit which the Absolute really is*
Der mangel dieser sftmtlichen Vorstellungswelsen
und Systeme 1st, nicht sur Bestimmung der Substans als
SubJekt und als Gel at fortsugehen.
The reason for Hegel* s view of the Absolute as personal is not hard
2
to find. In his own experience he finds that thought is dialectical.
This same experience, however, reveals that thought is never an isolated,
abstract principle, but always the function of a self whose activity mani-
fests the same dialectic. The distinguishing mark of personality is,
"seine Isoliertheit aufsugeben. ... Das Wahre der PersOnlichkeit ist
eben dies, sie durch das Tersenken, Versenktsein in das Andere su gewinn-
en.* In friendship and love, for example, the self surrenders its par-
ticularity and relates itself to the universal,4 But this is precisely
what is meant by the self-differentiating and self-uniting activity of
thought. It is thus altogether natural that Hegel, in discussing the na-
ture of absolute thought or the Absolute, should personalise it. In think
-
1 V, ENC
, p. 494. Cf. XII, BR, pp. 195-198; 264-257; XIV, BDG, pp.
126-150. The question as to whether Hegel himself is a pantheist, which
has divided his followers into two camps, is not a problem of this disser-
tation. He defines pantheism as the view that God is the immediate sub-
stance of the existing world, that finite existences such as human self-
consciousness, sun, moon, stars, mountains, rivers, and sea are in their
abstract immediacy divine, real forms of the divine existence (V, SRC, p.
64; XII, BR, pp. 254-257). He therefore insists that he is not a panthe-
ist, since for him God is concrete, self-mediating Spirit, existing nowhere
in abstract separation. However, in maintaining that the world is all one
being and that the Absolute alone is real (V, ENC, pp. S6-38), Hegel is un-
deniably pantheistic. Yet in affirming the personality of God he is at one
with theism. It would probably be most accurate to describe him as a per-
sonalistic pantheist. Cf. above, p. 81.
jj* Cf. II, FDG, passim .
J
XIV, AR, p. 81; cf. p. 158.
It is the personal, moreover, which makes itself the object of its
own knowledge. Cf. XII, BR, p. 156.
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ing lie finds that his finite thought drives him on to universal thought.
How natural is the further conclusion that, just as finite thought is
grounded in finite personality, so is this universal thought real only as
the activity of a universal personality, God! Almost inevitably, therefore,
the self-objectifying movement of thought which for Hegel characterises the
Absolute is not an abstract principle, hut essentially a personal activity
which is nothing apart from self-conscious experience. "Das ewige Beispiel
[haben wir] am Selbstbewusstsein,**1
God is not, however, a single person in the same sense as human indi-
viduals; neither is he merely a society of persons. He is rather the abso-
lute individual, the one universal personality who comprehends in himself
all particular finite persons, resolving and unifying their contradictions
2
in his own concrete wholeness, Without human society as the object of his
thought, God* e life would be barren and empty; without God, human life
would be hopelessly contradictory and chaotic.
Indem die Einselhelt als Ich, die PersCnllchkelt . in-
sofern nicht ein emplrlschee Ich, sine besondere PersOn-
lichkeit verstanden wird, vornehmlich indem die PersBnlich-
keit Gottes vor dem Bewusstsein 1st, so 1st von reiner, d.i.
der in slch allgemelnen PersOnlichkelt die Bede; eine solche
1st Gedanhe und kommt nur dem Denken an.'
In his fullest meaning, therefore, God is the Absolute Spirit. This
term is not opposed to the previously discussed determinations of thought
and activity, but includes them. Spirit is dialectical movement, which in
J
XIV, AB, p. 61. Cf. below, p. 198.
**Gott 1st wesentlieh in seiner Gemeinde, hat eine Gemeinde, 1st
slch gegenstSndlich, und 1st dies wahrhaft nur im Selbstbewusstsein."
(XII, BB, p. 156.) "God is a Spirit in his own concrete differences, of
which every finite spirit is one." (J. H. Stirling, SOH, II, p. 579.)
Cf. also J. A. Leighton, MCG, p. 66.
5 7, HfC, p. 90.
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turn is nothing if it it not Spirit. God if for Hegel the Absolute Spirit
who eternally objectifies himself in the creation of finite spirits whom he
reconciles to himself, thereby realising his own concrete unity, complete
self-consciousness. "Geist ist die gCttlichc Geschichte, der Prosess des
2
sich Unterseheidens , Dirlmierens und dies in sich Zurflcknehmens
.
w
b, God as a Trinity5
In riew of this emphasis on dialectical activity in the Absolute, it
is not at all surprising that Hegel should make free use of the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity in discussing the character of God. Repeatedly he
insists that the riew of God as a Trinity is the very heart of Christian-
ity.4 "Hur die Breielnigkeit ist die Bestimmung Gottes als Geistes;" if
God is to be anything more than an empty word, "so muss er als drelelnlger
Gott gefasst werden."6
Dieses neue Prinsip 1st die Angel, urn welche sich
die Weltgeschichte dreht. ... Die Christen wissen Ton
Gott, was er ist, insofern sie wissen, dass er dreiein-
lg 1st.
. . .
Wer Ton Gott nicht weiss, dass er dreiein-
ig ist, der weiss nichts Tom Christentum.
In all religions where God is conceived only abstractly as One, man's rela-
tion to him can be only one of servitude and fear. "Im Christentum, [in der]
7
Dreieinigkeit llegt die wahrhafte Befreiung."
Hegel is not, however, so orthodox as he sounds. Verbal similarity
cannot obscure the fact that his view of the Trinity is very different from
A
«D&8 absolute Wesen, das nicht als Geist erfass t wird, ist nur das
abstrakt Leere, so wie der Geist, der nicht als diese Bewegung erfasst
wird, nur ein leeres Wort ist." (II, PDG, p. 494.) Cf. XIV, AR, p. 166.
2 XIV, AH, p. 65. Cf. pp. 12, 47, 62-64, 69; XII, BE, p. 156; JUB,
XX, pp. 97-98; IX, PWG, p. 754.
J Cf. above, pp. 150-151.
* XII, BH, pp. 41-42. Cf. above, p. 150.
? XII, BR, pp. 42, 41.
J IX, PWG, p. 722.7
XIII, RGI, p. 91. Cf. also, XIV, AH, pp. 175-174; V, BSC, p. 18n*
"TJber: Hamann's Schrlftcn. " JUB, XX, p. 257.
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the traditional Christian conception. Hegel himself declares that the re-
lation of Father, Son, and Spirit is a childish forsmlation, though it has
value if it is clearly understood to be only figurative. Bven as a figure,
however, "Liebe wire noch passender."1 The real meaning of the Trinity is
to he found in the three moments of the dialectical movement of Spirit.
God as eternal being or Idea is incomplete, mere barren, abstract unity.
Only through eternally particularizing himself to produce his own other
does he attain reality. But this being-other is itself only an abstract
moment. Only, therefore, through returning out of difference to himself,
or through remaining identical with himself in difference* does God achieve
full self-consciousness, personality; only thus is he truly Spirit. 2 The
three-fold nature of God is therefore to be found actually in the abstract,
all-inclusive, totale Allgemeinheit of the Absolute Spirit, in the Tinend-
liche Besonderhelt of the finite spirits resulting from Spirit's self-dif-
ferentiation, and in the konkrete Blnselheit of the Spirit resulting from
his eternal reconciliation of spirits with himself. So conceived, the
Trinity expresses for Hegel the innermost essence of the Absolute Spirit*
Gott 1st Geist, d.i. das, was wir dreieinigen Gott
heissen. ... Gott 1st Geist, die absolute TStigkelt,
actus -purus
.
d.i. Subjektivit&t, unendliche Personlich-
keit, unendliche Uhterscheidung von sich selbst, sich
gegenstftndliche, sich objektive G8ttlichkeit .*
B. Corollaries to this View of God
1, The Immanence of God
Certain implications of Hegel's view of the Absolute require further
J
XIV, IB, p. 72.
The completion of religion, says Hegel, consists in this, that
Spirit "sich als seiner selbst bewusster Geist wirklieh und Gegenstand
seines Bewusstseins werde." (II, PDG, p. 437; cf. p. 14.) "Is ist der
Gott, der sich in sich unterscheidet , aber darin mit sich identisch bleibV
(XIV, AH, p. 69. Cf. XII, BR, p. 221.)
J
XIV, AH, p. 72; V, ESC, pp. 482-483. Cf* VIII, PWG, pp. 35-36.
* XIV, AH, p. 57; cf. p. 69; II, PDG, p. 439.
t
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consideration. In the first place, the concrete relation involved "between
Cod and hie world should he carefully noted. The Absolute Spirit is not a
being beyond or abore the world, but immanent, ceaselessly active in it.
1
"Per gOttliche Geist muss das Weltliche immanent durehdringen; so ist die
9
Weisheit konkret darin und seine Berechtigung an ihm selbst bestimmt."
The world is, in fact, nothing other than the developing life of God.
• • • Die Entwicklung Gottes in slch und die Ent-
wieklung dee Universume sind nicht . . . ahsolut ver~
schieden. Gott ist die Wahrhelt, die Subetanz des Uni-
Tersums, nicht bloss eln abstrakt Anderes. Es ist daher
derselhe Stoff ; es ist die intellektuelle gOttliche Welt,
das gOttliche Leben in ihm selbst, das sich entwickelt.
Aber diese Kreise—Tun seines Lebens ist dasselbe als
das Leben der Welt; aber dieses Leben ist nur Erschein-
ung, jenes Leben ist das ewige.
God, therefore, is to be found everywhere. In every process of na-
ture, every thought or deed of man, the eternal activity of the Absoluts
Spirit may be seen. Wherever we look with the spiritual eye, whether at
the planets in their orbits, the overflowing life of the natural world,
the slow, steady advance of world history, or the richly diversified oper-
ations of the living human mind, everywhere we find God,4 "for in him we
live and move and have our being."5
2, The Problem of Suffering6
One of the most distinctive and profound aspects of Hegel* s reli-
gious thought is his interpretation of suffering, the key to Which is his
conception of God. The dialectic which he finds in the Absolute provides
1 XII, BR, pp. 43-44. Cf. above, p. 118.
2 7, SIC, p. 466. This idea of God provides the basis for Hegel*
s
view, already discussed, that worship must eventuate in moral living. Cf.
above, pp. 75-78.
S XII, BR, p. 186; cf. p. 185.4 Cf. Hicolal Hartmann, Hegel , pp. 978-379. A good illustration is
the ethical life. It is not enough, says Hegel, to command giving to Cae-
sar what is Caesar* 8 and to God what is God's, for this sets up a false
separation; actually, Caesar has no rights as opposed to God, for all is
God* s. (7, ENC, p. 466.)
| Acts 17:28.
Cf. above, pp. 82-87,
f
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a ready tool for dealing with the fact of pain, and Hegel usee It with
consummate skill*
Why is there suffering in the world? Because, answers Hegel, there
is tension and opposition in the very nature of God. God is Spirit, and
Spirit eternally negates or differentiates itself. The agony and travail
so frequent in human life are no ephemeral appearance; **der Ernst, der
Schmers, die Geduld und Arheit des Hegativen"
1
characterise the very na-
ture of things* In the heart of God stands an eternal cross.
Already in this insight, however, are to he found the germs of a so*
lution to the problem of evil. For if it is true that the negativity in
God himself is the ground of pain, it is conversely true that pain is a
sign of the presence of God. That there is suffering in God means also
that God is in suffering*
Das Leiden der Seele 1st das Zeugnis von dem Geist,
indem er die HegativitSt 1st vom Endlichen und Unendlich-
en, Subjektivitftt und ObjektivitaVt susammenseiend noch als
diese Widerstreitenden. Ware dieser Streit geschwunden,
so wftre kein Schmers. Der Geist ist die absolute Kraft,
diesen Schmers su ertragen, d.h. beide su vereinigen und
so su sein in dieser Einigkeit* In dem Schmers ist die
Beglaubigung der Erscheinung Gottes.2
This element of negation and opposition in Spirit is fittingly rep-
resented in Christianity in the passion and death of Christ. God partic-
ularises himself, becomes finite. The most extreme degree of finitude and
m
limitation, however, is not mere temporal life, but death; and the most
4
extreme form of death is the dishonorable death of a criminal. Christ,
therefore, not only lives among men, but is despised and rejected of men
\ II, PDG, p. 13; cf* p. 140; IX, PWG, p. 937; above, p. 84.
* XIV, AH, p. 149.
9 XIV, AH, p. 157. Death is "diese hBchste negation, die abstrakt-
este, selbst naturliche, die Senrank e, Endlichkeit in ihrem hQchsten Ex-
tram."4
XIV, AH, pp. 161, 165*
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and dies the ignominious death of the cross. The closing events of his
earthly life are thus not merely the history of a particular individual,
hut the history of nan as nan in his relation to Cod, and even more deep-
ly, the eternal history of Spirit.
1 They symbolise for the religious con-
sciousness the tension and negation in the very nature of God. So con-
ceived, the death of Christ is "das seitliche, vollfcommene Dasein der g8tt-
9
lichen Idee in der Gegenwart." The fearful, terrifying thought, "Gott 1st
gestorben, Gott selbst ist tot," expresses for the imagination "die hoehste
Bntausserung der gOttlichen Idee . • « , den tiefsten Abgrund der Entswei-
ung,"
S
bringing with it the most intense pain, a feeling of complete hope-
lessness and helplessness. For everything which was deemed eternal and
true is itself negated and destroyed.
4
This very negation, however, carries with it the means of its own de-
feat. It is the nature of Spirit to pass through self-externalization to
self-identity. Beyond estrangement lies harmony, beyond division is recon-
ciling love, beyond suffering supreme peace. Love consists essentially in
the spirit of self-sacrifice, in "Aufgeben seiner PersBnlichkeit,"5 Pain
is thus the expression of a love which triumphs over pain. In fact, love
and pain are aspects of the same reality: "Jene ist dleser, der tiefste
Schmers, dieser [jene,] die hOchste Liebe, in Jenem diese."6 Estrangement
and opposition, far from indicating evil or vindictlveness In the nature
I XIV, AE, p. 156.
J
XIV, AH, p. 167.
XIV, AS, pp. 157-168. Cf. II, PDG (3d ed., 1928), pp. 523, 545.
See also the second stanza of the hymn, "0 Traurigkeit, o Herseleid," by
Johaan Hist, which begins, "0 grosse Noti Gott selbst ist tot."
* XIV, AH, p. 167.
6
XIV, AH, p. 158.
XIV, AH, p. 163. Similarly, Hegel speaks of "Liebe aus unendlich-
em Schmers," and of "dem Spekulativen und Negativen des unendlichen
Sehmerses der Liebe." (XIV, AH, pp. 179, 178.)
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of things, actually reveal the supremacy of lore.
The death of Christ, therefore, represents not only the gap between
the finite and the infinite, hut also their fundamental oneness; not only
the pain and travail in the heart of God, hut also his triumphant lore.
In the self-abandonment of the cross, love bursts forth in its full glory.
In suffering the most extreme form of death, Christ manifests the highest
life, 1 a love which transfigures man and elevates him to God, Popularly
it has been said that Christ was sacrificed for us and that his sacrificial
death wins satisfaction for all men. This formulation has justifiably
aroused the objection that each man must answer for his own acts. In the
concrete and speculative sense, however, Christ's death is sufficient for
our salvation, for it simply expresses vorstellungswelse the metaphysical
truth that Spirit through self-externalisation and self-limitation attains
concrete unity in a life of abundant love. Reconciliation is not the par-
ticular act of one individual, but the universal, eternal history of Spirit.
Der Tod ist ttberhaupt ebenso als die hSchste Ver- '
endlichung ebenso dies Aufheben der natttrlichen Endlieh-
ceit, des unmittelbaren Daseins, das Aufheben der Entftus-
serung, die AuflCsung der Sohranke, das Moment des Ceistes,
sieh in sieh su fassen.
. . .
Dieser Tod also, das Leiden,
der Schmers des Todes, der ist dies Element der TersQhn-
ung des Geistes mit sieh, mit dem, was er an sieh ist, ent-
hftlt. ... Dieser Tod ist also genugtuend fflr uns, indem
er die absolute Gesehiehte der gOttlichen Idee darstellt,
das, was an sieh geschehen ist und ewig geschieht.
The paradox of reconciliation through suffering is perfectly symbol-
ised in the absolute religion by the resurrection and ascension of Christ,
which follow his death and would have been impossible without it. Here is
\ XIV, AH, p. 150.
* XIV, AH, pp. 160-161, 166.
3 XIV, AH, pp. 158-159; cf. pp. 177-178. Individuals attain any-
thing only because the nature of Spirit, of which they are parts, makes
such attainment possible. "Dass der einselne Mensch etwas tut, erreicht,
CeinJ Zweck (von ihm] vollbraeht wird, dasu gehBrt, dass die Sache an sieh
in ihrem Begriffe so sieh verhalte." (XIV, AR, p. 159.)
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manifested in ohjective form the death of death, conquest of the grave,
triumph ©Ter the negative. Here God appears ae "both reeonciler and recon-
ciled. Here human nature if lifted to heaven, where the eon of man site at
the right hand of the Father. Han and God are eeen to he one, united in
divine love. 1
God, therefore, ie the Absolute Spirit who attains self-realization
through self-abnegation. He finds himself through losing himself, and
gains his highest life by giving it away. He knows in his own experience
the bitter pain of the cross, hut passes through and beyond it to a triumph
of redeeming love. He is a God who suffers, hut who through suffering
draws all men to himself.
Was uns also dies Leben Christ! sur Vorstellung
hringt, und zwar fttr das empirische, allgemeine und un-
mittelbare Bewusstsein, 1st dieser Prozess der Natur des
Geistes, Gott in menschlicher Gestalt. Dieser (Prozess
1st] in seiner Entwicklung der Fortgang der gBttlichen
Idee sur hOchsten Entsweiung, sum Gegenteil des Schmerz-
es des Todes, welcher selhst die absolute Umkehrung, die
hBehste Liebe, in sich selhst das Negative des Negativen,
die absolute VersBhnung 1st, das Aufheben des Gegensatz-
es der Menschen gegen Gott, und das Bide vorhanden als
AuflBsung in die Herrlichkeit, die gefeierte Aufnahme des
Menschlichen in die g9ttliche Idee 1st. Jenes Srste,
Gott in menschlicher Gestalt, ist er reell in dies em Pro-
zess, der die Trennung der gUttlichen Idee und ihre Wie-
dervereinignng, erst ihre Tollendung als Wahrheit zeigt.
Dies ist das Ganze der Geschichte. 2
C. Appraisal
1. Hegel* s Empirically Founded Rationalism
The critic can hardly fail to be impressed by the way in which He-
gel* s view of God combines loyalty to experience with a confident use of
thought in interpreting that experience. The negativity which Hegel finds
J XIV, AR, p. 163. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 734.2 XIV, AR, pp. 163-164; cf. pp. 139, 166, 203, 205. See also II,
PDG, p. 603, where Hegel writes of the Spirit, "dor in seiner Gemeinde
leht, in ihr ttglieh stirbt und aufersteht;" and Hegel's treatment of sin
from the standpoint of God, above, pp. 91-92.
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at the heart of things le hat another name for the conflict, the frustra-
tion, and the Borrow which bulk so large in normal human life. Likewise,
the reconciliation which for him harmonizes all contradictions in Spirit
reflects faithfully man*s experience of Godf s redeeming love, the deep
peace which broods over the soul of him who, rising above his petty cares
and clashing finite interests, has found God,
1 At the same time, Hegel*
s
view of God would have been impossible had he not gone beyond experience.
There is in his conception a definite and inevitable element of rational
construction. No mere description of the content of consciousness would
yield a God worthy of the name, Hegel builds up, by reasoning on the ba-
sis of experience, the idea of God to which he believes experience points.
He argues that the most reasonable interpretation of the kind of world we
have, with its dual aspects of conflict and reconciliation, suffering and
joy, is that the world is the manifestation of a Spirit whose nature is to
harmonise opposition in his own life, to transcend suffering in triumphant
2
love.
This same interplay of empirical and rational factors lies behind He-
gel's view of the Absolute as personal. As we have seen, through reflec-
tion on the dialectical nature of thought and personality as found in expe-
rience, he concludes that ultimate reality itself is dialectical, and best
described as thinking Personality, Spirit,'
2. Difficulties in Hegel's View
In certain respects, however, Hegel is neither sufficiently empiri-
cal nor satisfyingly rational.
In the first place, his exposition of the Absolute leaves much to be
1 Hegel expresses philosophically the same religious experience which
is voiced in the line, "Earth has no sorrow that Heaven cannot heal." (Hymn,
"Come, Te Disconsolate, n by Thomas Moore and Thomas Hastings. Methodist
Hymnal. H.Y. : Meth. Hk. Concern, 1906. P. 571.)






desired. Again and again he returns to the arguments for the existence of
God, tout nowhere does he offer a clear, detailed treatment of what he
thinks this Cod to be. Only by piecing together scattered and fragmentary
passages can one discoTer what seems to be Hegel* s view, but oren then one
cannot be certain. Otherwise so meticulously systematic, Hegel might rea-
sonably be expected to take particular pains to develop methodically and
coherently his thought of the Absolute, which is the very center of his
system. His failure to do this is a pronounced defect.
Secondly, Hegel gives no adequate account of the ultimate status of
good and evil. It is the universal testimony of Christian experience that
Cod is good. Hegel, however, gives little attention to the place of moral
goodness in the Absolute. It is true that he frequently uses the word love
to refer to Spirit, but love for Hegel commonly involves either an emotion-
al attachment or an intellectual relation. His mature writings nowhere re-
veal a clear recognition of the moral character of love. It is also true
that he definitely ascribes goodness to Cod in saying that in the Absolute
the good is no mere ought but already realised.* Nevertheless, as we have
already seen, Hegel is prevented by the structure of his philosophy as a
whole from giving morality its due place in the life of Cod. For while
art, religion, and philosophy are found in the realm of Absolute Spirit,
morality is limited to that of the objective spirit. The ethical finds its
completion in the morality of the state. This artificial separation of re-
ligion and morality prevents goodness from being truly integral in the
life of the Absolute. Indeed, evil seems to be just as real in Cod as
good. On Hegel* s view, evil is a necessary accompaniment of that self-ne-
1
"Das Cute ist • , . gOttliche Hacht und ewige Wahrheit." (XII, BB,
p. 259: above, p. 80. Cf. also XIV, AB, p. 140.)
* Above, pp. 76-78; cf. p. 177, n. 1.
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gation of Spirit which produces finite spirits. The morally godd, morc-
2
oyer, exists only in conflict with the morally had. Both are necessary
moments in the self-consciousness of God. This, however, runs counter to
the witness of the highest religious experience.
On the rational side* as previously shown* this coexistence of good
and evil in the Absolute Personality involves an insoluble contradiction.
Hegel affirms that the Absolute, as Absolute, is what it ought to be, per*
4
feetly good; as particular finite self, however, it is sinful. Any given
act is thus at once both good and evil. This is unthinkable. Either,
therefore, the Absolute is ethically defective, or human sin is an illusion.
Either alternative entails the surrender of a definite element in Hegel*
s
view of God.
A further defect grows out of Hegel* s view that the Absolute attains
full self-consciousness in man. 5 This process has two sides, the logical
and the chronological. Prom the standpoint of the former, Hegel's meaning
is clear: it is the nature of Spirit to exist not only subjectively, but
also objectively in finite spirits; apart from this self-object ification,
the Absolute is not truly Spirit. The historical aspect, however, is more
difficult to conceive. Spirit begins as abstract idea and gradually grows
to maturity in the long, slow advance of the evolutionary process, becom-
ing fully conscious only with the appearance of man. From the standpoint
of eternity, therefore, the Absolute is perfect, while from the point of
view of time it grows with the years, from imperfect abstraction to con-
1
"Dies negative Gottes 1st das TTbel, das BQse flberhaupt. Diese Be-
stlmmung 1st ebenso absolutes Moment in dem Gansen der Religion." XII, BR,
p. 162. Cf. XIV, AR, p. 140; and above, p. 92.
J XIV, BDG, p. 171.
J Cf. above, pp. 81-82, 94-96, 148.
? XII, BR, p. 259.
Cf. above, pp. 85, 178, 179.
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Crete, self-conscious Personality. In spit* of his bold and skillful at-
tempt through the use of the dialectic, 1 Hegel is unable satisfactorily
to reconcile the two points of view. The sane Absolute cannot be logi-
cally perfect and chronologically imperfect.
If the self-realisation of the Spirit in history is construed the-
istically to mean simply the progressive realisation of the divine pur-
poses, which find their fulfillment in a society of distinct persons, a
kingdom of God, the difficulty is removed. On this view the imperfect
primitive minds which gradually emerge are not identical with the Absolute,
and God's perfection is unimpaired* But this solution is not open to He*
gel. The Absolute is the primitive minds, and so, imperfect*
1 Cf. the general plan of Hegel's philosophy of religion, above, pp.
51-47.




HEGEL'S VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONALITY
"Der Geist," writes Hegel, "existiert nicht als ein Abstraktum, son-
dern als die vielen Geister."1 The Absolute by nature particularises it-
self into finite spirits, human beings. It is the purpose of the present
chapter to inquire into the precise nature and status, In Hegel's view, of
these finite individuals.
I. The Nature of the Finite Person
According to Hegel, the religious man may be viewed in two ways, as
particular subject, and as a moment in the total life of the Absolute.
The finite individual is at once a unique center of conscious life and an
aspect of the divine consciousness.
A. Man as Individual Subject
Nowhere in his Philosophie der Religion does Hegel give an adequate
account of the individual as such. In his "Philosophic des Geistes," how-
ever, under the heading, "Der subjektive Geist," he sets forth in system-
atic form his view of the particular human mind. Subjective mind has for
Hegel three phases: soul, consciousness, and mind, which form respectively
the subject-matter of anthropology, phenomenology of mind, and psychology.
Subjective mind an sich, or in its immediacy, is soul or natural mind.
The soul has three moments: natural soul, feeling soul, and real soul. The
natural soul is soul in general merely as existing, characterized mainly by
sensitivity ( Empfindung ) . the primitive movement of the mind by which it
partakes of bodily life. The feeling soul is an individualised center of
feeling, a particular subject distinguished sharply from other subjects by
its own unique and habitual combination of feelings. The real soul is the
1 XIV, BDG, p. 83.
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habitual identity of inward self-feeling with the hodily form through
which
the inner feeling expresses itself,
1
Consciousness is the mind in its effort to relate the content of the
soul and raise its own self-certainty to the status of truth. There are
three stages in this process: consciousness as such, self-consciousness,
and reason. Consciousness as such is characterized hy the fact that it
has an object. It includes the sensual consciousness, the immediate cer-
tainty of particulars of sense; perception, which relates sense-particu-
lars "by means of general thought-determinations; and understanding, which
formulates laws of the world of appearance. The truth and foundation of
consciousness is self-consciousness, in which the ego is its own object.
Consciousness of any object, in fact, is self-consciousness; I know the
object as my object, that is, I know myself. Self-consciousness includes
desire, recognition of one's self as free and as existing for other selves,
and universal self-consciousness, that affirmative knowledge of one's self
in others which is the substance of every social and spiritual relation.
The unity of consciousness and self-consciousness is reason, through which
the mind recognizes the content of its object as identical with itself and
itself as self-determined. It rises above the differences of individual
2
conscious subjects to objective and universal truth.
Soul and consciousness find their completion in mind, which has three
aspects: theoretical mind, practical mind, and free mind. The theoretical
mind is a concrete unity of three ways of knowing: perception, representa-
tion, and thought. Perception is intelligence operating under the forms
of space and time, thereby discerning itself in the external world and the
external world in itself. Representation is remembered perception (erin-
1 V, ENC, pp. 339-369.
2 V, ENC, pp. 369-380.
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ncrto Anschauung ). intelligence externalising itself while remaining with-
in itself; it takes the forms of recollection ( Erinnertmg ) , imagination,
and memory (Gedlchtnis). Thought is intelligence knowing in itself its own
product, the universal, the identity of the subjective and the object ire,
reason existing as the activity of the subject. What is thought, is, and
what is, is only as it is thought
•
As free intelligence, self-determining and self-fulfilling, the mind
is practical mind or will. This self-determination of the will takes three
forms: that of practical feeling, the immediate and formal determination
in which the content, though the same as that of reason, represents only
the contingent will of an individual subject; that of free choice between
particular inclinations and passions which are also afflicted with contin-
gency and subjectivity} and that of felicity ( Glftckscl igkelt ) » the univer-
sal truth and ideal good of all particular satisfactions, which, however,
remains a mere ought because subjective inclinations are still decisive.
The opposition of theoretical and practical mind is reconciled in
the concrete wholeness of the free mind, the free will which is fttr sigh,
in that the merely particular will is purified of all its formalism, con-
tingency, and limitation and elevated to universal determination, true free-
dom. On this level the will is free intelligence, which through thought
has as its end not a purely subjective but a universal content,*
B. Man as Spirit in Finite Form
For Hegel, however, man is more than a particular center of free in-
| telligence; he is also and fundamentally a moment in the life of the Abso-
lute itself. According to the structure of the "Philosophic des Geistes,"
the finite Individual is simply Spirit on its first or notional level*
1 V, ESC, pp. 380-418,
tt
Spirit must externalize itself in human institutions (e.g., the family,
the state) as objektlvor Geist . and return to itself as absoluter Geist. 1
The same Geist is present in each of the three stages. In the last anal-
ysis, therefore, the particular subject is not a unique consciousness, but
an aspect of and identical with the Absolute.
Throughout the Philosophic der Religion the same Tie* of man prevails
though the fact that religion falls entirely in the sphere of the Absolute
Spirit makes the dialectical scheme somewhat different. Here human person-
ality is "endlicher Gelst," "das endliche Bewusstseln," "der Geist in der
9
Bestimnung der Endl ichkeit . " Human individuals are but the Absolute man-
ifesting itself in finite form. As such, they are not separate entities,
but integral parts of the one Absolute Spirit which alone is truly real.
The only true idea of man is that which regards him as "Moment Gottes in
seinem ewigen Sein, Moment der Manifestation."3 Beality is ultimately not
many, but one, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Hegel insists
dass es nicht zweierlei Vernunft und sweierlei Geist
geben kann, nieht eine gBttliche Vernunft und eine
menschliche, die nach ihrem Kern und den Wei sen Ihr-
er TStigkeit schleehthin voneinander rerschieden
waren. Die Vernunft des Menschen, das Bewusstsein
seines Wesens, 1st Vernunft ftberhaupt, ist eben das
GBttliche im Menschen, und ... Gott ist gegenwtrt-
ig und ale Geist im Geiste und in den Geistern.*
C. The Relation of Man and God in Beligion
Religion, then, is not so much a communion between two distinct re-
alities, man and God, as a union of two sides or aspects of the same real-








» P. "I; XIII, RGI, p. 49; cf. XIV, AR, p. 96.
f XIV, AR, p. 102; of. p. 7.
* XII, BR, p. 43.
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ist der Geist als allgemeiner Geist, und anderseits 1st das Fursicheein
des Menschen, das Fursichsein dea einselnen Individuoms, m1 The Absolute
is no merely abstract One, but an infinite Spirit who through lore partic-
ularises himself into finite spirits whom he reconciles to himself,
Geist ist dies, nieht unmittelbar zu sein, sondern
sich gegenstlndlich. Geist ist fdr den Geist, so dass
beide untersehieden sind; sie sind bestimmt gegeneinander
,
der eine ale allgemeiner, der andere als besonderer, der
eine als innerlieher, der andere als tusserlicher, deg
eine als unendlicher, der andere als endlicher Geist.
Inasmuch as man is as spirit the image of God, he is an sich good,
that is, good according to his inmost nature, his idea. In reality, how-
ever, since he is the external! sation of God and in this sense separate
from God, he is also naturally evil, 3 In so far, therefore, as the indi-
vidual persists in following his own passions and particular finite inter-
ests, he sins, and is estranged from the Absolute Spirit of which he is a
part. In this way arises the need of reconciliation,* which occurs in re-
ligion. Here man becomes conscious of the truth of his relation to God,
and knows himself to be not only finite but also infinite.5 Realizing that
as spirit he is truly one with the Absolute Spirit, he annuls the merely
limited and particular in his nature and elevates himself to God. 6 Thus
the reconciliation of spirit and Spirit is effected.
In the last analysis, however, the whole movement is the work of the
Absolute Spirit, whose nature it is to pass through opposition to unity
with itself. Spirit is "der lebendige Prosess, dass die an sich seiende
I XIV, AH, p. 207.
J XIV, AH, p. 14.
J XIV, AH, pp. 114-115.
* XIX, AH, p. 29.
8 XIV, AH, p. 46.
6 XIV, AH, pp. 207-209.
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Einheit der g&ttlichen und menschlichen Natur fttr eich, daea aie herrorge-
bracht werde,"1 What happena in tha human aubject ia really "die Geechichte
2
der gBttlichen Idee am endlichen Geiet." Man aimply enjoye (genieast) or
experiences what God accompli shea in him. It ia "der g&ttliche Geiat . . .,
der die Wiedergeburt bewirkt."5 Hence man* a knowledge of God ia actually
God* a knowledge of himaelf in man, or what Hegel calle "common knowledge,"
Daaa der Menach Ton Gott weiss, 1st nach der wes-
entlichen Gemeinachaft ein gemeinachaftlichee Wiaaen,—-
d.i, der Menach weiaa nur von Gott, inaofern Gott im
Menachen Ton 8ich aelbet weias; diea Wiasen iat Selbet-
hewusataein Gottea, aber ebenso ein Wiasen deaaelhen
Tom Menachen, nnd diea Wiaaen Gottea Tom Menachen iat
Wiasen dea Menachen Ton Gott, Der Geiat dea Menachen,
Ton Gott su wiaaen, iat irar der Geiat Gottea eelbet.
Ultimately, therefore, the human eubject of religion ia one with its
divine object, for it ia itself an aspect of God, The Absolute Spirit ia
5
his own object, "Der Geiat iat identiach mit dam Geiate," The eigene
Boatlmmnng of religion ia,
daaa der Geiet nur iat fttr den Geist. Ea let unser-
trennlich der allgemeine nnd der einselne Geiet, der
nnendliche nnd der endllche; ihre abeolnte Identitttt
let die Religion, 6
1 XIV, AH, p. 58,
2 XIV, AH, p. 95.
J XIY, AH, p. 207,4 XIV, BDG, p, 117. Cf. XII, BH, p. 150; XIII, RGI, p. 109; Hohl,
TJS, p. 289, Ae might be expected, Hegel has difficulty in defining the
precise relation between God and man in each a way as to preserve both
their difference and their unity, Queatione ariee, he pointa out, con-
cerning human freedom, the connection between man* a individual knowledge
and the knowledge which he has in common with God, and so on. However,
he makes no effort to answer these questions at the time, eince they are
not the aubject primarily under conaideration (the coamological argument).
One looke in vain elsewhere in Hegel* a writings for a satisfactory treat-
ment of such problems. Cf, below, pp. 212-213.
J XIV, AH, p. 15.6 XIV, AH, p. 15.
$t » * \
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This absolute identity it best realised in the religions coamunity,
the Gemeinde . Here the tme indiTidnality of the diTine Idea, typified
first in one man, Christ, perfects itself through joining many indlTiduals
in the unity of the Spirit.
1
[per] Geist erfflllt seine Gemeinde; dies Qcommt
hier] sum Bcwusstsein, dass jeder Dieser Glied der Ge-
meinde, d.h. Gott in ihm und er in Gott let. 2
II. The Status of the Finite Individual
A view which treats the finite person as a moment in the life of God
would seem to deprive the human individual of its own distinctive signifi-
cance by merging it in the personality of the Absolute. If the Absolute
is all that truly is, what remains of man? It is not surprising, there-
fore, that Hegel has been charged with destroying the uniqueness of the fi-
nite self.' We have now to inquire how far this conclusion is justified.
Is it true that Hegel's universal Spirit swallows up particular finite
spirits? What is the precise status of the individual in Hegel's religious
thought?
A. Hegel's High Estimate of Human Personality
One of the first things to impress the student of this problem is
the abundant evidence in Hegel's works of a high estimate of human person-
ality. Both his world-view in general and his interpretation of religious
history in particular reveal an exceptional appreciation of the worth of
finite selves.
1. The Significance of Personality in Hegel's Idealism
Strange as it may seem, the very concept which appears to submerge
1 XIV, AH, p. 164. "Die Gemeinde sind die einselnen empirischen
Subjekte, die im Geist e Gottes sind." (XIV, AB, p. 194.)
| XIV, AB, p. 209; cf. p. 29; II, PDG (3d sd.), p. 642.3 Cf. above, pp. 5, 9, IS.
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men serves in Hegel* 3 hands to exalt them. A high estimate of human be-
ings is an integral element in his absolute idealism. This estimate he
finds to he well grounded both empirically and rationally.
Bnpirically, it is supported by the observation that personality is
the noblest thing in our experience.
In der panten SchBpfung ist vor All em der Mensch
erhaben; er ist das Wissende, Erkennende, Denkende: er
ist so in einem gans andern Sinne das Ebenbild Gottes,
als dies Ton der Welt gilt.1
Rationally, belief in the value of personality is based on several
considerations, all of which grow out of Hegel* s basic world-view. In the
first place v not only man, but all reality, is spiritual; nothing exists
which is not in consciousness. As conscious persons, human beings partake
of the nature of ultimate reality itself. This invests them with immeasur-
able significance.
Alles, was das menschliche Leben susammenh&lt , was
Wert hat und gilt, ist geister Natur; und dies Belch des
Geistes existiert allein durch das Bewusstsein von Wahr-
heit und Becht, durch das Erfass en der Ideen.
Moreover, because of this ultimate spirituality of things, the human
mind is capable of attaining truth. Such a mind is possessed of infinite
worth.
Der Mut der Wahrheit, Glauben an die llacht des
Geistes, ist die erste Bedlngung des philosophischen
Stadiums ; der Mensch soil sich selbst ehren und sich
des HBchsten wOrdig achten. Von der GrBsse und Macht
des Geistes kann er nicht gross genug denken. Das
verschlossene Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in
sich, welche dem Mute des Erkennens Widerstand leist-
en kBnnte: es muss sich vor ihm auftun und seinen
Beichtum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen und sum
\ XIII, BGI, p. 84.2 V, ENC, p. LXXVI.
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Genus s e bringen.
1 further indication of the eignificance of personality for Hegel is
his recognition that ideas are nothing apart from persons. In apprehending
truth, the finite mind begins with immediacy and, passing from the sensual
to the infinite, raises itself to the level of universal thought. This
does not mean, however, that the mind is subordinate to some impersonal
thought. Quite the contrary is true. Thought exists only as a spiritual
movement. The finite mind is actually
nicht das Beeultat des Denkens, sondem das Denken ist
nur duroh die Bewegung des Geist es, durch das Erheben.
Der Geist ist an sich die Erhebung. 2
No idea is more than a barren abstraction if it does not exist in conscious-
ness. "Die wahre Wissenschaft ist . . . auf dem offenen Pelde des Bewusst-
seine." 3 Hegel cites the ideas of religion and law as examples.
So ist es der Beligion wesentlich, nicht in ihrem
Begriffe nur su sein, sondem das Bewusstsein dessen su
sein, was der Begriff ist. Das Material nun, worin sich
der Begriff gleichsam als der Plan ausfflhrt, das er sich
su eigen macht und sich gemftss bildet, ist das mensch-
llche Bewusstsein . Ebenso ist s.B. such das Becht nur,
indem es im Geist e exist iert, den Will en der Henschen
einnimmt und sie von ihm als der Bestimmung ihres Will-
ens wissen, 4
2. The Christian Recognition of Free Personality
Hegel* s specifically religious thought reveals a similarly high con-
ception of man. While for him the history of religion traces, on the one
1 V, ENC
, p. LXXVI; JUB, XVII, GBP, p. 22. In "Der Geist des Christ-
entums und sein Schieksal," Hegel expresses essentially the same idea in
mystical terms: "In jedem Henschen selbst ist das Licht und Leben, er ist
das Elgenturn des Licht s; und er wlrd von einem Lichte nicht erleuohtet, wie
ein dflnkler KBrper, der nur fremden Giant trftgt, sondern sein eigner Feuer-
stoff gerftt im Brand, und ist eine eigene Flamme. • • • Ber Glauben an das
GOttliche stasmt also aus der GBttlichkeit der eignen Natur; nur die Modi-
fikatlon der Gotthelt kann sie erkennen." (Nohl, TJS, p. 313; of. p. 289.)
1 XIV, IB, p. 91.
2 IX, PWG, p. 569.
* XII, BB, p. 71. Cf. above, p. 178.
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hand, the Absolute* 8 attainment of complete self-consciousness , it re-
cords, on the other, the gradual emergence of free personality in man.
One important respect in which Christianity is superior is its recogni-
tion that man as man is a free spirit capable of willing universal ends.
Hegel criticises adversely the low estimate of man to he found in cer-
tain non-Christian religions and commends enthusiastically Christian-
ity's recognition of the infinite value of the human soul.
a. The Low View of Han in Non-Christian Religions
In China, writes Hegel, the religion of Fo sets up as the highest
perfection contempt for personal existence, 1 and the ancestor-worship
and emperor-worship of the native religion involve a humiliating subjec-
tion of the individual which expresses itself in such practices as slav-
ery, wife-purchase, child-exposure, and frequent suicide. "Dem Mensch-
2
en, der rein moralisches Innere hat, ist auch das Leben nichts wert."
Likewise in Indian pantheism man is stripped of free personality.
Everything in the world is worshiped as God: sun, moon, stars, beasts,
3flowers, trees, the Granges, the Himalayas, human reason, and so on.
Man* s distinctive worth is destroyed by a view which regards parrots,
cows, apes, and elephants also as incarnations of God. Human life in
India is "etwee Verachtetes, Geringgeschtttztes , es gilt nicht mehr als
ein Schlucx Wassers." Suicides, widow-burning, and child-sacrifice are
the natural result. Rows of women plunge into the Ganges at festivals,
not through bravery, but because life is to them so worthless.5 "Das
Moralische, das in der Achtung eines Menschenlebens liegt, ist bei den
1 IX, PWG, pp. 528-551.
\ IX. PWG, p. 509; cf. p. 506.
? XIII, NR, pp. 161-162, 156.
XIII, NR, p. 180; cf. pp. 169-170.




In the Socratic dictum, "Know thyself," Greece advances far toward
a true estimate of personality. Nevertheless, the Naturelement is still
present in the Greek view of spirit, with the result that human subjec-
tivity is "noch nicht in ihrer Tiefe erfasst" and nder menschliche Geist
noch nicht ahsolut berechtigt."2 The low status of women and the prev-
alence of slavery show that individuals are not yet judged according to
their true worth.
In the Roman world the value of "PersSnlichkeit , der unendliche
Wert des Individuume," is recognised in the right granted to all per-
sons as persons to own property. Yet individuals even here are valued
only abstractly, i.e., merely as owners. Moreover, they themselves are
the property of the emperor, so that their property rights are such on-
4
ly in appearance. Home's low estimate of individual worth is shown in
its acceptance of slavery and child-exposure, but most of all, perhaps,
in the ruthless slaughter of human beings involved in the gladiatorical
combats, which were held not to serve any ethical purpose, but for the
sheer amusement of the populace.
Dies kalte Morden ist es, was die Nicht igkeit
der menschlichen Individual itftt , und weil diese keine
Sittlichkeit in sich hat, die Wert los igkeit des In-
dividuums anschauen lftsst. 5
b. The Worth of the Individual in Christianity
Only in Christianity is man as man seen to possess infinite worth.
In its doctrines of incarnation and redemption Christianity expresses
\ IX, PWG, p. 409.
\ IX, PWG, pp. 723, 598.
T IX, PWG, p. 723.
* XIII, BGI, pp. 234-236; IX, PWG, p. 724.
&




the idea that every human soul is "both the object ificat ion of God and
"basically one with God. This relationship imparts an inestimable value
to all htunan individuals.
Durch die christliche Religion ist also die abso-
lute Idee Gottes in ihrer Wahrheit bum Bewusstsein ge-
kommen, worein ebenso der Mensch nach seiner wahrhaft-
en Natur, die in der bestinmten Anschauung des Sohnes
gegeben ist, sich selbst aufgenommen findet. Der Mensch,
als endlicher fur sich betrachtet, ist sugleich auch
Ebenbild Gottes und Quell der Unendlichkeit in ihm
selbst; er ist Selbstiweck, hat in ihm selbst unend-
lichen Wert und die Bestimmung sur Ewigkeit.
In Christianity, in short, man is seen in his true universality,
&e a being of infinite significance. Han as man is invested with a mor-
9
al dignity before unknown.
c. Man as Free Spirit
Where man as man is seen to be infinitely valuable, he is also
seen to be free. Only free personality can be truly worthful. The idea
of freedom, says Hegel, arose in Christianity, in which
das Individuum als solches einen unendlichen Wert hat,
indem es Gegenstand und Zweck der Liebe Gottes, dasu
bestimmt ist, su Gott als Geist sein absolutes Verhttlt-
nis, diesen Geist in sich wohnen eu haben, d.i. dass
der Mensch an sich sur hBchsten Freiheit bestimnt ist.
Practically, therefore, true Christianity condemns all forms of slavery;
theoretically it views all men as self-determining agents.
4
"Wo Christentum wirklich ist, kann Sklaverei nicht stattfinden."
In the Christian view all men express the divine idea, and all have
equal rights; the enslavement of one by another thus becomes unthink-
able and impossible6 in a genuinely Christian civilization. Man is
J IX, PWG, p. 745. Cf. XIV, BDG, p. 168.2
IX, PWG, p. 745. Cf. V, ENC , pp. 417-418; XIV, AH, pp. 150-131,
J V, ETC, pp. 417-418.




auf ganz allgemeine Weise in G-ott angeschaut; jeder
Einselne 1st ein Gegenstand der Gnade Gottes und des
gCttlichen Endzwecks: Gott will, dass alle Menschen
selig werden, Cans ohne alle Part ikularitat, an und
fflr sich hat also der Mensch, und zwar schon ale Mensch,
unendlichen Wert, tmd eben dieaer unendliche Wert hebt
alle Fart ikularitftt der Geburt und dee Vaterlandes auf.
Kr gilt nicht als Jude oder Grieche, als Wohl- oder
Schlechtgeborener, aondern als Mensch* 1
Purthermore, where the Christian principle dominates man is recog-
nised as a self-determining agent • The morality of chance and whim gives
way before an inward morality, the principle of which is independent sub-
jectivity. When subjective freedom enters, unreflected morality flees*
Greek freedom was chance and "genius;" in Christianity true freedom
arises* Here
tritt das Prinzip der absoluten Freiheit in Gott auf*
Der Mensch 1st jetzt nicht mehr im Verhftltnis der Ab-
hSngigkeit, sondern der Liebe, in dem Bewusstsein,
dass er dem g9ttlichen Wesen angehOrt. In Ansehung
der particularen Zwecke best inert jetzt der Mensch sich
selber und weiss sich als allgemelne Macht alles End-
lichen. Alles Besondere tritt gegen den geistigen
Boden der Innerllehkeit zurttck, die sich nur gegen den
gOttlichen Geist aufhebt* Dadurch fftllt aller Aber-
glaube der Orakel und des Tcgelfluges fort; der Mensch
ist als die unendliche Macht des Entsenilessens aner-
kannt. 2
While the principle of the worth and freedom of personality was in
Christianity at the very beginning, its full significance was not real-
ised until the dawn of modern times*' It was not until the Protestant
Reformation that humanity, emancipated through the influence of Christi-
anity, could exhibit that free universality Which is its essence. Into
a world in which religion had become external, hypocritical, and corrupt,
and in which the remission of sins could be purchased, came the movement
1 IX, PWG, p. 745.
2 IX, PWG, p. 746.
8 VIII, PWG, p. 39.
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which turned religion and life back to that spiritual inwardness which
it implicit in the Christian principle, A simple monk, Martin Luther,
was the type of this fulfillment.
Er hat in seinem Geiste die Vollendung gesucht
und hervorgebracht und hat das Dieses, das die Chriat-
enheit Tormals in einem irdischen, steinernen Grabe
suchte, vielmehr in dem tieferen Grabe der absoluten
Idealit&t alles Sinnlichen und lusserlichen, in dem
Geiste gefunden und in dem Hereon geseigt.
The Reformation attained the insight that man in his very nature is
2
meant to be free. Theoretically, personality here came into its own,
Hegel* s recognition of the worth of free personality finds classic
expression in his criticism of the Crusades, The main error of the Cru-
saders, he holds, lay in their external motives; they journeyed to the
Holy Land, many of them in blind enthusiasm and disorder, in search of
a thing, not of a living spiritual reality. Yet through the Crusades,
misguided and disastrous though they were, Christendom learned a lesson.
It discovered that the divine was not to be found in such dead objects
as cups and sepulchres, but within the personal life of man himself.
The ultimatum of Christian truth was not to be found at the grave. At
the sepulchre Christianity received the same answer as the disciples who
sought there the body of Christ: HWhy seek ye the living among the dead?
He is not here, but is risen,
"
Das Prinsip surer Religion habt ihr nicht im Sinn-
lichen, im Grabe bei den Toten eu suchen, sondern im
lebendigen Geiste bei euch selbst,
. , , Die Christen-
heit hat das leere Grab, nicht aber die Verknflpfung des
Welti ichen und Ewigen gefunden und das heilige Land des-
halb verloren. Sie ist praktisch enttttuscht worden, und
das Besultat, das sie mitbrachte, war von negativer Art:
1 IX, F0G, p. 878, Cf. Hohl, TJS, p, 194,
2
"Dies ist der wesentliche Inhalt der Reformation; der Uensch ist
durch sich selbst bestimmt, frei su sein," ( IX, FWG, p, 882,)





war, das s nftnlich fttr das Dieses, das gesucht wards,
nur das subjektive Bewusstsein und kein ftusserlicb.es
Ding das natftrliche Dasein 1st, dass das Dieses, als
das Verknttpfende des Weltliehen und Ewigen, das geist-
ige Ftlrsichsein der Person 1st. So gewinnt die Welt
das Bewusstsein, dass der Mensch das Dieses, das gtJtt-
lieher Art 1st, in sich selbst suchen mflsse: dadureh
wird die Subjektivitttt absolut berechtigt und hat an
sich selbst die Bestimmung des VerhSltnisses sum GOtt-
lichen. Auf eine sinnliche Weise kann die Wahrheit der
Beligion nicht erlangt werden; sie ist ein Geistiges
und kann nur im Geiste gefasst werden. Diese Krkennt-
nis ist das Vorffttglichste, das absolute Resultat der
Kreussftge. • • • Von hier fftngt die Zeit des Selbst-
rertrauens, der Selbsttfttigkeit an. Das Abendland hat
on Horgenland am heiligen Grabe auf ewig Absehied ge-
nommen und sein Prinzip der subjektiven unendliehen
Freiheit erfasst.*
In short, the truth about life and reality is to be found not in
the external world of nature, but in the inner life of the soul of man*
Nature is bound by necessity, but "das Beieh des Geistes ist das Beioh
2
der Freiheit." If we would know the truth and be made free, let us
look within.
3. Hegel* s Belief in Immortality
Further evidence of Hegel's high estimate of human individuality
is found in his belief in inmortality. Most modern critics, it is true,
have denied such a belief in Hegel. In view of the philosopher's own
words, however, this denial is untenable. Hegel's conviction that hu-
man life is eternal is shown alike in his own positive statements and
in his censure of those religions which lack the idea.
For Hegel, belief in immortality is the natural counterpart of be-
lief in the worth of man. Each implies and complements the other.
"Diese Absolutheit. Unendlichkeit des Selbstbewusst seine ist in der Vor-
3
stellung und Lehre der Unsterbliehkeit der Seele." As free and infi-
IX, PWG, pp. 849-650.
V, BHC, p. LXXVI. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 32.
XII, BB, p. 162; cf. p. 234*
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nitely valuable, the human spirit is also immortal.
The secret of this connection is man's relation to the Absolute*
Both the worth and the immortality of man depend on his kinship with
God. Concretely, to say that man has "unendlichen Wert" and is wabso-
lut frei" means just this: "Der einselne Hensch sel der absolute Gegen-
stand der Liebe Gottes, die Seele sei an und fdr sich, ewig in sich
selber, es sei Gott urn das Subjekt su tun."
Ultimately, therefore, human immortality is grounded in the char-
acter of God. As members of the Absolute Spirit, finite spirits are
eternal. Kan,
indem er sich in Gott weiss. weiss ... damit sein
unverg&ngliches Leben in Gott, er weiss von der Wahr-
heit seines Seins; hier tritt also die Vorstellung
yon der Unsterbl ichkeit der Seele als ein wesentliches
Moment in die Geschichte der Religion ein. Die Vor-
etellungen Ton Gott und von der Unsterblichkeit haben
eine notwendige Besiehung aufeinander: wenn der Menech
wahrhaft von Gott weiss, so weiss er auch wahrhaft von
sich. 2
Hegel means essentially the same thing when he says that man is
immortal through knowledge. Man's unique relation to God is a conscious
relation, resting on his ability as a thinking being to know God.
Fur als denkend ist er keine sterbliche, tier-
ische, sondern eine reine, freie Seele. Das Erken-
nen, Denken ist die Wursel seines Lebens, seiner Un-
sterblichkeit als Total it fit in sich selbst. Bie tier-
ische Seele ist in die Korperlichkeit versenkt, da-
gegen der Geist ist Totalitftt in sich selbst. 3
No less conclusive as indicating Hegel* s belief in immortality is
his criticism of those religions which do not teach it. For example, he
point 8 out that immortality in Indian religion is nothing more than a
vague metamorphosis in which the individual is ultimately annihilated.
J
XII, BR, p. 264. Cf. XIV. AE, p. 110; IX, PflTG, p. 738.
j: XIII, SB, pp. 7-8.3 XIV, AB, p. 129. Cf. XIV, BDG, p. 116.
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Dies HBchste 1st dort nicht eine Affirmation,
Fortdauer, sondern Nirwana, ©in Zuetand der Vernicht-
ung des Affirmativen, cin affirmativ Scheinendee, fthn-
lich mit Brahn su sein. Diese Ident ittt mit Srahm ist
aber sugleich das Zerfl lessen in jene swar affirmatir
scheinende, doch durchaus in sich beetimmungslose, un-
TLnt erschiedene Einheit.
Egyptian religion remedies this difficulty. In it
das HBchste des Bewusstscins ist die Subjektivitftt als
solehe; diese ist Totalitftt und rermag selbstftndig in
sich ru. sein. • • Diese Bestimmang der Subjektivitftt
,
die objektiv ist und dem Objektiven, dem Gotte zukoramt,
ist aaoh die Bestimmung des subjektiven Selbstbewusst-
seins in der Weise der Unsterblichkeit . Dieses weiss
sich als Subjekt, als Totalitftt und wahrhafte Selbst-
ftndigkeit und damit als unsterblich.
In Judaism, God is viewed abstractly as the One* Man* a relation
to Jehovah is one not of freedom, but of servile obedience to an exter-
nal power. Because of this lack of freedom the Hebrews did not believe
3
in immortality.
Die hohe Bestimmung des Geistes ist aber die,
dass er ewig und unsterblich ist; doch ist diese
Eoheit des Menschen, • • • das Bewusstsein der Un-
sterblichkeit des Geistes in dieser Beligion noch
nicht vorhanden.
In Christianity, however, where the individual is seen in his true
relation to God to be free and infinitely valuable, he is regarded as
immortal. "Die Seele, die einselne Subjektivitftt hat eine unendliche,
ewige Bestimmung, Burger im Reiehe Gottes zu sein."5
Abstractly conceived, immortality is endless duration in time, an
elevation above the power and the vicissitudes of change. 6 As a sepa-
J XIII, HR, p, 219.Z XIII, NE, p, 219.
* XIII, BGI, p. 97; cf. p. 106.
* XIII, RGI, p. 88; cf. p. 98.
J XIV, AB, p. 178.6 XII, BB, p. 234.
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rate, unitary center of consciousness, man is conscious of his freedom,
his "gans ahstrakter Freiheit." This consciousness is his "unendliches
Beisichsein," "reines Insichsein."
1
The human subject is seen to hare
absolute importance as an object of God's interest;
denn es ist fflr sich seiendes Selbstbewusstsein, Es
ist als die reine Gewissheit seiner in sich selbst;
es existiert in ihm der Punkt unendlicher Subjektivi-
tftt: es ist swar abstrakt, aber abstrakt an und fflr
sich Sein. Dies kommt in der Gestalt hervor, dass
der Mensch als Geist unsterblich ist, Kber die End-
lichkeit, AbhSngigkeit t liber Sussere Umstttnde erhab-
en, dass er die Frelheit ist, von allem su abstra-
hieren. 2
Human self-consciousness, however, is not only self-identical and
separate, but also integrally related to the Absolute, It is
ewiges, absolutes Moment in dem ewigen Leben. • * ,
in welches es fiber die Zeit, dieses Abstraktum der
VerSnderung, und fiber das Beale der Verflnderung,
fiber die Entsweiung hinaus entrflckt wird.
Seen in its concreteness, therefore, immortality is eternal life in unity
and reconciliation with the Absolute Spirit*
The words mortal and immortal do not, like combustible and incom-
bustible, refer to a possibility Which comes to an object from without,
but rather to a condition within*
Die Bestimmung vom Sein ist
, . . affirmativ be-
st immte Qualitttt, die es jetzt schon an ihm hat* So
muss bei der Unsterbliehkeit der Seele nicht vorge-
stellt werden, dass sie erst spBter in Wirklichkeit
trete; sie ist gegenwSrtige Qualitftt. Der Geist ist
ewig. also deshalb schon gegenwftrtig; der Geist in
seiner Freiheit ist nicht im Kreiee der Beschrflnkt-
heit. Fflr inn als denkend, rein wis send ist das All-
gemeine Gegenstand, dies ist die Ewigkeit**
\ XIV, AH, p. 110; XIV, BDG, p. 116.
\ XIV, AH. p. 110.
7 XII, BH, p. 254. Cf. XIV, AH, p* 178.




Abstractly, as opposed to finitude and transit oriness, immortality
is endless life in the future. Concretely and truly, it is an eternally
present quality transcending time and change. Abstractly, it is ever-
lasting self-identity. Concretely, it is constant awareness of the uni-
versal, eternal life in union with Cod.
Of Hegel's belief in immortality no doubt can remain. Moreover,
it is clear that the immortality which he affirms is personal and indi-
vidual. In Indian religion it is the merging of the individual into the
undifferentiated unity of the Absolute which precludes, in Hegel's opin-
ion, any true conception of immortality. In Christianity, on the con-
trary, it is "die Seele," "die einselne Subjektivitftt," Hder einselne
Mensch" as a "Total itftt in sich selbst" who is a citizen of the eternal
kingdom of Cod. In thus proclaiming personal immortality, Hegel carries
to its logical conclusion his idea of the infinite value of the human
soul.
8. Difficulties in Hegel's Yiew of the Individual
Few thinkers have proclaimed so vigorously as Hegel the worth of
personality. His world-view which makes man akin to the Absolute, his
enthusiastic support of the Christian exaltation of free personality,
and his belief in personal immortality all reveal a clear recognition of
the significance of the human individual. Tet there are difficulties in
his view of man which cannot be overlooked.
1. The Metaphysical Identity of Man and Cod
In the first place, Hegel's ultimate identification of man and Cod
prevents him from doing full justice to man. His metaphysics of the Ab-
solute is a two-edged sword. On the one side, it gives to man, because
f
of his spiritual kinship with the Absolute, an infinite value; hut on the
other, it deprives man of his uniqueness and individual identity by mak-
ing him one with God. In view of this ultimate identification of finite
spirits and the Absolute Spirit, Hegel is inconsistent in treating the
former as in themselves worthful. For in the Hegelian metaphysics human
beings have value not as individuals with their own characteristic capac-
ities, hut as moments in the life of the Absolute Individual.
1 Hegel's
whole glorification of Christianity for its insight that man as man is
valuable is thus vitiated. Actually, it is not man as man that is sig-
nificant, but man as the Absolute. Individuals in themselves have no ul-
timate reality.
In the Philosophic der Religion , the central object of study is not
the religious experience of human beings, but the life of the Absolute.
Religion for Hegel is primarily an affair not of man but of God. The
history of religions is not so much man's growing discovery of God or
even God's discovery of man as it is the long, slow progress of the Abso-
lute toward a complete realisation of itself, a gradual attainment by the
Absolute of full self-consciousness.
Die Religion 1st
. . .
die Idee des Geistes, der
sich su sich selbst verh&lt, das Selbstbewusstseln des
absoluten Geistes
. ... In der hOchsten Idee 1st so
die Religion nicht die Angelegenheit eines Menschen,
sondern sie ist wesentlich die hSchste Bestimmung der
absoluten Idee selbst. Indem sich der Geist an sich
selbst unterscheidet , tritt die Endlichkeit des Be-
wu88tsein8 ein. Aber dies endliche Bewusstsein ist Mo-
ment des Geistes selbst; er ist das sich Unterscheiden,
das sich Bestimmen, d.h. sich als endliches Bewusstsein
Setsen. Es ist demnach nicht vom Standpunkt des end-
lichen Bewusstseins, dass wir die Religion "betrachten. 2
Cf. above, p. 193.
XII, BR, pp. 150-151. Cf. above, pp. 32-33.
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To "be sure, finite consciousness has a definite part in religion,
but it is transcended in the Absolute; "denn das Andere, wovon der abso-
lute Geist weiss, ist er selbst, und er wird erst sum ahsoluten Geiste
dadurch, dass er sich weiss."* It is true that the Absolute attains com-
plete self-knowledge only through the mediation of finite minds, that is,
through being particularised into individual human consciousnesses. Nev-
ertheless, this movement is
wiederum nicht die Angel egenheit des einselnen Mensch-
en, sondern gerade ist darin das Einzelne aufgehoben
und die Religion Wissen des gQttlichen Geistes von sich
durch Vermittlung des endlichen Geistes. 2
Hegel believes his view of the relation of man to God to be empir-
ically ascertained. **Wir wissen von unserra Geiste," he writes, that we
are Spirit in its estrangement and separation, but ultimately in its rec-
onciliation or return to itself.' Something akin to this can be observed
in human religious experience. The religious man is alternately con-
scious of his separation from God through sin and his reconciliation with
God through repentance and the forgiveness of sin. But Hegel overlooks
another fact which is equally observable. In Christianity, which for him
is normative, the religious subject rarely identifies himself with God,
With the exception of some mystics. Christians feel themselves to be dis-
tinct from God even when in communion with him. The reconciliation of
the believer with his God involves not metaphysical union, but a unity of
will or purpose.
The defect involved here appears particularly in connection with
the fact of sin. If man and God are ultimately one, God sins as well as
\ XII, BB, p. 151.
XII, BB, p. 151; cf. pp. 44, 219, 235; above, pp. 194-195.3 XIV, AB, p. 29.
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man. My sinful act is not mine alone, but God's, for I am a part of God.
Yet Hegel affirms also the moral perfection of the Absolute. On his the-
ory, then, the same act which from the finite point of view is had is
from the standpoint of the Absolute perfectly good. As man, I sin; as
Absolute, I will the good in the same choice. This cannot be. One act
of will cannot be both right and wrong. On Hegelian premises the contra-
diction is insoluble. The only way out is to regard every individual as
in every aspect of his experience other than God.
1
From Hegel's identification of man with the Absolute one of two
conclusions seems necessarily to follow. Either the Absolute is nothing
more than the sum of the finite individuals who compose it, and has its
only reality in the consciousness of the worshiping community of believ-
ers, who then worship only each other; or God is all there is, and finite
individuals have no reality of their own whatever. Thus the choioe lies
2
between positivism and pantheism, either one of which thought through
to the end, deprives human personality of the ultimate value which Hegel
believes it to have. In view of his constant emphasis on the Absolute,
it is fairly clear that Hegel chose the latter alternative. Against the
background of his absolutism, however, he struggles valiantly to preserve
the uniqueness of individuals. That he fails is not surprising. No more
surprising is it that his left-wing followers took the other alternative
and denied the existence of the Absolute altogether.
2. Hegel* s Epistemological Monism
A further fundamental defect in Hegel's view of individuals lies
in his epistemological monism. In the act of knowing, according to He-
1 Cf # above, pp. 81-82, 94-95, 188.
Cf. above, p. 177, n, 1.
fi
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gel, idea and object, man and God are one. 1 Man's knowledge of Cod is
2
really "Selbstbewusstsein Gottes," God's knowledge of himself. It is
the rery nature of reason that man's thoughts are also those of the Ab-
solute. When I think, it is not really I that think, hut the Absolute
thinking in me*
Das Selbstbewusstsein, so die Gewissheit, dass
seine Bestimmungen ebensosehr gegensttadlich, Be-
stimmungen des Wesens der Binge, als seine eigenen
Gedanken sind, ist die Vernunft. 2
This identification of human and divine knowing involves a contra-
diction which Hegel's dialectic cannot remove. It is impossible to rec-
oncile the intellectual limitations of finite individuals with the cogni-
tive perfection of the Absolute. On Hegel's view, any given act of know-
ing yields both partial truth for the finite knower and complete truth
for the Absolute. Since, however, the finite knower is really a moment
of the Absolute, this means that the Absolute itself knows ignorantly and
wisely about the same thing at the same time. This is unthinkable and
impossible. The Absolute cannot be as ignorant as I am and yet have per-
fect knowledge.
Hegel admits that the connection between man's particular knowledge
and the knowledge which he has in common with God raises a real question,
but evades answering it on the ground that it would take him away from
4his subject. As a matter of fact, on Hegelian premises the question ad-
mits of no satisfactory answer. Only when the Absolute is viewed not as
the whole of reality, but as the Supreme Person whose purpose it is that
there shall be finite persons whose knowledge, though incomplete, is
J
Cf. above, pp. 162-163.
| XIV, BDG, p. 117. Cf. above, p. 195.
T V, HJC, p. 380.
XIV, BBC, p. 117. Cf. above, p. 195, n. 4.
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solely their own, can the problem be solyed and human individuality pre-
served. My thoughts are mine only, not Cod's. God's thoughts are his
only, not mine. Only if this is true can human ignorance be reconciled
with divine omniscience.
3. Freedom and Necessity
Difficulties emerge also in connection with Hegel's affirmation of
freedom in man. It is impossible to reconcile satisfactorily the free-
dom which he ascribes to personality with the necessity which he finds
in religion and the total spiritual life of man.1
a. Hegel's View of Freedom
To avoid misunderstanding at this point, it is important to have
clearly in mind what Hegel means by freedom. This appears in his defi-
nition of Spirit on its highest level as Bel sichs elb st s ein . or self-con-
tained existence. Spirit's advance from opposition to complete self-
reconciliation is equivalent to its attainment of freedom, "derm Frei-
3
heit ist, bei sich selbst zu sein." Matter is dependent, having its
unity or essence outside itself. Spirit, on the contrary, has its cen-
ter in itself. It exists in and with itself, and in this characteristic
lies its freedom.
Wenn ich abhftngig bin, so beziehe ich mich auf ein
anderes, das ich nicht bin, und kann nicht ohne solch
ein lusseres sein. Frei bin ich, wenn ich bei mir
selbst bin. 4
On this basie, freedom belongs not only to the Absolute, but to fi-
nite spirits as well. It is true that all men are determined by the Ab-
1 Cf. above, pp. 139-149.
2 VIII, PWG, p. 32.
3 XII, BR, p. 65. Cf. XIV, AE, p. 110. "Der Ceist ist das Bei-
sichselbstsein, und dies eben ist die Freiheit." (VIII, PWG, p. 32.)
4 VIII, PWG, p. 32.
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solute. Truly understood, however, the necessity which governs them is
seen to "be freedom.
Das Denken der Notwendigkeit ist . • • das Zusam-
mengehen seiner im Anderen mit sich selbst , die Befrel-
ung, welche nicht die Flucht der Abstraktion ist, son-
dern in dem anderen Wirklichen, mit dem das Wirkliche
durch die Macht der Notwendigkeit ausammengebunden ist,
sich nicht als anderes, sondern—sein eigenes Sein
und Setaen au hahen. Als fflr sich exist ierend heisst
diese Befreiung Ich, als au ihrer Total it ftt entwickelt
freier Geist . als Bnpfindung Liebe, als Genuss Seligkelt .
What first appears to the individual as necessity is thus really
his own will, for it is the will of the Absolute of which he is a part.
In being determined by the Absolute Spirit finite spirits are not sub-
ject to a foreign power; on the contrary, as one with the Absolute they
actually determine themselves. The truth of necessity, therefore, is
self-determination, and self-determination is freedom.
The individual realises this freedom in the moral life when, recog-
nising his true relation to the Absolute, he subordinates his own partic-
ular finite purposes to those of the Absolute. "Die Freiheit des Men-
schen besteht eben lm Wis sen und Willen Got tee durch Aufhebung des men-
2
schlichen Wissens und Wollens." In knowing his participation in the di-
vine nature, man is free and is "selbst der Proaess
. . ., seine beson-
dere Individualitftt absuwerfen und sich in diesem Inhalte frei au machen."
This means simply that we are free when we rise above our purely individ-
ual and selfish interests and identify ourselves with universal ends.
Die wahre Freiheit ist als Sittlichkeit dies,
dass der Wille nicht subjektive, d.i. eigensftchtige,
sondern allgemeinen Inhalt au seinen Zwecken hat.*
J V, ENC , pp. 156-156.
\ XII, BR, p. 258.
J
XIV, AH, p. 183.
V, ENC, p. 408. Cf. Nohl, TJS, pp. 286-287; and the words of
Goethe: "Nicht das macht frei, dass wir nichts fiber uns anerkennen wollen,
sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das fiber uns ist," ( Gesprflche with
Sckermann. Reelam, I, p. 219.)
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Hegel here voices a basic principle of life. Freedom is grounded
in necessity and impossible without it. Man frees himself "by limiting
himself, finds his life by losing it. He is most free when he recognises
the laws of the object ire order and submits himself to them. Through
conmitting his own will utterly to the will of God, the individual
achieves his highest selfhood. He is most truly a self when he is least
selfish, when he devotes himself completely to God.
1
In dying to our-
selves we truly live.
With this phase of Hegel's thought no one can quarrel. It is firm-
ly grounded in both experience and reason. Difficulty arises, however,
when one attempts to harmonise Hegel's conception of freedom with other
aspects of his thought.
b. Defects in Hegel's Conception of Freedom
In the first place, in Hegel's view of necessity more seems to be
implied than the self-commitment of the individual to universal ends.
The total impression of the Philosophic der Religion is not that neces-
sity is the presupposition or condition of freedom, but that everything
that happens in religion is in the complete control of the Absolute Spir-
it, which alone is truly free. The entire historical development of re-
ligion proceeds according to dialectical necessity; it is "durch den Be-
2griff bestiumt, im Begriffe notwendig." The individual as such seems to
have no part whatever in shaping the course of religious history.
In short, there seem to be in the Fhilosophle der Religion two di-
vergent views. On the one hand, the growth of religion in man is deter-
mined and controlled in all points by the Absolute Spirit. On the other,
1 Cf. XIII, EGI, pp. 92, 94. Cf. IX, PWG, p. 758; above, p. 177.
z XII, BB, p. 72. Cf. above, pp. 159-142.
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the individual attains genuine freedom by recognising the necessity which
limits him. Here is an irreconcilable contradiction. If human freedom
is real, some events represent the freely directed acts of conscious in-
dividuals, and so are not necessary; while if the various religions are
what they are solely because the Begriff is what it is, free determina-
tion on the part of religious persons is a mere fiction. Either, there-
fore, the necessity which limits the individual is not absolute, in which
case some freedom is actual; or else it is complete, in which case free-
dom is an illusion.
We must reject one view or the other. Either man is entirely de-
termined or he is to a certain extent, however limited, free. He cannot
be both. The same person cannot be both free and determined in the same
act. No man can serve two masters. We can affirm necessity alone or
freedom alone; we can affirm partial necessity and partial freedom; but
we cannot consistently affirm both freedom and complete necessity. If
man is really free in but the smallest portion of his life, necessity is
not absolute.
The problem is not solved by saying, with Hegel, that we are free
in recognising the necessity which governs us* This is profoundly true
if the necessity is regarded as incomplete. But if it is absolute, as
Hegel thinks it to be, is our submission to the universal actually a free
choice? Is the "Aufhebung dee menschlichen Wissens und Wollens*^ a vol-
untary Aufhebung? If freedom consists in the recognition that we are in
all things determined by the Absolute, is not that recognition itself de-
termined by the Absolute? Hegel seems to be saying, in fact, that man is
1 XII, BR, p. 258. Cf. above, p. 214.
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free when he perceives that he has no freedom.
The extent to which Hegel's doctrine of necessity cancels his
affirmation of freedom is seen especially in his treatment of sin. We
have seen that for him not only the possihility of sin, hut sin itself
is necessary to true virtue. 1 On this view, however, freedom disappears.
Han* s capacity of choice becomes an illusion. He sins not hecause he
chooses to, hut hecause he must*
The implications of this lack of choice for the status of the in-
dividual are ohvious. Lacking the ability to decide between alterna-
tives, man is not properly speaking a human spirit, but an automaton.
He is not an infinitely valuable personality, but a machine. That Hegel
emphasizes the worth of the individual cannot be denied. In proclaiming
this worth, however, he contradicts the implications of his own doctrine
of necessity.
III. Appraisal
In Hegel* 8 view of the individual there are two contrasting strains.
On the one hand, he proclaims in unmistakable terms the infinite value of
the human spirit. This is shown alike in his idealistic world-view, his
adherence to the Christian conception of the freedom and worth of man as
the object of God's love, and his belief in immortality. Other factors,
however, at least equally integral in Hegel* s thought, render inconsist-
ent this high estimate of the individual. Hegel* 8 metaphysics of the Ab-
solute, his monistic epistemology, and his doctrine of necessity tend in-
evitably to reduce the significance of the individual and destroy its
1
Cf. above, pp. 93-94.
Hegel himself writes that freedom is "das eineige Wahrhafte des
Geistes." (IX, IWG, p. 32.)

uniqueness. Nowhere does Hegel reconcile satisfactorily these two con-
flicting strains of thought. Ee is forever wrestling with the problem
of the relation between the individual and the Absolute and striving to
do justice to "both, hut he never quite succeeds. As long as he deals
primarily with one or the other, he encounters little difficulty. But
whenever he considers the relation between the two, he must of necessity
suppress one. In such eases of conflict the victory goes to the Abso-
lute, and the individual suffers accordingly. For in spite of his effort
to exalt man, Hegel is first and last an absolutist. The universe is
ultimately not many, but one; it is not spirits, but Spirit.
Hegel* s failure to maintain consistently his high estimate of man
is due primarily to rational considerations. It is his epistemological
and metaphysical thought which prevent him from doing full justice to
the individual. This does not mean, however, that his main difficulty
is exaggerated rationalism, though this extreme appears in his view of
necessity. In fact, it might even be said that Hegel is not rational
enough. It is not chiefly observation of experience, but thought, which
discovers and corrects the errors in his view. No mere survey of em-
pirical facts can reveal the difficulties in identifying God and man or
in treating all human acts as necessary. Only a steadfast effort to be
rational can do this. It cannot be said, therefore, that Hegel* s view
of the individual suffers chiefly frctn an eclipsing of the empirical by
the rational.
In fact, there is every indication that Hegel* 8 theory of man was
based on a careful observation of human nature and influenced largely by
the environment in which he lived and worked. His insistence on the in-
completeness of individuals and their ultimate participation in a whole great-

er than themselves is a natural reaction to the subjective and abstract
individualism which prevailed in eighteenth century Europe. Hegel strug-
gled valiantly to restore the claims of objective truth, * which the atom-
istic subjectivism of his day held to be impossible of attainment* In
doing so, perhaps inevitably, he over-emphasized the universal, the Ab-
solute, and subordinated the individual. This does not justify his er-
ror. It does show how naturally the great exponent of absolute objectiv-
ity of thought was influenced by considerations of time and place. In
his view of human personality the rational is never divorced from the em-
pirical, but grounded in and directly affected by it.
* Cf. V, ENC, p. 532.
In a letter to Niethammer, Nov, 22, 1808, Hegel writes that "die
DistelkOpfe, die Spinotzisten, den Menschen ftberhaupt vorstellen, wie
eine Portion Seewasser in eine Bouteille abgesondert im Ocean schwimmen."




On the basis of the foregoing inquiry, the following conclusions
may toe drawn:
I. According to Hegel, philosophy deals with religion as given in ex-
perience. The primary essential of religious experience, however, is
thought, in the sense that religion is possible only where thought, as the
all-organising activity of consciousness, is active.
II. In Hegel's view religion, to exist at all, must he felt or ex-
perienced, hut to l>e objectively true it must he grounded in reason. Thus
Hegel is empirical in regarding feeling as indispensable, rational in
holding that it is insufficient and in need of thoughtful criticism.
III. Hegel recognises the importance of the volitional factor in re-
ligious experience and insists that religion must manifest itself in moral
living, but ie too empirical in identifying the morality to which religion
leads with the accepted morality of the state.
IV. Hegel is in accord with experience in maintaining that from the
divine standpoint the triumph of the good is secure, since Spirit rules in
the world; logically, however, his view is defective, for his personalis-
tic pantheism makes it Impossible to reconcile moral perfection in the Ab-
solute with sin in finite spirits.
7. Hegel* 8 principle of negativity and his theory of sin, treating
the religious life as an alternation between estrangement, discord, and
suffering on the one hand and reconciliation, peace, and joy on the other,
reveal both an intimate acquaintance with religious experience and a pro-
found use of rational interpretation. He is over-rational, however, in
I
making actual sin a necessity,
VI. Hegel's view of religious experience is not so much intellectu-
alism as synopticism. The religious life is for him an activity of the
total personality, the relation of the whole mind, involving feeling,
will, and thought, to God.
VII. Though Hegel's historical descriptions reveal several instances
of distortion, partly through rationalistic influence, partly through the
operation of an exaggerated empiricism, they rest on a painstaking study
of the history of religion, and in the main record faithfully the facts
as known in Hegel's day.
VIII. Hegel recognises the importance of historical manifestation in
religion, out insists that, since the mere recounting of facts concerning
origin or development cannot reveal the eternal truth and meaning which
the facts express, the purely historical approach must be supplemented by
rational, philosophical inquiry.
IX. Hegel appears to build up a priori the idea of religion and the
logical system of religions demanded by this idea, after which he fits the
various religions into his preconceived scheme. Actually, however, his
idea of religion is founded on knowledge gained through careful study of
religious history. In his lectures he simply presents systematically the
results of concentrated reflection on facts empirically ascertained, pur-
posely and naturally excluding any account of the psychological and chron-
ological processes by which his conclusions were reached.
X. To a remarkable degree, therefore, Hegel synthesizes hist orleal
description of religion and philosophical interpretation; to a factual sur-





XI. However, two notable departures from this general synthesis are
evident: in treating the development of religion as governed throughout by
logical necessity, though he here voices his conviction that God is in his-
tory, Hegel is over-rational; in regarding Christianity as final and clos-
ing the door to the emergence of further truth about God than he and his
time possessed, Hegel is too empirical.
XII. In emphasising the arguments for God* s existence, especially
the ontological argument, Hegel is a thorough-going rationalist. His re-
liance on reason here is partly a conviction of the inadequacy of mere em-
piricism. However, in denying presuppositions and claiming that his whole
philosophy proves the existence of God, Hegel attaches undue weight to
pure reason operating independently, and not enough to empirical consid-
erations.
XIII. Hegel 1 s view of God as self-differentiating, self-reconciling
Spirit combines loyalty to experience, with its dual aspects of conflict
and harmony, suffering and joy, with a penetrating use of reason in inter-
preting experience. However, in including finite spirits in the Absolute
and so making God both good and evil, perfect and Imperfect, the concep-
tion is true to neither experience nor reason*
XIV. In Hegel* s thought a profound appreciation of the significance
of the human individual appears in an absolutistic setting which tends to
annul this significance. Hegel* 8 high estimate of man is well grounded
both empirically and rationally; his failure to maintain it consistently,
though partly traceable to extremes of both empiricism and rationalism,
is primarily due to neither, but to contradictions in thought which clear-





This dissertation has sought to determine the relative extent to
which Hegel* s philosophy of religion is derived from and founded on (1)
empirical observation and (2) the operations of reason. A review of the
work of other investigators and a discussion of the sources and plan of
the inquiry are followed hy an outline of Hegel's philosophy of religion
and an investigation of four major aspects of it*
I. Hegel's Philosophy of Religion
In Hegel's view, philosophy aims to bring out the meaning or reason
in religious experience, to understand religion. Its basic principle is
that man can know Cod, since both are Spirit. Religion stands midway be-
tween art and philosophy, revealing in the form of representation or im-
agination the same absolute truth which the former reveals in immediate
perception and the latter in conceptual thought.
The first of the three major parts of the Philosophic der Religion
deals with the notion or idea of religion. Religion Hegel defines as the
relation of the human spirit to the Absolute Spirit, or more truly, the
self-differentiating and self-reconciling life of the Absolute itself.
The concrete reality of religion is a synthesis of two aspects, the the-
oretical and the practical, intellectual representation and worship. Both
aspects exhibit three phases: (1) the moment of universality, God as the
universal mind; (2) the moment of particularity, the self-differentiation
of God to produce finite minds; and (3) the moment of individuality, the
restoration of the unity of God and man. Theoretically, mediation is ac-
complished in the proofs of God's existence; practically, reconciliation
t
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it effected in worship*
By its very nature the notion manifests itself in history to produce
the definite religions, comprising (D the nature-religions, in which Spirit
and nature are still abstractly identical, and (2) the religions of spir-
itual individuality, where differentiation replaces immediacy and Spirit and
nature are distinguished. In all of them, however, the manifestation of
the notion is limited and abstract.
Only in the absolute religion, Christianity, does the determination
fully manifest the notion. On this third stage religion exhibits the same
phases as the notion itself. Beginning as abstract unity. Spirit differen-
tiates itself to produce finite spirits Whom it then reconciles with it-
self. Through reconciling the universal and the particular, God and man,
Spirit attains concrete unity and true individuality, complete self-knowledge,
II. Hegel's View of the Nature of Religious Experience
Hegel insists that philosophy seeks to understand the religion which
it finds. Though religion is possible only where thought is active, it
cannot be known or understood without being inwardly experienced; if it is
to exist at all, it must be felt. Feeling alone, however, is inadequate,
for (1) its subjectivity prevents it from apprehending objective, universal
truth; (2) it deifies the selfish, particular desires of men; (3) its
truth depends on its content, which can be tested only by thought; and (4)
since religion is found only in thinking beings, its center is not feeling
but thought.
In Hegel's early thought morality is essential to religion. In his
mature conception of religion also, though the speculative interest as-
sumes greater importance, the final stage, that of worship, centers in the
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will. True worship, the volitional activity whereby the unity of God and
man is restored, inevitably finds completion in moral conduct. Religion
is thus the basis of the morality of the state. Yet Hegel is too empiri-
cal in regarding the accepted morality as fully embodying the religious
ideal. On the other hand, his logical system compels him to restrict
ethics to the organised state, which is unjustifiable. With regard to the
moral ought Hegel opposes the subjective moralism of Kant and Flchte, hold-
ing that in God the good is secure, being already realised. This is true
to experience, but in a pantheistic view illogieally requires the Absolute
to be both good and bad at once, and also fails to recognise adequately
the temporal element in the Absolute. Hegel's regard for the facts of
moral experience is further shown in his principle of negativity and his
theory of sin, which find opposition, discord, and estrangement at the heart
of life, but regard conflict as transcended in man's reconciliation with
God, At the same time, he displays a profound use of reason, as in his
insistence that sin is possible only through moral knowledge. His view is
defective in making evil necessary and in identifying finite spirits and
the Absolute, thus endangering the reality of sin and the goodness of God.
Religion is for Hegel an affair of the total personality. Feeling
and will are important aspects, but both must be guided by reason as the
all-organising activity of consciousness. The mind which experiences re-
ligion is a concrete whole which rises to God in all the many-sided rich-
ness of its life.
III. Hegel's 71 ew of the Historical Development of Religion
A high regard for the facts of history is evidenced in Hegel both by




curacy of his historical accounts. In spite of several important defects,
due partly to his primarily philosophical purpose and the limited knowl-
edge of his day and partly to influences both over-rational and over-em-
pirical, Hegel is habitually loyal to historical fact.
His chief concern, however, is not to record the history of reli-
gions, hut to present that history as a rational, unitary development.
While historical manifestation is a necessary stage in the self-realisa-
tion of the Absolute, for Hegel it is not in itself sufficient. Histori-
cal inquiry is inadequate because (1) it is external, dealing only with
truths known to others, and (2) it lacks an immanent criterion of truth
and value. To historical description, therefore, must be added philo-
sophical evaluation, the unifying, interpreting activity of concrete
thought. The historical and the rational interpenetrate.
The fact that Hegel* s lectures begin with the notion of religion
gives the impression that his account is a priori . However, this possi-
bility is precluded by his concern for and intimate knowledge of history,
as well as by the accurate correspondence of his speculative development
of the idea of religion with the actual historical growth of religion.
Hegel's lectures set forth the result of a life-time of thought on reli-
gious experience and history, purposely omitting an account of the pro-
cesses by which these results were obtained.
There are two prominent exceptions to Hegel* s general synthesis of
history and reason. He is over-rational in treating the steps in the de-
velopment of religion as logically necessitated. This view makes neces-
sary "facte" which have not existed, overlooks the hypothetical character
of all knowledge, leaves no place for human freedom, and makes the Absolute
non-moral; but has the virtue of recognising the immanent control of God
t
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in history. Hegel is too empirical in regarding Christianity as absolute
and final. This conception overlooks the values in other religions and
arbitrarily limits the development which Hegel himself affirms.
IY. Hegel's View of the Absolute
Hegel rigorously maintains the knowableness of the Absolute. Man is
immediately aware of God in feeling and imagination. However, this subjec-
tive certainty must be elevated to the status of objective truth. This
takes place in the arguments for the existence of God, which exhibit the
necessity and connection in things and chart for thought the course follow-
ed by the human spirit in its rise to God. In Hegel* s formulation, the
cosmological argument proceeds from the incompleteness and contingency of
the finite world to an absolutely necessary being; the physicotheological,
from finite purposive activity to absolute, universal purpose. So con-
ceived, both are valid, but neither yields the full reality of God as Gelst .
Only the ontologlcal argument can do this, for it begins not with the em-
pirical world, but with the idea of God. Concretely formulated, it shows
that the Notion by nature negates its barren, subjective unity and objecti-
fies itself. The idea and the existence of God, the infinite and the fi-
nite, are both moments of a concrete whole, the Absolute Spirit. Hegel is
here a thorough-going rationalist. In preferring the ontologlcal argument
he clearly regards Intellect as the essential activity of the mind in rela-
tion to God, and again he fails to recognise the place of hypothesis in
knowledge.
The Absolute may be variously described as Activity, Movement, Life,
Thought, and Love, but most truly it is Spirit or Personality, whose nature
it is to objectify or differentiate itself in finite spirits and in them to
:
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achieve true unity with itself. This view give* Hegel a penetrating an-
swer to the problem of suffering. God himself suffers. Tension, conflict,
and discord are involved in his very nature as Spirit. But the pain,
though desperately real, is transcended in reconciling, redeeming love.
Through self-abnegation Spirit attains self-realisation. Suffering opens
the way to a triumph of supreme joy.
To a large degree Hegel's view of God, especially in its dual recog-
nition of evil and conquest over evil, combines acute observation of fact
with a confident use of reason in interpreting fact. However, his exposi-
tion of the Absolute is fragmentary and obscure; he gives no adequate ac-
count of the ultimate status of good and evil; and he fails to reconcile
satisfactorily the logical and the chronological aspects of the Absolute.
V. Hegel's View of Human Personality
The finite person is at once a particular center of free intelligence
and a moment in the life of the Absolute, an individual conscious subject
and a finite manifestation of the divine consciousness, spirit and Spirit.
The reconciliation of man and God in religion is a union of two aspects of
the same reality, the Absolute Spirit.
Though this view seems to deprive the finite individual of distinc-
tive significance, in Hegel's own thinking it is accompanied by a clear
acknowledgment of the value of human personality. In his idealistic world-
view, which makes man akin to the Absolute, regards man as capable of know-
ing truth, and recognises that ideas are nothing apart from persons; in
his criticism of the low view of man in non-Christian religions and his
commendation of Christianity's recognition of the worth and freedom of per-
sonality as such; and in his belief in individual immortality Hegel reveals
Ifro *%• f»nf -.f%p
an exceptionally high estimate of human individuality,
Nevertheless, his identification of man and God does take from man
his -unique identity and individual worth. Since, fundamentally, finite
spirits are significant only as moments in the divine life, Hegel is in-
consistent in treating them as worthful in themselves. Moreover, on a
basis of metaphysical absolutism and epistemological monism it is impos-
sible to reconcile sin in man with complete goodness in the Absolute,
ignorance in man with the Absolute* 8 cognitive perfection. Furthermore,
while Hegel rightly recognises that freedom, self-determination, comes
only through self-limitation and self-commitment to universal ends and
so is grounded in necessity, he removes all meaning from freedom as ap-
plied to individuals by treating the entire historical development of re-





I. Worka of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Werke (original edition). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1832-1887.
XVII. Vermiachte Schrlften . VS
Letter to Duboc, July 30, 1822.* Pp. 520-524.
XIX. Briefe von trad an Hegel (Karl Hegel, ed.). BVAH
Stotllche Werke (Georg Lasaon, ed. ). Leipzig: Meiner, 1907-1933,
I. Erete Drnekachriften . ED
"Glauben nnd Wiaaen." Pp. 222-346.
II. Phanomenologle dea Geiatea . PDG
V. Encyclopedic der philoaophlaohen Wi8aenachaften . INC
VI . Grundllnien der Philosophic dea Hechta . GPH
VIII-IX. Vorleanngen gbgr die Philoaophie der Weltgeschichte . PWG
XII-XIV. Vorleanngen fiber die Philoaophie der Religion .
XII. Begriff der Religion .* BB
XIII. Die Baturreligion .* NB
Die Religionen der geietlgen Indlvldualitftt . * RGI
XIV. Die ahaolnt e Religion.* AB
Vorleanngen fiber die Beweiae vom Dasein Gottee . * BDG
Stotliche Werice ( Jnbll&uaaanagabe . Hermann Glockner, ed.).
Stuttgart: Pr. Frommann, 1927-1930. JUB
III. Philoaophl ache PropKdeut Ik
.
Gymnae ial reden nnd Gut-
achten fiber die Phi 1 oaonhl e-Uhterricht
. PHPB
IV-V. Wisaengchaft der Logik. WDL
VIII-X. System der Philosophic . SDP
XII-XIV. Vorleanngen fiber die Aeathetik
.
1 Abbreviations used in the text are listed with each book. Books
and articles read in their entirety are indicated by an asterisk. Those
not ao indicated have been read in part.
t
2 31
XVI I-XIX. VortgggagB Bffi die Oeschlchte der Phllosonhie . GDP
XX. Vermlechte Schrlften . vs
"Vorrede an Hixlrich8 , Religionephiloeophie." Pp. 1-28.
Review of Wilhelm von Humboldt •a Poor die tmter dem Naiaen
Bhagavad-Glta bokannte Episode dee Mahabharata .
Pp. 57-131.
Review of Hamann'a Schriften . Pp. 202-275.
Review of ttber die Hegel f ache Lehre oder: abaolutea
Wissen tmd moderner Panthelamua . (anon. ). Pp. 314-562.
Review of Carl Friedrich GOschel's Anhoriamen fiber Klcht-




"Wer denkt abatrakt?"* Pp. 445-450.
Hegele theologische Jugendschrlften (Herman Nohl, ed. ).* Tubingen:
Mohr, 1907. TJS
Keue Briefe Hegele nnd Verwandtes (Georg Lass on, ed.). Hegel-Archly .
Band 1. Heft 2. Leipsig: Meiner, 1912. FTBH
II. Works of Hegel's Expoaitora and Critics
A. Writings Immediately Relevant
Anon., Review of Haering, HWW.* Revue Philosophlque . 66 (1931), pp.
440-442.
Adams, George Plimpton, The Mystical Element in Hegel j a Early Theo-
logical Writings .* Berkeley, Calif., 1910.
.
MEH
Baillie, James Black, "Hegel." ERE (Hew York: Scribner, 1914), VI,
pp. 668-687.
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield, Immortality in Post-Kantian Idealism.*
Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 1925. IPI
Dens sen, Paul, Review of Werner, HO.* Arch. t_. Gesch . cL Phil .
.
5 (1890), pp. 154-155.
Dilthey, Wilhelm, "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels." KCnlgl
. Akad . d.
Wlss








Arthur, Pie dent ache Spekulation selt Kant mit besonderer
Rucks icht aaf das Wesen des Absoluten und die PersPnllchkelt
Gottes. 2d ed. Vol. I. Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1895. DSK
, Hegel s Religlonsphllosophie in gekflrzter Form , mit
Einftthrung . Anmerkungen . und Brl&uterungen . Jena: Eugen
Diederichs, 1905. HRP
Falkenheim, Hugo, Review of Haering, HWW.* Logos . 20 (1931), pp.
306-310.
Glockner, Hermann, Hegel . 1. Band: Die Voraussetzungen der Hegel
-
schen Philosophie . Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929.
, "Hegel und Schleiermacher im Kampf um Religionsphil-
osophie und Glaubenslehre."* Deutsche Viertel.iahrsschrlft .
8 (1930), pp. 233-260.
Griffiths, Rees, God in Idea and Experience . Edinburgh: Clark, 1931.GIE
Hadlich, Hermann, Hegel s Lehren fiber das Verh&ltnis von Religion
und Philosophie . Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer, 1906. VRP
Haering, Theodor L., Hegel . seln Wollen und seln Werk . Vol, I.
Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1929. HWW
Hammacher , Em11 , Die Bedeutung der Philosophie Hegel
s
fflr die
Gegenwart . Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1911. BPHG
Hartmann, Eduard von, Die Religion des Gelstes ( Ausgewahlte
Werke, VI). Leipzig: Wilhelm Friedrich, (1882) 1888. RDG
, "Mein Verhaltnis zu Hegel." Phil . Monatsh . . 24
(1888), pp. 316-341.
Haym, Rudolf, Hegel und seine Zelt . 2d ed. , Hans Rosenberg, ed.
Leipzig: Heims, (1857) 1927. HSZ
Hessen, Johannes, Hegels Trlnltfttslehre .* Freiburg i. Brelsgau:
Herder, 1922. HT
Hocking, William Ernest, The Meaning of God in Human Experience .*
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1912. MGHE
Kesseler, Kurt, "Hauptprobi erne der Religionaphilosophie." Zelt
.
f. Phil. u. phil. Krit., 158 (1915), pp. 27-48.
Kroner, Richard, Von Kant bis Hegel . II : Von der Naturphllosophie
zur Philosophie des Gelstes
. Ttibingen: Mohr, 1924. KBH




Laeson, Adolf, Review of Werner, HO.* Phil . Monatsh . . 24 (1888),
pp. 351-354.
, Review of Seth, HP.* Phil . MonatBh . . 27 (1891), pp.
216-221.
Lasson, Georg, Review of Werner, HO.* Zelt . f. Phil , u. phil . Krlt.
>
96 (1889), pp. 146-160.
f Review of Brightm&n, IPI.* Kant-Studlen . 34 (1929),
p. 186.
, Elnfunrung, in Hegel Rellgionsphllosonhle.* In Hegel*
8
SBmtliche Werke . XII. Leipsig: Meiner, 1930.
—
— ,
ed. , Rene Briefe Hegel s und Verwandtes. Hegel-Archly .
Band 1, Heft 1. Leipsig: Meiner, 1912. (Also listed in works of
Hegel.) H*H
Leighton, Joseph Alexander, Typical Modern Concentions of God .
Hew York: Longmans Green, 1901. MCG
Levy, Heinrich, Review of Hay*, HSZ.* Logos . 18 (1929), pp. 441-447.
Lindsay, James, "Theistic Idealism.'1 * Arch , f. syst . Phil .. 11
(1905), pp. 86-104.
Loewenberg, J., Reriew of Wahl, MCPH.* Phil . Rev., 40 (1931), pp.
500-501.
Mackensie, J. S., "The Hegelian Point of View."* Mind . NS 11 (1902),
pp. 54-71.
MeTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic .
Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1896. ' SHD
—
, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology . Cambridge: Univ. Press,
(1901) 1918. SHC
Moore, George Foot, "The History of Religions in the nineteenth
Century."* Congress of Arts and Science. Howard J. Rogers, ed.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906. II, pp. 432-442.
Hoaek, Ludwig, Per Religionebegrlff Hegel
s
. Darmstadt: Leske, 1845. RBH
Hohl, Herman, Hegel s theologische Jugendschr i ften nach den Hand-
schrlften der Konigliohen Blbllothek in Berlin .* Tubingen: Mohr,
1907. (Also listed in works of Hegel.) TJS
Ott , Xmil , Die Religionsphilosoohle Hegel in ihrer Genesis (large-
stel It und in Ihrer Bedeutung fflr die Gegenwart gewflrdlgt .




Pfleiderer, Otto, The Philosophy of Religion on the Basle of Ite
Hlatory (Allan Mensies, transl.), Vol. II. London: Williams &
Horgate, 1887. PHBH
, The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant .
and Its Progress in great Britain since 1825 (J. F. Smith,
transl.). London: Swan Sonnensehein, 1895. DT
Bichert , Hans , Hegel s Bellglonsphllosouhle in ihren Grundsugen.
Bromberg: 0. Grunwald, 1900. HHP
Ritchie, David G., Darwin and Hegel . London: Swan Sonnenscheln,
1893. DAH
Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, "The Absolute of Hegelianism."* Mind . KS 9
(1900), pp. 332-548.
RosenkranB, Earl, Krltlsche Srlluterungen des Hegelschen Systems .
KOnigsherg: Borntrager, 1840. KISS
t Hegel als deutscher Nat 1 onalphl 1 osoph . Leipzig:
Duncker & Humblot, 1670. HDN




Andrew, The Development from Kant to Hegel
.
with Chapters on the Philosophy of Religion . London: Williams &
Horgate, 1882. DKH
, Scottish Philosophy . Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1885. SP
—
, Hegelianism and Personality . Edinburgh: Blackwood,
1893. HP
Stace, Walter Terence, The Philosophy of Hegel . London: Hacmillan,
1924. PH
Sterrett , James Kacbride, Studies in Hegel 1 s Philosophy of Religion.
Hew York: Appleton, 1890. HPR
Stirling, James Hutchison, The Secret of Hegel. 2d ed. Edinburgh:
Oliver & Boyd, 1898. SOH
Troeltsch, Ernst, Gesammelte Schrlften . Tubingen: Mohr, 1913. GS
II. Znr rellglPsen Lage . Bellglonsphllosophie und Ethlk .
III. Per Historlsmus und seine Probi erne .
, "Die St el lung des Christ enturns unter den Weitreligi-
onen." * In Per Historlsmus und selns flberwlndung. Berlin:
Heise, 1924. Pp. 62-83.
t
235
Ulrici, Hermann, "Zur Rellgionsphilosophie. Auffassung des Verhtlt-
nieses von Religion und Philosophic bei Hegel, Schleiermacher,
Herbert und ihren Hachfolgern." Zeit. f. Phil , u. phil . Krit.
,
23 (1863), pp. 240-286.
Vera, Augusto. Introductions to his French translation, Philosophic
de la religion de Hegel . 2 vols. Paris: Germer Ball 1ere, 1876-
1878.
Yowinckel, Ernst, Religion und Rellglonen Pel Schleiermacher und
Hegel . Erlangen: R. Merkel, 1896. RRSH
Wahl
,
Jean, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophic de
Hegel . Paris: Rieder, 1929, MCPH
Weisse, Christian F. , "Strauss und Bruno Bauer," Zeit . f. Phil .
&• ThSSk'* 10 (1843), pp. 40-82.
Werner, Johannes, Hegel s Offenbarungsbegriff . Bin religions-
phllosophlscher Versuch . Leipsig: Breitkopf k. HErtel, 1887. HO
B. Writings of Minor Relevance
B&umler, Alfred, "Hegel und Kierkegaard."* Deutsche Vierteljahrs-
schrift, 2 (1924), pp. 116-130.
Caird, Edward, Hegel . Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1901.
Caird, John, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion . Hew
York: Macmlllan, 1880.
Croce, Benedetto, What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy
of Hegel (Douglas Ainslie, transl.). London: Uacmillan, 1916.
Cunningham, Gustavus Watts, Thought and Reality in Hegel * s System .
Hew York: Longmans Green, 1910.
Dieter, Theodor, Die Frage der PersBnllchkelt Gottes in Hegel *
Philosophle . Tttbingen: G. Sehnflrlen, 1917.
Dresser, Horatio Willis, "The Element of Irrationality in the Hegel-
ian Dialectic." Supplementary Essay in The Philosophy of the
Spirit . Hew York: Putnam, 1908. Pp. 385-537.
Fischer, Kuno, Hegel s Lebcn . Werke und Lehre . 2 vols. Heidelberg:
Carl Winter, 1911. HLWL
Gelssler, Hurt, "1st die Annahme von Absolutem in der Anschauung
und dem Denken moglich?"* Arch . f_. syst . Phil .. 9 (1903), pp.
417-432.
Glockner, Hermann, "Krisen und Wandlungen in der Gesehiehte des
Hegelianismus."* Logos . 13 (1924-1925), pp. 840-357.
I
236
, "Robert Vischer und die Erisie der Geisteswiseenschaften
ia letsten Drittel dee neuniehnten Jahrhunderts." Logos . 14 (1925),
pp. 297-545.
, "Hegelrenaissance und Heuhegelianismus." Logos . 20 (1951).
pp. 169-195.
von Hartmann, Eduard, "Schillings positive Philosophic ale Einheit von
Hegel tind Schopenhauer."* Phil. Monateh . . 5 (1869), pp. 279-284.
.
t "TJber die notwendlge Umbildung der Hegel* senen Fhiloeophie
aas ihrem Grundprincip heraus." Phil . Monateh . . 5 (1870), pp. 587-
415.
Hartmann, Nicolai, Die Philosophic dee deutechen Ideal ismus . Vol. Hi
Hegel . Berlin: W. de Graft er, 1929,
Hoffmann, Frane, "Hegel, K. Rosenkrans und Baader." Phil . Monateh .
.
5 (1869), pp. 1-24, 95-110, 186-202.
Hulsaann, J., "'Was wirklich let, dae 1st vernttnftig, und was verntinftig
ist, ist wirklich.'"* Phil . Mouatsh., 6 (1670-1871), pp. 506-518.
James, William, "Absolutism and Empiricism."* Mind . 9 (1884), pp. 281-286.
r "Hegel and His Method."* Hibb . Jour .. 7 (1908-1909), pp.
65-75.
EBstlin, Earl, Hegel in philosophischer pol it lecher und natlonaler Be-
slehung. TUbingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1870.
ErBger, Otto, "Reiner Idealiemue und empirische Weltansicht."* Arch , jf.
syst . Phil .. 51 (1928), pp. 275-281.
Lasson, Adolf, "tfber Gegenstand und Behandlungsart der Religionsphil-
oeophie." Phil . Monateh .. 16 (1879), pp. 1-55.
Levy, Heinrich, Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deutechen Philosophic .
Berlin: Pan-Verlag Rolf Heise, 1927.
Mackintosh, Robert, Hegel and Hegellanism. New York: Scribner, 1905.
Marshall, Troward Harvey, A Study of the Origins of Hegel f s Philosophy
of Religion . Unpublished Harvard University theeie, 1910.
Michelet, Carl Ludwig, Hegel und der Emplrlsmus . Berlin: Nicolaische
Buchhandlung, 1875.
Metske, Erwin, Earl Rosenkrang und Hegel . Leipzig: Wilhelm Helms, 1929.
Moog, Willy, Hegel und die Hegelsene Schule . Mflnchen: E. Reinhardt, 1950.
Prsywara, Erich, "Thomas Oder Hegel?" Logos . 15 (1926), pp. 1-20.
tI
(
Reese* Heinrich. Hegel fiber dai Atiftreten der chrletliehen Religion in
der Weltgeachlehte . Tubingen: Mohr, 1909.
Ritchie, David G. , ••Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers." Mind .
NS 8 (1899), pp. 1-24.
, "Hegel's Early Studies a Correction."* Mind . NS 8 (1899),
p. 568.
Roques, P., Hegel , sa vie et see oeuvres . Paris: Alcan, 1912.
Hosenkrans, Karl, Gcorg Wilhelm Prledrlch Hegel s Leben . Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 1844.
, Apologle Hegel e gegen Dr. R. Haym. Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1858.
Schubert, Johannes, "Hegels Gottesbegriff ."* Zelt . f. Phil , u. phil .
Krit., 154 (1909), pp. 166-210.
Seth (Pringle-Pattison), Andrew, "Hegel: An Exposition and Criticism."
Mind . 6 (1881), pp. 515-530.
Tillich, Paul, "Die tTberwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religions-
philosophic." Kant-Stadien , 27 (1922), pp. 446-469.
Troeltsch, Ernst, "Zur Religionsphilosophie."* Kant-Studlen . 23 (1919),
pp. 64-76.
, "Meine Bttcher."* In Die dentsche Philosophic der Gegenwart
in Selbstdar8tellungen . Leipsig: Meiner, 1921. Pp. 161-175.
Ulrici, Hermann, "Der Begriff des Unendlichen und sein VerhSltniss sum
Theismus und Pantheismus." Zelt . £. Phil , u. nhll . Krit . . 22 (1855),
pp. 82-115.
Wallace, William, Introduction to The Logic of Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon,
1892. Pp. ix-xxvi.
1 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel * s Philosophy and Es-
pecially of His Logic . 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1894.
Weisse, Christian F., "Die philosophische Literatur der Gegenwart.
1. Artikel: Schleiermacher, Hegel, Steffens." Zelt . £. Phil , u.





ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS AND ENCYCLOPAEDIAS CITED
Arch , f. Geach. d. Phil.:




Hlhh . Jour .
:




Theol. Stud , u. Krit .
:
Zelt
. f. Phil , u. phil . Krit .:
Zelt . f. Phil , u. epek . Theol .
ArehlT fllr Geechlchte der Philoaophle .
Archiv fttr eystematieche Philosophic
.
Deutsche VIert el Jahrs achr i ft fttr Litera-
turwi s 8enechaft und Ceisteegeachichte .








Theol ogieche Studien und Krltiken .
Zeltachrlft fttr Philoeophie und phllo-
Bophische Krltik .
Zeitachrift fttr Philoeophie und specu-
lative Theol ogie .
tt
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
Sylvester Paul Schilling, son of Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester Schilling,
was born in Cumberland, Maryland on February 7, 1904. He received his
early education in the public schools of Cumberland and graduated from
the Allegany High School in 1919. He
then entered Saint John's College at
Annapolis, being graduated in 1925
with the degree of B.S. During the
following year he taught English in
Allegany High School, Cumberland, and
in the year 1924-1925, English and
French in Millersburg Military Insti-
tute, Millersburg, Kentucky.
In the fall of 1925 Mr. Schilling
became a graduate student in Boston
University, studying one year in the
School of Beligious Education and three
years in the School of Theology. In
1927 he received the A.M. degree and in
1929 the degree of S.T.B. , summa cum
laude. In 1929 he was awarded the
Frank D. Howard Fellowship by the School
of Theology, and elected a Fellow of
the National Council on Religion in
Higher Education. As a candidate for
the degree of Ph.D. in philosophy of
religion, he continued his study during the years 1929-1930 and 1931-
1932 in Boston University and Harvard, and in the year 1930-1931 in the
University of Berlin.
Mr. Schilling was ordained elder in the Methodist Episcopal Church
on June 1, 1930. On June 18 of the same year he married Miss Mary Al-
bright, of Piedmont, West Virginia.
From 1932 to 1933 he was pastor of the Methodist Episcopal church-
es at Vienna and Oakton, Virginia. He is now associate minister of the







j also j i Joipsno 'snepy
9681 'SI "AON d3J.N3LI.Vd
3|qtsj3A3^j ajqnoQ

